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Abstract 
In this thesis, I have assessed the impact free competition has on the productivity, costs and 
environmental footprint of the chemical tanker freight market. My impression is, after an 
extensive dialogue with participants of this market, that there is a general belief that a 
consolidation between operators in the market, would allow for a more sensible allocation of 
cargo, and therefore a more productive use of vessels, as well as a reduced environmental 
footprint. By comparing the current market situation under free competition with a simulated 
regulated market under a central planner, using the same input data in the two scenarios, I was 
able to complete a comparative study examining productivity measures (utilization of vessels 
and port congestion), changes in cost, and changes in CO2 emissions. Thus, I could ascribe 
the observed differences to the incorporation of market regulation, as this was the single 
factor differentiating the two. The simulation of a central planner and the following 
observations were that utilization of vessels increased, and port congestion, voyage costs and 
overall environmental footprint decreased under market regulation. In other words, free 
competition did in fact, based on this assessment, contribute to neither optimal use of vessels 
nor the lowest possible environmental footprint. However, when that is said, I also shortly 
evaluated who the beneficiaries of market regulation would be, and examined crucial 
challenges of implementing a central planner. Though the challenges are many and certainly 
cause for further research, the most predominant and vital challenge is that of setting the 
correct freight rate in a non-competitive setting. Assuming that it is possible in an efficient 
manner to achieve a correct price under market regulation, both ship operator and customers 
would reap benefits, as free competition in this case, does not cause for the optimal use of 
vessels and the lowest environmental footprint.   
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1. Introduction 
After a continuing dialogue with members of the chemical tanker market as a part of the 
process of determining a research question for this thesis, I gained an impression that there is 
a general belief in the market that a consolidation between operators will allow for a more 
sensible distribution of cargo, and therefore a more productive use of vessels, in addition to 
reducing the industries environmental footprint. To determine whether there is truth to this 
idea, I have in this paper assessed the impact free competition has on the productivity, costs 
and the environmental footprint of the chemical tanker freight market. More specifically, the 
idea amongst operators is that using a central authority to consolidate in terms of cargo 
allocation will increase efficiency. As indicated by Triton Partners, a fairly new market 
player, there are advantages in operating larger fleets. Operating large fleets makes it is easier 
to minimize the number of vessel voyages carrying little to no cargo (Wright 2012), in other 
words increasing utilization. Further he indicates that being able to control more ships, you 
have the capability to co-ordinate the logistics part of operations more efficiently (ibid.).  
 
Inefficiencies are also indicated to be a result of port congestion, due to the large number of 
vessels berthing at the same ports. Carriers in short sea shipping spends about 40% of their 
time either servicing cargos or waiting at anchorage (Jetlund and Karimi 2003). Odfjell 
vessels are indicating to be spending 44% of their available time in port (Walderhaug, 2013). 
By comparing the current market situation under free competition with a simulated regulated 
market under a central planner with the ability to redistribute cargo, I will attempt to 
determine whether free competition in the global chemical tanker market causes for the 
optimal use of vessels and the lowest environmental footprint. 
 
In order to underpin this assessment I begin by introducing the chemical tanker market´s 
different fragments, actors and mechanisms in chapter 2 and 3. Following this, in chapter 4 I 
give an overview of some of the theoretical frameworks of shipping economics that will be 
useful for my assessment, as well as a presentation of the model I use in order to solve the 
scheduling problem of a simulated central planner. In chapter 5 I present the method by which 
I attempt to compare the two scenarios in addition to the parameters of which the comparison 
is based. Finally in chapter 6, I introduce the comparable estimates of the parameters for both 
scenarios. I then attempt to compare and analyze these estimates in order to draw some final 
conclusions in chapter 7.   
	   7	  
2. The Chemical Tanker Market 
 
Shipping in general is a broad industry defined as the transportation of commodities by sea. It 
is said that ocean going ships are the blood vessels of international trade and facilitate the 
expansion of the global economy, in other words shipping plays a crucial part of the global 
society (Christiansen, Fagerholt and Nygreen, et al. 2007). Due to the very different nature of 
commodities traded, one may divide shipping into different sub-industries or niches like for 
instance container shipping, liner shipping, bulk shipping, LNG shipping, chemicals shipping 
and so on. Each of these segments is characterized by many similarities as well as several 
crucial differences. The chemical tanker market is defined as the market for transportation of 
bulk liquid chemicals by sea (Østensjø 1992). A market is defined in the Oxford Dictionary 
(2010) as a regular gathering of people for the purchase and sale of provisions, livestock, and 
other commodities. In my case the market is a gathering of suppliers and buyers of the 
commodity “chemical shipping transport”. In order to address my research question, it is 
crucial to have an underlying understanding of what the chemical tanker market consist of and 
further how it operates. In this section I identify the different market players and their role in 
the market.  
 
2.1 Demand 
2.1.1	  The	  Buyers	  
In a market, the buyer is the player that requests a certain commodity (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 
2009). In other words, they represent the demand side of the market. Simply put, the buyer is 
anyone requiring the transport of liquid chemicals from one specific port to another.  
 
Customers of chemical transport are most commonly divided into four main categories, 
manufacturers, receivers, trading companies and distributors (Walderhaug and Hammer 
2007). Manufacturing companies produce a specific commodity and sell it under their own 
name. If the manufacturing company pays for the transportation of the good, the manufacturer 
is the demander of chemical shipping. In the same situation, if the receiver of the specific 
commodity pays for the transportation, the receiver is the demander of chemical shipping.  
Chemical transportation is also often requested by trading companies who speculate in 
chemical prices therefore buying and re-selling commodities before, after and often while in 
transportation. In contrast to trading companies, distributers often buy large volumes of 
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chemicals and redistribute it to many smaller buyers through shipping. In addition to 
transportation, distributers often require storage of their products at terminals (ibid.). 
 
As one can see there is a large variation in the types and size of companies demanding 
chemical transportation. Buyers can be anyone from large companies like Shell Chemicals 
and Exxon Chemicals to independent market speculators buying and selling liquid chemicals 
wishing to make a margin off a product. On a global basis there are several hundred 
companies involved in buying chemical transportation, thus representing the demand side of 
the market (Walderhaug and Hammer 2007). 
 
2.1.2	  The	  Cargo	  
In order to understand the niche of chemicals shipping one must understand the nature of the 
commodities that are in demand of transportation. This is of importance because they affect, 
understandably the design of vessel that is used in transportation, but also the way the market 
interaction works, which I return to when describing market mechanisms in section 3.1. 
Liquid chemicals transported by freight are most commonly divided into four main product 
groups: organic chemicals, inorganic chemicals, vegetable/animal oils and fats, and molasses 
(Østensjø 1992). Organic chemicals are the largest segment, representing chemicals such as 
methanol, xylene and ethylene glycol. In 2008, 48% of chemical seaborne trade consisted of 
organic chemicals (Drewery Shipping Consultants 2009). Inorganic chemicals include among 
others, sulfuric acid, caustic soda and phosphoric acid, and stood for 17.5% of the trade in 
2008. Vegetable and animal oils and fats counted for 26.8% of the trade in the market and 
involve transport of for example palm oil, soybean oil and rapeseed oil. Molasses is the 
smallest segment of chemical transport and involve the transport of molasses cane, base oils 
and molasses beet sugar (ibid.). In addition to these segments chemical tankers are also used 
for transport of special products such as lube oil, lube oil additives, alcohols as well as clean 
petroleum products like for instance jet fuel, paraffin, gasoline or naphtha (Walderhaug and 
Hammer 2007). 
 
Chemical commodities such as these, all have different characteristics. Some may be reactive 
towards other commodities, causing a risk of spoiling the product or worse, safety hazards if 
not handled correctly. Also some of these products might need to be handled at a certain 
temperatures in order for it to maintain its liquid state necessary for shipment. In addition to 
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the general security regulations put forth by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), 
the customer might also have additional handling requirements of its products, in order to 
maintain quality and quantity (Walderhaug and Hammer 2007). For example they might not 
allow the product to be moved from one tank to another more than twice (loading and 
discharge), making for instance transshipment difficult. Also the global focus on 
environmental issues in later years has increased the demand for stricter regulations with 
regards to the operation of chemical tankers. All these considerations make up a very complex 
and specialized transportation market specific for chemical tankers (ibid.).  
 
2.2 Supply 
Now that we have an idea of what makes up the demand side of the market I shift our focus to 
introducing the supply side. In order to supply transportation of a commodity by sea one must 
be in possession of a ship or a vessel. In shipping, vessels come in many shapes and sizes 
depending on the intended use (Stopford 1988). Dry bulkers, container vessels, tankers and 
specialized carriers are all examples of different ship categories, where each category has 
different variations of sizes as well as functionality areas. In the transportation of liquid 
chemicals, various sizes and types of tankers make up the supply (ibid.).  
 
2.2.1	  Chemical	  Tanker	  Vessels	  
Historically the first chemical tankers were introduced in the late 1950´s when there was a 
growth in chemical demand together with an expansion of the petrochemical industry 
(Østensjø 1992). Tankers for petroleum products built during the Second World War were 
converted into the first chemical tankers. The first ship owners were already in the oil trade 
and offered primarily short sea transport from the oil nations in the Middle East by the Suez 
Canal.  The cost of converting of vessels was quite low and there were therefore many ship 
owners willing to invest. When refineries were set up closer to the consumer, the demand for 
transport increased creating a global market. During the 1960´s the first specially designed 
chemical tankers were developed opening up for a wider range of cargos to be carried at the 
same time (ibid.). 
 
A tanker is defined as a sea going vessel fitted with tanks for carrying oil or other liquids in 
bulk (Encyclopædia Britannica Inc. 2013).  Common tankers descending according to size 
are: Ultra large crude carriers (ULCCs) with a capacity of 320 000 to more than 550 000 
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dwt., Very large crude carriers (VLCCs) with capacities between 200 000 and 320 000 dwt., 
Suezmax with the capacity of 120 000 to 200 000 dwt., Aframax with capacities of 80 000 to 
120 000 dwt., Panamax with capacities of 50 000 to 80 000 dwt., and Handymax, Handysize, 
Coastal, and other classes. These final vessels have capacities of less than 50 000 dwt., 
however some can be as small as a few thousand dwt., with lengths up to approximately 200 
meters. These vessels represent the size of vessels operating in the chemical tanker market 
carrying liquid chemicals (ibid). 
 
Today there are several types of chemical tankers dependent on their size as well as their 
ability to carry specific chemicals or for instance several chemicals simultaneously. Chemical 
tankers generally can be divided into five categories; parcel tankers, chemical carriers, 
solvents carriers, specialized chemical tankers and molten sulphur carriers (Stopford 1988). 
Most chemical tankers are parcel tankers. A parcel tanker is a vessel designed to carry 
different liquids in separate piping and tanks as illustrated in figure 2.1 below. 
 
Figure 2.1: Chemical Parcel Tanker (Frydenbø Marine 2008) 
 
One might also distinguish between deep-sea tankers and short-sea tankers, where deep-sea 
tankers are larger and are used for the longer distance trade lanes, while the short-sea tankers 
are smaller and service mostly coastal areas (Stopford 1988). A chemical tanker overall is 
often defined as IMO I and IMO II tankers, with stainless steel, zinc, epoxy, or marineline 
coated tanks. If one does not distinguish between parcel and chemical tankers, the chemical 
global fleet consists of 2 700 vessels of totally 47 million dwt. (Rex, et al. 2012). 
 
As mentioned above the commodities carried by these vessels have many different 
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characteristics and are therefore subject to many restrictions and regulations with respect to 
how they can be transported. A restriction mandatory for all chemical tankers is to have a 
double hull. In 1992 MARPOL was amended to make it mandatory for tankers of 5 000 dwt 
or more, ordered after July 6th 1993, to be fitted with double hulls (IMO 2013). The hull of a 
vessel is the body or shell. Requiring a double hull implies that the vessel must have two 
shells separating the commodities from the water. In 1995 a program was started to also 
include ships built before 1993. The program implied that all tankers would have to be 
converted or taken out of service when they reached up to 30 years of age. This measure was 
phased in over a number of years in order to avoid causing a disruption in world trade and 
industry. However due to the Erika catastrophe off the coast of France in December 1999, 
IMO Member States eventually decided to speed up the out-phasing of single hull vessels, 
and as a result most tankers today have a double hull (ibid.). 
 
There are many different restrictions as to how one can carry chemicals, implemented by the 
IMO that effect vessel design and system complexity. Tankers as a result of this are some of 
the most technologically complex vessels in global shipping (Walderhaug and Hammer 
2007). Products to be carried in bulk must be carefully considered with regards to their 
compatibility with other cargoes being carried and with the various tank coatings. Other 
necessary considerations are the method of containment, their heating requirements, pumping 
arrangements, tank cleaning procedures, etc. Chemical cargo tankers are constructed from 
either mild steel or stainless steel where the mild steel tankers are further coated with a 
protective covering. There are many different coatings offered in the market due to the large 
amount of mild steel tankers in the global fleet (ibid.). Examples of coatings are phenolic 
epoxy or zinc paint. Some cargoes require stainless steel due to their extreme corroding 
nature. Stainless steel containers have high initial costs and are therefore not offered by all 
operators (Østensjø 1992).  
 
A vessels cargo system includes the tank compartments, pumping system, piping, venting 
system, cargo monitoring systems, environmental control systems and tank cleaning systems. 
The IBC code provides four types of cargo tanks: independent, integral, gravity and pressure 
tanks (Escola Superior Na ́utica Infante D. Henrique 2011). An independent tank´s boundaries 
are not part of the hull structure and therefore do not contribute to the structural strength of 
the vessel. These tanks are designed to eliminate the transfer of stress from the vessels 
structure to the tank structure and typically are deck tanks. An integral tank is formed by the 
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hull structure by dividing the hull into several compartments creating the individual integral 
tanks. Integral tanks are the most common type of tank used on chemical tankers. Gravity 
tanks are either independent or integral tanks designed for a maximum pressure of 0.7 bar 
gauge at the top of the tank. Pressure tanks are designed for pressure greater than 0.7 bar 
gauge and are uncommon in chemical tankers (ibid). 
 
The piping system that allows for the tanks to be loaded and discharges can be shared, 
however on modern chemical tankers it is more common to have completely segregated 
piping to each tank (Escola Superior Na ́utica Infante D. Henrique 2011).  This makes it 
possible to service a larger range of commodities simultaneously. In a segregated system each 
tank is equipped with a deep-well pump and its own pipe system, completely segregating 
commodities. The tanks are also equipped with a tank cleaning system. After discharging a 
commodity, the tank must be prepared for the next cargo. The system by which this is done 
varies greatly according to the size, shape and material of the tank.  Although not officially 
defined, there are two main washing standards, the “Water White” standard and the “High 
Purity” standard. The “Water White” standard leaves the tank clean, dry and odor free. The 
“High Purity” however is required when contamination of the cargo may lead to spoliation of 
the product or large safety risks. The customer might then also require the tank to be tested 
and approved before loading (ibid.). 
 
2.2.2	  New	  Building	  and	  Scrapping	  
Ship owners acquire chemical tankers either through the contracting of one or a series of new 
buildings or by the purchase of one or several vessels in the second hand market (Stopford 
1988). When new buildings are delivered, the global fleet or supply increases, likewise when 
a tanker is scrapped, the global fleet or supply decreases. The growth rate of supply in the 
chemical tanker market can therefore be determined by the balance between deliveries and 
scrapping of chemical tankers in the market (ibid.). 
 
In a shipping market review delivered by Danish Skibskredit in October (2012), the chemical 
tanker fleet was expected to grow only 3% in 2012. Deliveries were at the lowest level in ten 
years, as a result of cancelations, only 49% of the expected deliveries actually were delivered. 
About 40% of the vessels delivered were highly specialized chemical tankers with either 
stainless steel or marineline coated tanks. The remaining 60% were vessels with less 
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sophisticated tanks, coated either with zinc or epoxy. Scrapping activity remained fairly high 
compared to previous years. During the first eight months of 2012 scrapping amounted to 0.5 
million dwt. with an average scrapping age of 27 years (Rex, et al. 2012). 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Annual Fleet Growths 2008-2012 (Rex, et al. 2012).  
 
As shown in figure 2.2 above, there is a clear reduction of fleet growth over the last couple 
years. This reduction can possibly be ascribed to the downfall of the global trade following 
the financial crisis, thus the fall in chemicals shipping demand and as a result thereof reduced 
fleet expansion (Rex, et al. 2012). 
 
2.2.3	  Vessel	  Emissions	  
Today’s global society has an increased focus on environmental issues due to the fear of 
global warming and the predictions of its consequences (Psaraftis and Kontovas 2009). 
Dreading these consequences of increasing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the global 
community is constantly driving to address the problem in a more formal manner. According 
to the Kyoto protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change –
UNFCCC (1997), reduction of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions are necessary in order to curb 
the projected growth of GHG worldwide. CO2 is the most prevalent of the GHGs and it is 
obvious therefore, that any set of measures to reduce GHG primarily should focus on CO2 
emissions reductions. Shipping has so far not been included in the Kyoto global emissions 
reduction target for CO2 and other GHG emissions. The seemingly recent high sense of 
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urgency on this matter on the other hand will probably lead to an incorporation of global 
shipping in the near future (ibid.). 
 
Today, international shipping stands for approximately 2.7% of global CO2 emissions (figure 
2.3) according to a study presented by Øyvind Buhaug at the “Seas at Risk Annual 
Conference” in Brussels in 2008. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Global CO2 Emissions (Buhaug 2008) 
 
	  
Figure	  2.4:	  CO2	  Emission	  from	  Global	  Commercial	  Shipping	  (Buhaug	  2008)	  
 
Further it is determined that tanker vessels account for a significant share of this portion, see 
figure 2.4 above. One might further discuss whether port congestion for chemical tankers due 
to the large number of berth calls per vessel, might be contributing to this relatively large 
share of international shipping emissions.  Psaraftis and Kontovas (2009) discover in their 
analysis that by changing the capacity utilization of a tanker, the CO2 emissions uniformly 
responded, telling us that an increase in utilization leads to a decrease in emissions. Their 
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estimated utilization of tankers was approximately 50% compared to 70% for container 
vessels. Based on their findings one might assume that an increase in productivity will reduce 
the environmental footprint of the chemical tankers. 
 
2.2.4	  The	  Ship	  Operator	  
 
Going back to the initial definition of a market, which is a gathering of people for the 
purchase and sale of commodities, we can ask: who are the suppliers of chemical transport by 
sea? Behind each chemical tanker there is an owner or ship operator who make their vessels 
available to the market or in other words, offer the market the “product”, chemical transport 
by sea.  
 
In the 1960´s Norwegian ship owners dominated the market with vessels primarily under US, 
British and Norwegian flags (Østensjø 1992). The main players were from strong and 
historically grounded ship owning families like Stolt Nielsen, led by Jacob Stolt Nielsen, 
Odfjell who had been engaged in international shipping since 1914 and Anco Tanker Service, 
a coalition between Norwegians and the British after WW2. During the 70´s and early 80´s 
the growth was less rapid than expected due to the excess supply creating poor returns. 
Regulations of the vessels with regard to how chemicals were to be handled also caused an 
increase in new building during this period. There was a tendency towards building larger 
chemical tankers. Due to these conditions several of the ship owners struggled. Stolt-Nielsen 
experienced financial problems early in this period and was granted a loan by the American 
BP injecting capital to become 50% owner, thus causing the company to move from Oslo to 
the US. The Odfjell family restructured the company dividing into JO Odfjell/Johnsen and 
Odfjell. The latter continued the joint venture with Westfal Larsen, also a Bergen based 
company. Newer actors like Mowinckels and PanOcean-Anco left the market during this 
period leaving their fleets to be handed over to other competitors like for instance Stolt-
Nielsen. In the late 80´s early 90´s there was a new increase of the fleet size, with an increase 
in capacity in tonnage of 85%. This growth eliminated to some extent the effect of the 
expansion of trade in the same period, causing worsened freight rates and employment. Due 
to these difficult times the market again saw that there was a tendency for concentration by 
which the strongest actors acquired smaller companies (ibid.). 
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As of today the main ship operators in the deep-sea chemical freight market are still the 
Odfjell and Stolt-families with a total market share of approximately 30%. Other operators are 
Tokyo Marine, Navig8 Chemicals, MISC and so on, with fairly small market shares.  These 
estimates are based on the global fleet of suppliers operating mainly in chemical freight, deep-
sea shipping comprised of vessels with IMO II capacity for the entire vessel, or at least the 
center tanks. In addition the vessels must have minimum 6 tanks with an average tank size of 
maximum 3000 cbm or minimum 50% stainless steel tank capacity. 
   
Table	  2.1	  Overview	  of	  Ship	  operators	  in	  the	  Chemical	  Tanker	  Market	  as	  of	  March	  2013	  (Walderhaug	  2013)	  
  
Current fleet 
 
 
# '000 Dwt %  
Odfjell 79 2,574 16.4  
Stolt-Nielsen 60 2,024 12.9  
Total big two 139 4,599 29.4  
Fairfield/Iino 50 1,311 8.4  
Tokyo Marine 39 1,016 6.5  
Navig8 Chemicals 45 840 5.4  
MISC 26 831 5.3  
Eitzen 26 688 4.4  
Nordic Tankers 36 653 4.2  
IMC/Aurora 16 617 3.9  
BLT/Chembulk 21 523 3.3  
Westchart 10 450 2.9  
Dorval/Sinochem 23 400 2.6  
Others 196 3,730 23.8  
Total fleet 627 15,656    
  
Looking briefly at this overview of chemical tanker suppliers and their corresponding market 
shares (table 2.1), one can see that close to one third of the market is supplied by smaller 
operators categorized as “others”. This indicates that the chemical tanker market today is 
characterized by having a large number of small suppliers in addition to the historically 
grounded larger market players. This is in contrast to the high market concentration with only 
a few suppliers seen in the past.  
 
2.3 Ports  
The ports play a crucial role for any shipping segment, also for chemical shipping as they 
represent an important element of an extended supply chain (Stopford 1988).  Primarily the 
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role can include the facilitation of loading and unloading vessels, storage, freight handling, 
and transportation to or from the hinterland. Port activities are in other words seemingly 
heterogeneous products involving different actors (ibid.). Depending on the shipping segment 
in which one operates, for instance liner service or tramp shipping, the role of the port as well 
as the activities provided differ. In liner shipping, which I return to in section 3.2, the ship 
owner operates within a schedule and has fixed port rotations, while in tramp shipping the 
vessel has no fixed route and can theoretically therefore give notice of readiness and proceed 
to berth at any port in order to pick up a charter (Jetlund and Karimi 2003). In chemicals 
shipping, the ship owner operates his or her vessels with contracts as well as spot charters, cf. 
section 3.1. The contracts specify certain ports that must be called, however additional 
capacity is chartered in the spot market making port rotation unique and often unpredictable 
(ibid.).  
 
The main activity at port is of course the loading and/or discharging of cargos to/from the 
chemical tanker (Stopford 1988). The procedure associated hereto varies from port to port. 
When a chemical tanker is approaching a port, the vessel first typically sends a notice of 
arrival to the port master. The port master or harbormaster is an officer with responsibility to 
execute the regulation of a port or harbor (Oxford Dictionary of English 2010). The 
authorities at the port in Singapore for example, require notifications latest 12 hours before a 
vessel´s arrival, and if the vessel is carrying hazardous cargo, they require the notification of 
arrival 24 hours in advance (Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore 2008). When the 
vessel is within the port operational area a second notification is reported to the port master 
called the conformation of arrival. The vessel then typically gives a specific notice to berth 
according to an intended rotation plan. However due to port congestion the berth might not 
always be available, the vessel is then typically ordered to wait or change the rotation plan. 
According to Jetlund and Karimi (2003) port delays are significant, as carriers in short-sea 
operation spend about 40% of their time in ports, either handling cargos or waiting at 
anchorage. The method of which a port handle port operations and costs varies, some might 
operate with contracts where one pays for a specific slot in advance, however most commonly 
ports facilitate vessels at a first come first serve basis. This is considered an inefficient 
method due to the fact that it disregards the differences in waiting costs. After a vessel has 
given notice of arrival there is normally a six-hour free waiting period before the vessels 
agreed laytime begins to run, regardless as to whether or not the vessel still is waiting for 
anchorage. The laytime is the amount of time the vessel uses to load and/or discharge the 
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cargo required at berth (Oxford Dictionary of English 2010). All time used in addition to the 
pre-negotiated laytime, is charged the customer by the ship owner, and however is possible to 
negotiate. The extra charge is called demurrage and is defined as the amount payable to the 
owner of a chartered ship on failure to load or discharge the ship within the time agreed 
(Oxford Dictionary of English 2010). Odfjell alone collected approximately 60 million USD 
in demurrage in the coarse of 2012 indicating that chemical tankers spend a considerable 
amount of time waiting in ports (Walderhaug 2013). They have estimated that their vessels 
spend approximately 44% of their service time in port, 25% of this, presentably 10% of total 
available time, represents waiting for berths (ibid.).  
 
When a chemical tanker has berthed, the applicable cargo is to be loaded or discharged. As 
mentioned above, chemical tankers are equipped with a complex piping system that makes it 
possible to discharge or load essentially all tanks simultaneously. This is done simply by 
connecting the ports pipe system (normally a hose) to the specific outlet of the tank one 
wishes to load or discharge followed by starting the pumps. Cargo is then transferred through 
this piping system, typically to storage tanks where the customer can further distribute the 
commodity to the hinterland. The possibility of storage is typical for chemicals transport and 
is therefore why one might refer to these complete port facilities as terminals. Other port 
activities may include vessel maintenance, classification inspections, and so on.  
 
The pricing of port activities is done differently from port to port. No two ports are similar. 
Typically port pricing differentiates according to vessel type and destination, location of 
operations in the port territory, processing time and season. The fact that these points of 
differentiation do not reflect actual cost incurred under port operations causes severe 
inefficiency at port. In an article by Strandenes (2004) alternative pricing methods are 
researched as a method to reduce port congestion.  Traditional port pricing is typically 
characterized by lack of transparency, favoring regional and coastal shipping, favoring 
exports and differentiated cargo charges (ibid.). In addition to this, the lack of expansion of 
ports compared to the increase in port demand from an expanding Asian economy is 
considered to cause additional port congestion (CEMT/ITF 2007).   
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3. Market Mechanisms 
Now that I have established the elements involved in the chemical tanker market it might be 
appropriate to further introduce how the market works, the market mechanisms, which 
essentially means the interactions between supply, demand and price that determine the 
reallocation of resources and again quantity of transport supplied (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 
2009). 
 
3.1 Chartering 
When buyers and sellers meet in the market, they negotiate price and terms for transportation 
of a specific commodity. The purchase of transportation of liquid chemicals by sea is 
negotiated and purchased predominately through spot chartering, entering into contracts of 
affreightment or by time chartering one or several ships (Stopford 1988). 
 
3.1.1	  Spot	  market	  
The spot market is comprised of single voyage charters for the transportation of one or a 
combination of cargos (Walderhaug and Hammer 2007). The price of transportation of a 
specific cargo from one point to another is called the spot freight rate. The freight rate is 
determined based on the interaction between the supplier’s marginal cost and the demander’s 
willingness to pay. The buyer expresses a demand for a specific charter and the ship owner 
then follows by tendering an offer. The best offer normally wins the charter. According to 
Norman (1980) the tanker market is a highly efficient.  The spot market is often used in order 
to reap the benefits of short-term arbitrage possibilities, to secure competitive freight rates in 
booming markets or to postpone the locking of contract freight rates in low markets 
(Walderhaug and Hammer 2007).  
 
3.1.2	  Contract	  of	  Affreightment	  
A contract of affreightment (COA) is an agreement between a charterer and a ship owner for 
the transportation of one or several commodities over a period of time (Østensjø 1992). COAs 
are typically entered into for 12 or 24 months at a time and account for about 50% of all bulk 
liquid chemical transport worldwide. Like in the spot market, COAs are negotiated and 
tendered between the buyer and ship owner. In many ways one can consider COAs as a series 
of spot charters with built in flexible terms (ibid.). 
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A COA often guaranties the quantity of cargo to be transported during a specific period of 
time between certain ports (Walderhaug and Hammer 2007). There are however limitations as 
to minimum and maximum quantity as well as the number of parcels per lifting. In chemical 
shipping these contracts binds the ship owner for having to make vessels available for a 
customer in cycles. Most commonly the contracts involve having a vessel available once a 
month due to the customers wish to adapt according to changes in chemical prices. COAs in 
which the volume is not guaranteed are called requirement contracts. The COA is beneficial 
for the charterer as it secures the transportation of his or her commodity from a known and 
perhaps trusted source. In a longer production chain the contract, contrary to the spot market, 
might provide savings in time as well as overall costs. The ship owner secures employment of 
his or her vessel over a period of time through these contracts and is therefore able to reduce 
market exposure (ibid.). 
 
3.1.3	  Time	  Charter	  
It is also possible for a customer to charter a vessel on a time charter basis (Stopford 1988). 
Under a time charter the owner still manages the vessel, but the charterer selects the ports and 
directs the vessel where to go. The charterer covers all voyage specific costs and pays a daily 
hire to the owner of the vessel. A charterer may wish to do this because they can justify the 
need for the entire capacity of a vessel, or in order to keep a closer quality control due to 
special product requirements or for example to reduce the risk of untimely delivery. However 
there are disadvantages in the fact that the vessels voyage costs in this case would not be split 
on several charterers as well as limiting flexibility with regards to reaping the benefits in 
periods where there otherwise are low freight rates (ibid.). 
 
3.1.4	  Bill	  of	  lading	  
When traders buy and sell commodities in the market the ownership of the commodity 
changes frequently, also when under shipment. The owner of the commodity while under 
shipment is the person holding the bill of lading. The bill of lading is a receipt for goods 
delivered to and received by a ship, signed by the person who contracts to carry them, or his 
agent, and evidencing the terms of contracted of carriage under which the goods have been 
delivered and received (Burden, Barlow and Barlow 1992). During the period of transit and 
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voyage, the bill of lading is recognized as the symbol of the goods described in it, and the 
endorsement and delivery of the bill of lading operates as a symbolic delivery of the goods. 
This allows for market speculators to buy or sell cargo while in transit by handing over the 
bill of lading. Hence s.1 of the Bills of Lading Act 1855 provides that an endorsee or 
consignee of such a bill of lading "... shall have transferred to and vested in him all rights of 
suit, and be subject to the same liabilities in respect of such goods as if the contract contained 
in the bill of lading had been made with himself". A bill of lading is in other words a 
combination of a receipt for the goods, evidence of the terms of the contract of carriage, and a 
document of title (ibid.). 
 
The method of which a customer wishes to charter its cargo is therefore based on the “type” 
of customer and his or her specific needs. Generally speaking, the spot market is typical for 
customers demanding single voyage transportation; the COAs are typical for customers with 
continuing needs for transportation over time, often to and from the same ports, while the 
time charter is common for larger customers with the need for closer quality control. Finally, 
the bill of lading, as part of all charter agreements is considered a tool often used by market 
speculators in order to buy and sell commodities while still in transit. 
 
3.2 Ship owner’s operational motivation (Supply) 
The shipping industry is often categorized into three main segments based on their mode of 
operation, liner, industrial or tramp shipping (Stopford 1988). Liner shipping involves vessels 
following a fixed route according to a public schedule. A liner operator, like an operator of 
container ships, wishes to operate its vessels so to maximize the earnings. Liner shipping can 
be compared to a bus service in the sense that it follows a given route according to a given 
schedule, at a speed and with a vessel that maximizes profit (Jetlund and Karimi 2003). Like 
there are frequent departures at busy bus stations, there are frequent departures from busy 
liner terminals (ibid.).  
 
Industrial shipping is when the ship operator owns the vessel, as well as the cargo and 
operates with an intention to minimize costs within their extended supply chain. The quantity 
supplied, in other words the number of vessels, therefore reflects the exact amount necessary 
in order to meet their own demand (Stopford 1988).  
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Tramp shipping on the other hand, is when the ship owner or operator offers them vessels 
with available cargo capacity in order to maximize the earnings (Stopford 1988). Tramp 
shipping is often compared to a taxi service by the fact that nobody operates with a fixed 
schedule or route, but elects the passengers to be serviced based on their contribution to the 
marginal profit, which often is determined based on how a particular passengers requested 
route fits in with the place where the taxi is going or coming from (Jetlund and Karimi 2003). 
The chemical tanker market is as mentioned a form of tramp shipping. The ship owner in 
tramp shipping considers taking cargos like the taxi driver considers passengers. How will 
serving this customer increase the marginal profit? However unlike taxies, chemical tankers 
can carry several cargoes from different customers simultaneously. In chemical shipping the 
cargo sizes are small and a combination of several customers cargoes are often necessary to 
fill a single vessel. The market therefore rests on the concept that you can combine customer’s 
cargo on the same vessel and the same voyage. This is also in contrast to the general tanker 
and bulk market where one often fills the entire vessel with a single cargo. In chemical 
shipping the ship owner first commits a vessel to the customers with existing COAs. The 
remaining capacity is filled using the spot market. The ship owner therefore has a set of 
commitments by which the vessel must call, and evaluates all additional cargos with 
consideration to these limitations. Each new cargo added in addition to the COAs, is a 
marginal consideration. For instance if a ship owner has nominated vessel A to commit to a 
set of contracts that give him the obligation to call certain berths in Houston, Freeport and 
Corpus Christy before proceeding, his additional cargo capacity can then be filled by spot 
cargos for charterers from this area with the motivation of increasing vessel A´s marginal 
profit. In many ways one can compare this type of operations to selling Christmas trees, 
where all spaces or capacity has to be sold before a given date. All Christmas trees must be 
sold before Christmas Eve, like all tank capacity must be chartered before the vessels sets sail 
for its final destination (Walderhaug and Hammer 2007).    
 
3.2.1	  Drivers	  of	  supply	  
Market supply is the number of vessels available and their aggregated capacity to transport 
cargo. The number of vessels owned or controlled by the various operators is given by the 
costs connected to operating the vessel as well as the level of demand for capacity in the 
market. Contracting of new buildings for the first eight months of 2012 was historically low 
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with only five contracts signed during this period (Rex, et al. 2012). Ship owners decide to 
adjust their fleet size when they are confident that additional unit of capacity can be utilized to 
increase revenue from the freight market, as lay up of vessels are costly (Lun, et al. 2013). 
One might therefore conclude that the factor market and freight market are heavily interlinked 
where seaborne trade and freight rates affect the number of ships provided.  
 
An updated table of the historical development of the chemical tanker fleet is presented in 
table 3.1 below. As can be seen, the global chemical fleet in total grew 4.4% in 2012. This 
represents a contrast to the high growth rates in the years 2004-2010 of around 14%. This 
might be explained by high demand in the market prior to the financial crisis (see figure 3.1). 
Ship owners expectations to continuing high freight rates might explain the high number of 
new buildings that were delivered in the following years causing a considerably increase in 
the global fleet in the period 2004-2010. A drop in demand as a result of the financial crisis in 
2008/09 (see figure 3.1) lead to the more recent low growth rates as new buildings were rarely 
contracted during the crisis, cf. the 2012 growth rate of 4.4%. 
Table 3.1: Historical Development of Chemical Tanker Fleet (No. and '000 dwt) 
                
Start of Small Handysize Handymax 
Total >1,000 
dwt 
Growt
h 
Year 1,000 - 9,999 10,000 - 19,999 20,000 - 29,999 
30,000 - 
39,999 
40,000 - 
49,999 50,000 +   p.a. 
  No. 000 Dwt No. 000 Dwt No. 
000 
Dwt No. 
000 
Dwt No. 
000 
Dwt No. 
000 
Dwt No. 
000 
Dwt % 
2002 1 136 5 202 320 4 622 112 2 881 208 7 430 116 5 202 5 313 1 897 25 650 6,0% 
2003 1 166 5 392 340 4 938 117 3 006 217 7 824 145 6 480 5 313 1 990 27 953 9,0% 
2004 1 210 5 654 367 5 402 121 3 099 250 9 038 179 8 013 5 313 2 132 31 519 12,8% 
2005 1 246 5 845 394 5 832 125 3 181 282 10 213 221 9 904 6 407 2 274 35 383 12,3% 
2006 1 305 6 161 435 6 486 134 3 428 305 11 051 260 11 652 22 1 341 2 461 40 120 13,4% 
2007 1 366 6 407 510 7 599 137 3 494 332 12 058 301 13 478 42 2 365 2 688 45 403 13,2% 
2008 1 428 6 742 614 9 138 139 3 525 368 13 417 352 15 815 64 3 560 2 965 52 198 15,0% 
2009 1 535 7 391 771 11 491 145 3 666 400 14 597 406 18 277 
12
7 6 889 3 384 62 310 19,4% 
2010 1 636 7 994 898 13 441 148 3 731 415 15 156 456 20 559 
18
1 9 706 3 734 70 587 13,3% 
2011 1 673 8 206 972 14 612 148 3 719 427 15 596 486 21 938 
22
6 12 099 3 932 76 171 7,9% 
2012 1 708 8 451 1 019 15 373 156 3 913 427 15 586 501 22 630 
25
5 13 576 4 066 79 530 4,4% 
2013 1 735 8 636 1 037 15 703 160 3 995 419 15 304 518 23 415 
27
8 14 754 4 147 81 806 2,9% 
                
march-13* 1 735 8 637 1 039 15 735 160 3 995 420 15 341 523 23 651 
28
9 15 312 4 056 82 671   
~ Indicates highest IMO grade on vessel. *Data as at start 
month. 
          Note : The Historical Fleet data show the position as at 1st January each year, and take into account subsequent changes to the database. Totals include 
chemical tankers of unknown chemical grading. The Clarkson Fleet Changes database is compiled under procedures accredited to ISO9002 Quality Standards.  
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Figure	  3.1Freight	  Rate	  Development	  on	  the	  US	  Gulf-­‐Asia	  Trade	  Lane	  (Clarkson	  Reasearch	  Service	  2010) 
  
In addition to supply being affected by freight rates and global demand, it is also indirectly 
affected by the price of tanker fuel. Being that fuel costs are the most significant voyage 
specific cost, the bunker price also affects the tanker market in determining the speed at which 
a vessel is set to go. When fuel prices are high, the voyage costs increase resulting in a 
reduction of the earnings. Thus if freight rates in a period are low, a ship owner might choose 
to slow steam in order to minimize the costs thereby reducing the total supply in the freight 
market (Strandenes, Is there potential for a two-tier tanker market ? 1999). Empirical 
evidence from the dry bulk capsize sector however, shows that speed as an adjustment factor 
is in fact not used to the same extent as predicted through theory (Ådland 2013). One could 
consider whether the same is expected from the chemical tanker market.	   
 
3.3 Customer motivation (Demand) 
When a customer wishes to transport cargo from one specific berth on the US coast to one 
specific berth in Asia they normally tender a request in the market. The suppliers then respond 
with a set of price and terms for the specific voyage, a spot, or a COA price if the tender is for 
a set of voyages within a time period. The supplier with the best offer normally wins the 
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tender. The customer wishes to minimize its cost of transportation. With a large number of 
suppliers and assuming them all to deliver identical service the price or in this case the freight 
rate the customers must pay, will at the lowest be equal to the marginal cost of service 
(Walderhaug and Hammer 2007). The marginal cost of service differs with regards to the time 
horizon of which it is evaluated (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 2009). In the long run a ship operator 
is more flexible and has the possibility to adjust capacity through new buildings or 
acquisitions through the secondhand market, thus including capital costs. In the short run 
however the ship operator is unable to adjust the capacity causing the marginal cost to include 
only voyage specific and operating costs (Evans and Marlow 1990). Capacity may however to 
some extent be adjusted by speeding up or slowing down the vessels, cf. section 4.1.1. 
 
Other additional considerations for the customer are timeliness, regularity and quality control, 
which might cause them to choose a more costly provider (Walderhaug and Hammer 2007). If 
the customer has high costs for tardiness in their further production and are dependent on the 
product being delivered at the specific point in time, they might be willing to pay more in 
order for this to be secured. Also customers might be willing to pay more in order to reduce 
the risk of cargo contamination or loss. This also might affect with whom a customer wishes 
to charter their cargo (ibid.). 
 
3.3.1	  Drivers	  of	  demand	  
The demand for chemical tankers is influenced mainly by the trends in the world economy, 
the restructuring of production facilities, feed stock prices, tariffs, quotas, protectionism and 
exchange rates (Stopford 1988). As mentioned in the introduction to chapter 2, shipping is 
considered the blood vessels of the global economy. The relationship between the global 
economy and sea trade is however is not obvious. Generally there are three main aspects of 
the world economy that may bring change in the demand for sea transport: the occurrence of 
business cycles, the long term trend relationship between the growth of seaborne trade and the 
growth of the world economy, and the occurrence of economic shocks (ibid.).  
 
The demand for sea transport also depends on the distance over which a cargo is to be shipped 
(Stopford 1988). Cargo shipped from Ulsan to Houston therefore generates far more demand 
for sea transport then the same cargo shipped from Ulsan to Shanghai.  
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3.4 The Rules and Regulations of The Market 
 
When operating in a global market one is accountable to several jurisdictions. As mentioned 
earlier chemical tankers are subject to security requirements determined by IMO, MARPOL 
and the IBC code. In addition to these environmental and safety regulations, governments also 
monitor market transactions in order to maintain free competition and therefore efficient 
trade. 
 
Ship operators are subject to trade regulations in terms of “game rules” to safeguard the 
market competition. The Norwegian Competition Law 1993 (not applicable for business only 
outside of Norway) provides restrictions enforcing competition, like other regulators such as 
the EU and the US. The EEA treaty article 53 states that “the following shall be prohibited as 
incompatible with the functioning of this agreement: all agreements between undertakings, 
decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade 
between Contracting Parties and which have as their object or effect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition within the territory covered by this Agreement, and in 
particular those which: 
 
a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; 
b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; 
c) share markets or sources of supply; 
d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, 
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;  
e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, 
have no connection with the subject of such contracts” 
 
(EU Commission 1994) 
 
In other words, any participants in the market who limits competition from flowing freely in 
the form of fixing prices, controlling production or in any way defer from operating 
independently, will be sanctioned. Similarly the Us Sherman Act §1 states that “Every 
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
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commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” 
(Encyclopædia Britannica Inc. 2013). 
 
To sum up, it is illegal to fix prices among competitors, share the market or customers, to co-
operate with competitors in relation to tenders (bid rigging) or agree with competitors to 
restrict supply or boycott customers, or act in any way that contributes to reducing free 
competition in the market. These rules are set with the clear motivation to maintain an 
efficient market driven by free competition. In late 2003 The EU and US government opened 
an investigation of Stolt Nielsen and Odfjell SE based on suspicion of an anti competition 
cartel had been formed (Daly 2008). In April 2007, the European commission sent out 
statements of objections to the companies, accusing them of bid-rigging, price-fixing and 
exchanging confidential market information regarding the transportation of bulk liquids by 
sea, this way restricting competition in the EU market violating the EEA Treaty, they were 
however exempted based on the treaty’s article 81. The US government as a result of these 
competition-distorting activities invoked sanctions on them in US jurisdiction (ibid.). 
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4. Theory 
 
Now having presented a basic description of the chemical tanker market, its participants and 
mechanisms, I in this chapter give an overview of theoretical frameworks and concepts of 
shipping economics. These concepts will compose the basis of my analysis, as well as provide 
a general understanding of the economics of shipping. 
 
4.1 The Chemical Tanker Market 
The chemical tanker market, as described in chapter 2 is made up of supply and demand. 
Supply can be defined as the amount of a product available for a customer, while demand is 
considered the amount of product asked for by the customer (Oxford Dictionary of English 
2010). We can, using economic theory, portray and analyze how these two factors interact 
with each other when for instance environmental factors or base assumptions change.    
 
4.1.1 Supply Curve 
The supply curve in shipping economics is a function of the capacity of the vessel and number 
of vessels, as well as the speed at which each vessel sails (Strandenes 1999). The supply 
function of a perfectly homogenous fleet is typically expressed as follows: 𝑆 = 𝑙 ∗ 𝑑𝑤𝑡 ∗𝑚 12− 𝑜 𝑟(𝑠), where l is the load factor, dwt is the capacity, 𝑚 is the mean distance 
travelled by the vessels and r(s) is the number of trips travelled per month, corrected by the 
number of months off hire (o).  The supply curve is illustrated in the figure below and is 
commonly referred to as the “hockey stick” based on its form. It consists of four parts; the 
part above maximum speed, the elastic part or curve, the part below minimum speed (p*) and 
the lay up rate (pu) (ibid.). The shape of the supply curve does however change at different 
marginal cost levels based on the technological specification of the vessel. Looking at the 
mathematical supply function above, one can determine that for instance, vessels with 
different load factors, or speed range would cause the supply function to take a different form, 
possibly increasing the steepness of the curve. Further more the global fleet most often does 
not consist of perfectly homogenous vessels, but vessels of many different sizes as well as 
technological specifications. However this theoretical framework provides us with insights in 
the composition and behavior of supply in the market.    
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Figure 3.1: Supply and demand curve for the tanker market (Strandenes, Is there potential for a two-tier tanker market ? 
1999). 
 
In figure 3.1, the tanker market is inactive at freight rates below pu, the vessels in the fleet lay 
up. It is more costly to operate the vessels than what is earned through freight rates. When the 
freight rate reaches p* the vessels operate at minimum speed and with freight rates passing p* 
the ship operator will increase speed, causing the hockey stick shape of the curve. When all 
vessels are operating at full speed we have reached the vertical part of the supply curve 
limiting capacity (Strandenes 1999). Supply can only expand by contracting a new building of 
an additional vessel pushing the supply curve to the right like in figure 4.2 (Stopford 1988).  
 
 
Figure 4.2:  Aggregate Supply Curve (Stopford 1988) 
 
4.1.2	  Demand	  Curve	  
The demand curve shows how much of goods or services consumers are willing to buy as the 
price per unit changes (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 2009). The demand curve is an exogenous 
measure of the total demand for chemical transportation in the market. It is an expression of 
the charterers’ willingness to pay in terms of freight rate per ton-miles transportation. Figure 
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3.3 shows a highly inelastic demand curve, indicating that the charterer’s willingness to pay is 
high, for the same amount of transportation. The demand curve is downward sloping from the 
left to the right based on the law of demand that states that buyers will increase their number 
of purchases of a product when its price falls, and will decrease their number of purchases 
when its price rises (Y.H.V. Lun 2010).   
 
Figure 3.3 Demand Curve (Stopford 1988) 
 
The inelasticity of the curve might be a result of few alternative options for transportation 
(Stopford 1988). Given that the chemical tanker market supplies the transportation of liquid 
bulk chemicals, a commodity with many special requirements in transportation, one would 
assume that the demand curve would be somewhat inelastic, similar to figure 3.3 above. If 
alternative transportation methods become available as possible substitutes for chemical 
tankers, like for instance chemical containers, the demand curve would possibly become more 
elastic. This given that the customer would be able to transport the same amount of 
transportation to a lower price causing their willingness to pay to be reduced (Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld 2009). Demand elasticity is also affected by the cost of the good transported. The 
lower the cost of sea transport as a proportion of the total cost of the final good, the more 
inelastic the demand for sea transport will be (Y.H.V. Lun 2010). One should think that the 
high value of the chemical commodity contra the low value of for instance coal would cause 
the demand curve in the chemical tanker market to be more inelastic than for instance the dry 
bulk market. In addition to this the demand for sea transport tends to be price-inelastic in the 
short run (ibid.).    
 
The demand curve is also directly affected by the demand for the commodities transported, 
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liquid bulk chemicals cf. section 2.1.2 (Stopford 1988). This affects the positioning of the 
curve; a fall in demand for liquid chemicals results in a shift to the left, while an increase in 
demand causes a shift to the right. In the wake of the financial and economic crisis, when 
spending is and was restricted, the chemical tanker market expected the demand for almost all 
chemical commodities to suffer (Drewery Shipping Consultants 2009), shifting the demand 
curve to the left. In subsequent years however, an increase in chemical tanker demand is 
predicted (ibid.), possibly shifting the demand curve to the right. 
  
4.1.3	  Freight	  Rates	  
The market price or freight rates are determined in the intersection of the supply and demand 
curve (Stopford 1988). This is the rate at which the market is cleared. The “hockey stick” 
curve in the supply function causes for two separate regimes of the tanker market, a high rate 
and low rate regime. Under high rates one is situated to the right on the supply curve above 
the elastic bend, where small changes in demand lead to large changes in freight rates. Under 
low rates the left side of the supply curve, the elastic part, changes in demand cause for 
minimal changes in freight rates (ibid.). 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Changes in demands effect on freight rates (Stopford 1988) 
 
4.1.4	  Market	  Interactions	  
There are four interlinked markets in the tanker shipping industry, the freight market, new 
building market, second hand market and the scrapping market (Lun, et al. 2013). Sea 
transport services like assessed herein are dealt with in the freight market. However, a ship 
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owner is exposed to the other three markets as new vessels are ordered and built in the new 
building market, used vessels are traded in the second hand market, and old or obsolete 
vessels are scrapped in the demolition market. These markets can be considered as a factor 
market. Being that vessels supplied in the freight market are provided and recalled through 
the factor market, we can consider these two as interlinked. The demand in the freight market 
reflects the prices and activity in the other markets. When there are future expectations of 
increasing freight rates, ship owners then wish to expand fleet capacity therefore causing an 
increase of demand for new buildings or for purchases in the second hand market driving up 
the value of a vessel (ibid.). 
 
4.2 An Efficient Market (Free Competition) 
 
A market as mentioned is defined by the Oxford Dictionary (2010) as a regular gathering of 
people for the purchase and sale of provisions, livestock, and other commodities. The 
chemical freight market is a gathering of suppliers and buyers of the provision of transport by 
tankers.  The price of the provision is determined based on the interaction between the 
supplier’s marginal cost (supply) and the buyer’s willingness to pay (demand) (Stopford 
1988). In a perfectly competitive market the supplier services at the level at which these two 
aspects are equivalent.  Changes in supply or demand effect the price of the provisions, for 
example if the cost of input increases, the marginal cost for the suppliers would increase and 
therefor shift up causing an increase in price (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 2009).  
 
What is an efficient market with perfect free competition? The model of perfect competition 
rest on three basic assumptions; 1) price taking, 2) product homogeneity and 3) free entry and 
exit (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 2009). Assuming that there are many suppliers, each individual 
firm sells a sufficiently small proportion of total market output, thus their decisions have no 
impact on market price. Therefore each competitor takes the market price as a given, 
assumption 1. Secondly in order for the players in the market to be in competition with each 
other, they will have to produce identical products that are perfectly substitutable with one 
another, product homogeneity; assumption 2.  Finally, there must be no entry or exit barriers 
so that suppliers can easily enter or exit according to their ability to make a profit; this way a 
buyer can easily switch from one supplier to the next. In order for a market to be in perfect 
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competition all of the three assumptions above must be held. In most markets these 
assumptions are unlikely to hold (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 2009).  
 
4.3 Simulating The Central Planner – Regulated Market. 
A central planner can be defined as a person, government, or organization that controls the 
development of a given subject (Oxford Dictionary of English 2010). The most well known 
central planners are probably the Soviet government enforcing a planned economy in former 
Eastern Europe. Here the Soviet government determined production, investment, prices, and 
incomes (Encyclopædia Britannica Inc. 2013). In contrast to central planning of the Soviet 
who acted in self-interest, the central planner in a global chemical tanker market should aim 
to improve productivity of the market as a whole, thus seeking to improve the interests of all 
market players. The central planner should attempt to do this by taking advantage of better 
information achieved through the consolidation of economic resources when making 
decisions regarding for instance, the composition of routes and distribution of cargoes. 
 
Nagurney (2007) defines transportation networks as complex large-scale systems that come in 
a variety of forms, such as road, rail, air, and waterway networks. Further she describes that 
from an economic perspective, the supply in such network systems is represented by the 
underlying network topology and the cost characteristics. This could for example be the time 
charter equivalent for a specific vessel. The users of the transportation system represent the 
demand, so for chemical tankers that would typically be the charterer wishing to transport 
chemicals from port A to B. An economic equilibrium in the transportation network occurs 
when the number of trips between an origin and destination equals the travel demand given by 
the market price (Nagurney 2007). In other words a transport network in equilibrium occurs 
when all cargoes demanded are served. 
 
The aim of the central planner will be to attempt to improve productivity by taking advantage 
of better information when making decisions regarding route scheduling and vessel 
assignment, while at the same time serving all requested cargo transportation keeping the 
transport network in equilibrium. The object of the scheduling problem is to minimize the 
sum of the costs for all the ships in the fleet. By doing this the central planner can find an 
optimal solution preserving the interest of all market players as well as the interests of society 
as a whole. The cargoes that are lifted from loading ports must also be unloaded at the 
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corresponding unloading ports. The chemical tanker vessel, as described in section 2.2.1, is 
able to carry several cargoes simultaneously. In order to solve the scheduling problem of 
assigning vessels to routes so as to minimize the total cost, one can use a mathematical model 
like the one presented in the article “Ship routing and scheduling, status and trends” by 
Christiansen et al (2002).  
 
The mathematical formulation of the model for a given planning period is presented in the 
article using the following notation: Denote the set of ships (fleet) to be scheduled as V, 
indexed by v, and let N be the set of cargoes, indexed by i. They then make the assumption 
that for each ship v, a set of candidate schedules (or routes) is available, denoted vR , and a 
specific schedule is indexed by r. Further they let vrc  be the transportation cost for sailing 
schedule r by ship v, and constant ivra  is equal to one if schedule r for ship v services cargo i 
and zero otherwise. Let vrx  be a binary variable that is equal to one if ship v sails schedule r 
and zero otherwise. The set partitioning formulation of the scheduling problem can then be 
given as follows: 
 1                                                         𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑐!"𝑥!"!∈!!!∈!  2                                                        𝑎!"#𝑥!" = 1                                            ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁!∈!!!∈!  3                                                                𝑥!" = 1,                                                                ∀𝑣 ∈ 𝑉,!∈!!  4                                                                 𝑥!" ∈ 0,1 ,                                                                    ∀𝑣 ∈ 𝑉, 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅! 
 
The objective function (1) minimizes the transportation costs, which also is the motivation of 
the simulated central planner. Constraints (2) ensure that all cargoes are serviced so the 
transportation network is at equilibrium. Constraints (3) ensure that each ship in the fleet sails 
one of its candidate schedules. The "=" in (3) may be replaced by "≤ ", thus allowing some 
ships to be unused, which will be the case in my simulation. This because we wish to increase 
productivity, reducing the number of vessels on this trade lane should thus be an option. 
Constraint (4) imposes binary requirements on the variables. Often, ship-scheduling problems 
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are well restricted; this means that it is possible to enumerate all feasible candidate schedules 
in a set partitioning approach. Because of the long duration of each ship voyage and the high 
uncertainty, it is hardly possible for a ship schedule planner to make plans for more than a few 
voyages ahead for each ship. It is therefore sensible to set the ship scheduling to a limited 
time horizon (ibid.). 
 
4.4 Productivity measure 
The productivity of a market can be defined as the effectiveness of productive effort often 
measured in the rate of output per unit of input (Stopford 1988). When increasing productivity 
one is able to increase output without increasing the input. In other words you are able to 
transport a larger amount of chemicals within the same time period using the same number of 
vessels. The productivity can in this case be measured as the utilization rate of the vessels, as 
an increase of utilization would lead to an increased output using the exact same number of 
vessels, the input remains unchanged.  A typical productivity measure of a fleet can be 
calculated by dividing the total ton-miles of cargo shipments by the total tonnage actively 
employed in carrying the cargo. 
 𝑈 = 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙  𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 , 𝑈 = 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙  𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑦    
Productivity in shipping often depends on three main factors, the mean operating speed as this 
determines the time a vessel spends on a journey, the deadweight utilization, and the number 
of loaded days at sea in contrast to unproductive days waiting in port, travelling empty or in 
ballast or periods in off hire (ibid.). Observing these parameters over time or across sectors 
can provide an insight in the productivity level of an industry. 
 
4.5 Shipping Costs  
 
When optimizing the utilization of a vessel, ship owners’ use the cost structure of the voyage 
in order to determine what result the voyage will bring. The costs are divided in to three main 
groups, capital costs, running costs and voyage specific costs. (Evans and Marlow 1990) 
 
Capital costs are the actual costs of the ship (Evans and Marlow 1990). Shipping is a highly 
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capital intensive business, since even a small chemical tanker requires a substantial capital 
investment. However the vessels have a long life span and are “easily” tradable in the second 
hand market making the capital invested in the long run considered liquid. In the short run 
when making chartering decisions it is considered a fixed cost and can be regarded as sunk 
(ibid.). 
 
Running costs are the costs that must be incurred, when the vessel is in service. These costs 
do not vary with the specific voyage and are time related. Examples of running costs may be 
crew salaries, insurance, protection and indemnity, maintenance, virtual, lubricating oil and so 
on. The level of costs is influenced by the efficiency with which the owner manages the 
operation of the ship, including the administrative overhead (Stopford 1988, 100). Crew costs 
account for up to half of the running cost and comprise of all direct and indirect charges 
incurred by the crewing of the vessel (Evans og Marlow 1990). Mainly two things determine 
the crew costs, the size of the crew and the direct and indirect cost of hiring them. Another 
significant cost of operating a vessel is expenditure on consumable supplies such as spare 
parts, deck and engine room equipment, and lubrication oil, which may account for about 
one-quarter of running costs. Repairs and maintenance costs are the costs associated with 
maintaining the vessel at a standard required by company policy or classification societies. 
Routine maintenance includes maintaining the main engine and auxiliary equipment, painting 
superstructure and so on. To maintain class for insurance purposes, all merchant ships must 
undergo regular surveys. Running costs also include the cost of insuring the vessel and for 
instance the administrative costs of managing the ships (ibid.). 
 
Voyage specific costs are the costs related to the specific voyage being undertaken and 
include fuel costs, port charges, cargo handling and so on (Evans and Marlow 1990). In order 
to estimate the specific voyage costs the ship owner must have information on the following: 
vessel capacity, vessels speed and fuel consumption, list of bunkering ports and fuel prices, 
maritime atlas (to determine different possible routes and the location of cargo and bunkering 
ports), a map of the load line zones, ports disbursements, canal dues, rates of loading and 
discharging, and the exchange rates (often in US dollars) (ibid.).  
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4.5.1	  Fuel	  Costs	  and	  Speed	  Optimization	  
Fuel costs are the single most important item of voyage costs (Stopford 1988). Fuel costs are 
determined by the vessels fuel consumption and the bunker fuel price at the time of the 
voyage. Although the ship owner cannot influence fuel prices, since this is determined by oil 
prices, he has considerable control over the level of fuel consumption. The amount of fuel 
burned is dependent on the way the vessel and its main engine are designed and of course the 
way it is operated.  The fuel consumption can be expressed as follows, where F is the actual 
fuel consumption, v is the speed of the vessel, k is a fuel constant and a is the admiralty 
consumption, 𝐹 𝑣 = 𝑘(𝑣)! (Strandenes 2012). 
 
When a vessel is earning unit freight revenue the mean operating speed of a ship is important 
because it determines the amount of cargo that can be delivered during a fixed period and 
hence the revenue earned. In a market with high freight rates and low bunker prices the ship 
operator will have an incentive to steam at full speed. In a market with a given freight rate as 
shown in figure 5.1 below, the change in bunker prices may cause for a change in speed (and 
therefore supply) because the fuel cost savings may be greater than the loss of revenue 
(Devanney 2010). 
 
 
Figure 5.1:  Slow Steaming (Devanney 2010). 
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In order to determine the optimal speed of a vessel we must maximize the gross profit of a 
voyage per day with regards to the vessels speed.  
 
GS = gross surplus per day 
C = cargo tons carried 
RC = running costs 
V = speed in nautical miles per day  
s = freight rate per cargo ton 
D = distance 
p = fuel price per ton 
k = vessels fuel constant 
α = exponent in fuel consumption function 
 
  𝑀𝐴𝑋   𝐺𝑆 = 𝑠𝐶𝐷𝑉 − 𝑅𝐶 − 𝑝𝑘𝑉∝   𝑤. 𝑟. 𝑡.    𝑉   𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔   ∝= 3  𝜕𝐺𝑆𝜕𝑉 = 𝑠𝐶𝐷 − 3𝑝𝑘𝑉! = 0 
𝑉! = 𝑠𝐶3𝑝𝑘𝐷 → 𝑉!"# = 𝑠𝐶3𝑝𝑘𝐷 
(Strandenes 2012) 
 
The optimal speed of a vessel is in other words a function of the fuel price and freight rates 
obtainable in the market (ibid.). 
 
4.5.2	  Port	  Costs	  	  
Port-related costs make up a major component of the voyage costs. According to Meersman et 
al (2010) current port pricing methods differentiate according to a set of criteria’s. Among 
others they pinpoint the vessel type and destination, location of operations in port territory, 
total time of service use (processing time) and the season. Mentioned in section 2.3, this is 
considered an inefficient method due to the fact that these criteria’s do not reflect the waiting 
cost connected to the different vessels. As a result of increased port congestion the chemical 
tanker operator might in addition be subject to higher port costs due to the necessity of 
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shifting berths within the port in order to serve a large number of customers simultaneously. 
The complex pricing systems that are in use today make it increasingly difficult to compare 
costs of alternative ports (ibid.).  
 
4.5.3	  Additional	  Costs	  
Other voyage costs include canal dues and cargo handling costs (Evans and Marlow 1990). 
The main canal dues payable are for transiting the Suez and Panama canals (Stopford 1988). 
The toll structure of the Suez Canal are calculated in terms of Suez Canal Net Ton (SCNT)/ 
Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). This method is used to determine the revenue-earning 
capacity of a vessel, which is the basis for what is charged. The Panama Canal however 
operates with a flat rate charge per Panama Canal Net Ton (PCNT). Cargo handling is also a 
significant cost of the voyage involving the loading and discharging of cargo. Investing in 
improved ship design to facilitate rapid cargo handling, along with advanced shipboard cargo 
handling gear may reduce the level of these costs (ibid.). 
 
4.6 Voyage Optimization 
When the cost structure of the voyage is determined, the ship owner is able to set up a voyage 
calculation determining the result of a specific voyage (Stopford 1988). A ship owners desire 
is to maximize this result. In order to compare one voyage from another, it is common to use 
the time charter equivalent. The time charter is the charter hire of the vessel per day. Under a 
time charter the owner is managing the running costs and operating costs, and the charterer 
covers the voyage specific costs.  The time charter equivalent is the average daily revenue 
provided by this vessel and is calculated:  𝑇𝐶𝐸 = !"!"#$ when on a specific voyage. The voyage 
result (VR) is the gross revenue of the voyage, minus the voyage specific costs (ibid.). 
 
The Voyage Cash Flow Analysis (VCF) is concerned with computing the cash flow on a 
particular vessel voyage or combination of voyages, with the specific objective of assisting 
the ship owner in deciding whether the voyage is worth undertaking, or in deciding which 
vessel to use on a particular voyage where there are several operations (Stopford 1988, 128). 
The cash flow analysis typical includes five main sections. First of all information about the 
ship type with regards to capacity and fuel consumption is provided. Secondly information of 
the specifics of the voyage such as cargo, distances and freight rates are presented. Then the 
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time needed to complete the voyage is calculated, including estimated port time and so on.  In 
the fourth section the voyage cash flow is estimated using the information in the sections 
above.  This amount represents the actual amount the voyage provides to cover the running 
costs of the vessel. Finally running costs are deducted to give the net cash flow of the voyage. 
The running costs of the vessel are calculated in section five. 
 
Example of a Voyage Cash Flow Analysis 
  
   1. Ship Type: Size 15 000 d.w.t. 
 
Fuel Consumption 25 tons/day 
 
Average Speed 15 knots 
   2. Voyage Information: Route Houston-Ulsan 
 
Distance 9000 miles 
 
Cargo  10 000 tons 
 
Freight Rate $50/ton 
 
Fuel Price $ 100/ton 
   3. Days On Voyage Calculation: 
  
   Average Speed 15 knots 
 Voyage Distance 9000 miles 
 Sea Time 25 days 
 Port Time 5 days 
 Total Days on Voyage 30 days 
 
   4. Voyage Cash Flow Calculation: 
 
   Freight Earnings $ 500 000 
 Fuel Costs $ 62 500 
 Port Costs $ 35 000 
 Canal Dues (here disregarded) 
  Cargo Handling $ 20 000 
 Contribution to Running Costs  $ 382 500 
 Running Costs (from section 5) $ 126 650 
 Net Voyage Cash Flow $ 255 850 
 
   5. Running Costs: 
  
   Crew Costs $ 1 068 000 
 Repairs and Maintenance $ 270 000 
 Insurance $ 220 000 
 Administration $ 215 000 
 Total Annual Cost (350 days) $ 1 773 000 
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Cost per Day $ 5 066 
  
(ibid.) 
 
4.7 Estimating CO2 Emissions and the Environmental Footprint 
In Psaraftis and Kontovas (2009) study of CO2 Emission Statistics for the World Commercial 
Fleet the fuel consumption of the vessel was used as an input measure of emissions. The 
measurement of CO2 emissions using the fuel consumption is independent of the type of fuel. 
By multiplying the total bunker consumption in tons per day (port and transit) by a factor of 
3.17 you compute CO2 emissions, also in tons per day.  
 
The CO2 factor 3.17 is empirically estimated and is the factor most commonly used in CO2 
emissions calculations (Psaraftis and Kontovas 2009). In a broad specter of studies the actual 
value has been estimated to lie between 3.159 and 3.175. More recent studies have also 
differentiated between bunker qualities like for instance heavy fuel oil (3.021) versus marine 
diesel oil (3.082).  The most common factor to use for simple estimation is 3.17 without 
differentiating between bunker qualities (ibid.). 
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5. Method 
 
Having presented the chemical tanker market, how it works, as well as the theoretical 
framework, I now shift my focus towards the research question of this paper and how to shed 
some light on the topic at hand. For the sake of clarity I repeat the research question, which is 
as follows: Does free competition in the global chemical tanker market cause for optimal use 
of vessels and the lowest environmental footprint? 
 
As mentioned in the introduction it is suggested by ship operators in the global market today, 
that the combination of many suppliers in free competition and limited port capacity creates 
an unnecessary amount of waiting in port and low utilization of vessels, in other words low 
productivity. These aspects are assumed to create higher costs and therefore a non-optimal 
situation for both ship operator and charterers. In addition, these aspects are considered to 
contribute to an increasing environmental footprint, which again is non-beneficial for the 
global society as a whole. In order to attempt to give a reasonable test of these assumptions 
and therefore an answer to the overall research question, I have elected in the following to 
compare the real situation in free competition with a simulated regulated market under a 
central planner. 
 
1. What are the potentials for productivity improvements in the chemical freight market 
in a regulated market in the form of a central planner, compared to a market with free 
competition between suppliers?  
2. Are there costs savings under a regulated market for both ship operator and charterers? 
3. What are the environmental effects of a regulated market? 
 
5.1 Data 
In my comparative study I have decided to limit my examination to a geographical segment of 
the chemical freight market. I have chosen to look at the Asia-Pacific trade-lane, as this is the 
geographical segment of the market with the largest amount of available data, thus giving me 
the most complete picture of the market. The data gives information of the number of 
chemical tankers leaving the US gulf heading for Asia within a limited time period, their size, 
charterer and cargo specifications.  
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I have selected a time period stretching from the 15th of October to the 15th of December of 
2012, as chemical shipping is considered to be seemingly monthly repetitive. The chemical 
tanker market is considered to have seasonal trends where market activity tends to be slightly 
higher in spring and fall, contra low activity levels during the summer. My data set is from 
late fall; therefore I must consider the possibility of a slightly higher activity level then 
perhaps the yearly average. Taking this into consideration I believe the dataset still provides 
me with an adequate impression of the market under free competition. 
 
I have been given access to PIERS data (Port Import Export Reporting Serice) (Appendix A) 
for the chemical cargoes transported from the US Gulf to the Asia/Pacific area in time horizon 
selected. PIERS data is a standard in trade intelligence for organizations participating in the 
import/export business. The data includes area of operation (trade lane), operator, load date, 
IMO number, vessel name, loading port, discharge port, country, commodity, commodity 
group, cargo in metric tons and charterer. The PIERS dataset lists 532 different charter 
agreements by 18 different ship operators. There are a total of 53 charterers (customers) 
requesting a total cargo of 1.125 million metric tons to be transported by 50 different vessels. 
The data provides me with information on each and every charter agreement being that spot 
or a COA. However the data does not provide me with information on the exact sailing 
pattern of each vessel, in other words the order of which the vessel loaded and discharged at 
the different ports. Using the information from this dataset I have assumed a sailing pattern 
that roughly minimizes the distance of travel for each vessel, given the date of loading. In 
order to estimate the sea distances between ports I use an online sea distance calculator (Sea 
Distances.com 2013).  I also assume all voyages to be west bound as they are categorized as 
an Asia-Pacific voyage set out from the US. This results in every vessel going through the 
Panama Canal.  
 
I was also provided with vessel specific data both for their own and competing tonnage 
(Appendix B). This includes the vessels IMO number, operator, name, dead weight tonnage, 
age, shipyard where it was built, IMO classification, number of segregations and tanks, and 
finally its epoxy, zinc and stainless steel capacity. This information is necessary in order to 
successfully understand the capacity limitations in a simulated regulated market situation with 
a central planner.  
 
Other information provided is among other things estimates of average speed, fuel 
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consumption and port costs. Being since the focus of this paper is a comparative study of the 
productivity level of the market under free competition, the exact specific cost structure is not 
considered necessary. An estimate in cost changes will sufficiently enlighten the issue at 
hand. I will therefore be using, aggregated estimates as well as a constant fuel price and 
freight rate for all voyages.  
 
5.1.1	  Statistical	  Errors	  
When dealing with data sets like those provided for this assessment, it is important to be 
aware of and evaluate the validity of the data and assess their accuracy. When collecting these 
datasets from Odfjell, it was indicated to me that there often are plotting errors in for instance 
the PIERS dataset. Due to the fact that a lot of the information is plotted manually, one must 
consider the possibility of human error. It was also indicated that the data provided through 
PIERS in some occasions would lack last minute spot charter agreements. This would result 
in an incomplete picture of vessels utilization and sailing patterns. In addition to plotting 
errors I have been advised to consider statistical inaccuracy of the estimates provided for 
average speed, fuel consumption and port costs. Even if these are estimates based on Odfjell’s 
practical experience in the chemical tanker market, they can result in discrepancies and 
inaccuracies in my results, as they are simplified to fit this assessment. However, in my 
analysis I assume the data provided to be sufficiently correct, and when assessing my results I 
take the possibility of errors into account.  
 
5.2 Simulating a Central Planner 
To create a situation with reduced free competition I attempt to simulate a regulated market 
with a single central planner. A central planner is an authority center that attempts to improve 
productivity and coordination by taking advantage of better information achieved 
(Encyclopædia Britannica Inc. 2013). I will attempt to improve productivity as the central 
planner by redistributing cargo to vessels in a seemingly more production efficient manner.  
 
The first step of my simulation is setting up routes that serve all cargo demand, but at the 
same time, to as far a degree as possible, minimizes the distance travelled and total number of 
berth calls. In order to do so I categorized 530 cargo requirements (excluding 2 cargo charter 
with insufficient information) from the given time period according to their discharge port. I 
chose to group them in this manner due to the large distances between discharge ports in the 
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Far East contra the distances between the loading ports in the US Gulf, this being the simplest 
way to roughly minimize the total distance travelled. I then composed routes typically going 
to approximately two loading ports in the US Gulf and one discharge port in the Far East, 
however with some variation. I also composed the routes to have a total volume of cargo 
similar to the capacities of the chemical tanker vessels available. I composed a total of 36 
routes (Table 5.1) in order to cover the 530 cargo charter requirements from this period. An 
overview of the cargoes redistributed to the different routes is found in Appendix C.  
 
When having composed the routes, I then determined which vessels in the fleet had the 
capacity to be assigned to which routes, and what costs each vessel would have if assigned to 
that given route. The costs were estimated in the same manner as will be presented in section 
5.3.2. Under free competition the vessel manager assembles a set of charters with respect to 
maximizing the vessels revenue. The vessel manager considers the cargos load and discharge 
port, distance, time restriction, stowage restrictions and so on, with regards to its profitability 
and compatibility with existing chartered cargo. This results in not all cargos being able to 
travel on every vessel. Under the central planner, when redistributing cargoes to different 
routes, I have disregarded the security regulations considering stowage of different chemicals 
and assumed all cargo can be stowed adjacent to all other cargo. Also, as indicated in the 
presentation of the model I am scheduling only for a limited time period, here from the 15th of 
October 2012 to the 15th of December 2012. Since chemical shipping is considered 
approximately monthly repetitive this therefore was a suitable time horizon. 
 
Table 5.1 Composed Routes (Central Planner) 
Route Cargo (dwt) Distance (miles) 
Days in 
transit 
# of 
berthings 
Houston 
# of berthings 
other US 
ports 
# of 
berthings 
Far East 
1 20797 12300 37 1 2 6 
2 31018 10389 31 1 2 1 
3 20000 10339 31 1 0 1 
4 29002 10230 30 1 1 1 
5 11299 11009 33 1 2 4 
6 21995 10855 32 1 2 3 
7 14523 10874 32 1 3 1 
8 15300 10113 30 1 0 1 
9 34351 10678 32 1 0 1 
10 19139 10689 32 1 4 5 
11 31789 10033 30 1 0 1 
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12 33483 10033 30 1 0 1 
13 29244 10510 31 1 3 1 
14 48860 10784 32 0 4 1 
15 30968 10256 31 0 1 1 
16 44168 10556 31 1 3 1 
17 26964 10698 32 1 1 1 
18 28100 11332 34 0 4 3 
19 33648 9217 27 1 0 1 
20 21628 9785 29 1 2 6 
21 17113 12261 36 0 4 2 
22 42830 12261 36 1 2 3 
23 47332 9628 29 0 1 1 
24 13044 9653 29 0 1 1 
25 21694 9601 29 0 1 1 
26 52562 9641 29 1 0 1 
27 33216 9516 28 0 1 1 
28 47748 9641 29 0 1 1 
29 15055 11212 33 0 3 1 
30 23269 9515 28 0 1 1 
31 27911 9774 29 0 1 3 
32 12992 9989 30 1 3 4 
33 37263 10203 30 0 2 1 
34 39112 10498 31 1 2 1 
35 41765 11120 33 1 4 2 
36 14262 12620 38 1 1 2 
 
 
When the routes were composed, I as mentioned determined which vessels had the capacity to 
serve each route, and the cost connected to vessels serving the different routes. I then used 
linear programing to set up a model that assigns vessels to routes. The model minimized the 
total costs of the entire regional fleet, simulating the scheduling problem of a central planner. 
It is an optimization based on the model presented in Christiansen et al. (2002), cf. section 
4.3. The central planner wishes to minimize the total cost of the entire fleet as this contributes 
to minimizing fuel consumption as well as the total number of berths called, thus causing 
possibly increased productivity.  
 
By examining the results of the schedule optimization I was able to compare the number of 
berth calls, distance travelled, and utilization laying the grounds to answer whether free 
competition is optimal with regards to productivity, cost and environmental footprint.  
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5.3 The Comparative Study 
5.3.1	  Comparing	  Productivity	  
Using the information in the dataset provided, I estimate the utilization rate (U) of each vessel 
and based on them, estimate an average utilization rate for this segment of the market.  
This gives an idea of the potential for productivity improvements of a regulated market, as 
running with fully loaded vessels is considered more efficient than running with partly loaded 
vessels.  
 
In addition to utilization, port congestion can be considered an aspect reducing productivity. 
Spending time waiting for occupied berths contributes to increasing the time spent per voyage 
and therefore reducing output without a corresponding reduction of input. Comparing the 
number of times each vessel calls a berth in the two scenarios I have been able to estimate a 
change in productivity. Based on the fact that the two scenarios include transport of the same 
cargoes, having the same capacity available, only redistributed, I assume that a reduction or 
increase in the number of berth calls will contribute to a reduction or increase in the vessels 
total waiting time during a voyage and therefore also an increase or reduction in productivity 
overall.  
 
5.3.2	  Comparing	  Costs	  
I also present an estimation of the voyage specific costs connected to the sailing routes 
travelled for this trade-lane in a selected time period, in order to compare them with the same 
calculated estimates for the voyages under a central planner. I use a theoretical voyage cost 
analysis. However I disregarded running costs and cargo handling costs as these are 
considered to be close to identical in a free competition situation and a regulated market 
situation. One might consider that a change in utilization, therefore a change in the amount of 
cargo handled per berth call, might cause a change in cargo handling costs. Assuming that the 
cargo handling cost is the same for all operators and given in $/ton, the cargo handling cost 
will remain unchanged as the total amount of cargo handled in both scenarios is the same, 
allowing me to disregard these costs in my calculations. I only include the costs that are 
specific for a voyage and in addition might change in the two situations being compared. 
Examples of this might for instance be a reduction in the distance traveled and therefore 
reduction of fuel costs, or the reduction of port due to a more efficient route and therefore 
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fewer berth calls per vessel. I have however also chosen to disregard any canal dues in my 
assessment for simplification purposes 
 𝑉𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐  𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 = 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙  𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 +     𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡  𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 
 
In order to calculate the voyage specific costs I made certain assumptions with regards to the 
fuel price, fuel consumption, estimated number of days in port and port dues (Table 5.3). 
These assumptions are as mentioned above in section 5.1, based on estimates provided to me 
by Odfjell through their experience in chemical tanker operations as well as market statistics. 
For example I have noticed in table 5.2 below that the average speed for chemical tankers is 
approximately 14 knots. As shown in the table, it does vary some according to the vessels 
level of fuel consumption, however to a very low extent. An overview of the estimates that 
compose the base for the voyage cost analysis is shown in table 5.3 below. I addition to this, 
an example of a complete voyage cost calculation can be viewed in Appendix E. 
 
Table	  5.2:	  Average	  Speed/Fuel	  Consumption	  (Clarkson	  Reasearch	  Service	  2010)	  
 
Table	  5.3:	  Estimates	  used	  in	  Voyage	  Cost	  Calculations	  
Average speed (nm/h)   14 
Estimated days in port   3 
      
Fuel price ($/ton) 100 
      
Port Costs     
Houston  $50 000,00  
Other US ports    $35 000,00  
Far East ports    $35 000,00  
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Fuel consumption (in transit)   
Vessels above 40 000 dwt. 35 
Vessels between 30 000 and 40 000 dwt. 30 
Vessels below 30 000 dwt. 25 
  
Fuel consumption (in port)  
Vessels above 40 000dwt. 25 
Vessels between 30 000 and 40 000dwt 20 
Vessels below 30 000 dwt. 15 
 
 
5.3.3	  Comparing	  the	  Environmental	  Footprint	  
In order to estimate the environmental footprint caused by each and every vessel I have 
elected to use the fuel consumption of the vessel as an input measure of emissions, like done 
in Psaraftis and Kontovas (2009) study of CO2 Emission Statistics for the World Commercial 
Fleet. The measurement of CO2 emissions using the fuel consumption is independent of the 
type of fuel; I simply multiply the total bunker consumption in tons per day (port and transit) 
by a factor of 3.17, to compute CO2 emissions also in tons per day. These estimations are 
rough, however they give an idea of the environmental footprint caused by the chemical 
tanker vessels in the two different scenarios. After estimating the amount of real CO2 released 
by the vessels in the current situation, I estimate the amount of CO2 released in a situation 
with a central planner where the exact same cargos were transported.  
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6. Analysis 
 
In order to determine whether a regulated market situation will improve vessel productivity 
and port congestion, reducing the environmental footprint and leading to optimal use of 
chemical tankers, I compare a segment of the market under free competition with a simulated 
regulated market. In order for this to be a reasonable comparison I first have to determine 
whether we can categorize today’s market as an efficient market with a high level of free 
competition.  Then I give a brief introduction of my observations from this scenario before 
presenting the results from the schedule optimization of a simulated central planner. Now 
with two separate scenarios at hand, I observe, compare and discuss the differences between 
the two in terms of productivity levels, costs and environmental impact. Based on these 
observations and the following discussions I attempt to give an insight into the overall effect 
of regulation in the form of a central planner, and whether free competition therefore 
contributes to an optimal situation for both ship owner, charterer and the global society as a 
whole.  
 
6.1 The Two Scenarios 
In order for my comparison to be sensible, I must first determine the nature of the scenarios, 
where one scenario is an efficient market under high levels of free competition and the other 
is a simulated regulated market under a central planner. Using the same input data in the two 
scenarios I will sufficiently be able to compare the scenarios ascribing the observed 
differences to this difference in regulation. 
 
6.1.1	  Free	  Competition	  
Is the chemical tanker market as it operates today, an efficient market under high levels of 
free competition? The chemical freight market can be described as the demand for the 
transport of liquid chemicals by sea provided by ship operators for a customer. An efficient 
market as presented in section 4.2, is often characterized by; including many buyers and 
sellers, uniform motives, low barriers for entry and exit, perfect information and homogenous 
products (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 2009). Essentially consumers and suppliers rule an efficient 
market without being regulated by externalities like governments and unions driven by 
external non- market agendas.  
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The chemical freight market, as presented in chapter 2, is considered to have several buyers 
and sellers where the actors operate with a uniform motive. The motivation of the ship owners 
is to maximize their revenue given limitations set by their own production. The buyers on the 
other end are motivated to purchase a given transport at the lowest possible price. The 
chemical freight market can therefore be considered to have a significant number of players 
with seemingly uniform motives on the demand and of the supply side.   
 
The barriers for entry and exiting the chemical freight market are considered to be relatively 
low. Even though the initial capital investment necessary in order to buy a single vessel and 
therefore enter the market might be considered high, the vessels are marketable through the 
secondhand market making it possible to reduce the risk of the initial investment again 
lowering the barrier for entry (Walderhaug and Hammer 2007). This might also in a way 
contribute to an increasing number of suppliers in the market. 
 
The chemical freight market is also characterized by large and free information flows. Freight 
rates, second hand market rates, fuel prices and so on are available and accessible at any given 
time. This information is available through a number of different information channels like 
for instance Clarkson’s Shipping Intelligence. Market players are considered to have close to 
perfect information, where perfect information is a situation where all actors have access to 
complete and identical information (Oxford Dictionary of English 2010). The market is also 
characterized as supplying close to identical services, the transport of liquid chemicals from 
port A to port B. There is some differentiation when it comes to specialization and 
technological aspects of vessels, giving some operators the ability to differentiate supplying 
transport of chemical products requiring special conditions for transport. This is however a 
small segment of the market.  
 
How is the price of chemical transport set and is the price affected by new information in the 
market? In shipping the price of transportation is set as a freight rate either through spot or 
COAs. In order for the market to be considered as operating efficiently the freight rate must 
respond to new information in the market. Looking at historical trends in the freight rate one 
can conclude that the freight rates do indeed respond to new information in the market like for 
instance a drop in fuel prices (Norman 1980).  
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Competition is defined as the activity or condition of striving to gain or win something by 
defeating or establishing superiority over others (Oxford Dictionary of English 2010). In other 
words one might say that free competition prevails when the rival activity between suppliers 
to meet the demand of the customer is able to flow freely without regulation. All operators 
should have the freedom to operate in any segment of the market that they are able to with 
respect to own financial or operational limitation, which is provided by the rules and 
regulations in the chemical tanker market, cf. section 3.4. Also, if reducing any of the 
characteristics of an efficient market discussed above, one may consider the competition in 
the market to be weakened, again resulting in the freight rate not efficiently responding to the 
conditions of the market (Pindyck og Rubinfeld 2009).  
 
I can conclude therefore, from the analysis above that the chemical freight market today 
operates in an efficient market characterized by a high level of free competition with many 
actors, uniform motives, low barriers for entry and exit, close to perfect flow of information 
and homogeneous services, thus meeting the characteristics of the free competition scenario 
of my comparison. 
 
 
The input data of the two scenarios that I compare consist of a fleet of 50 different vessels 
subject to serve 530 cargoes as presented above in section 5.2. In figure 6.1 below, the routes 
of 8 of the 50 vessels are illustrated as they were operated under free competition in order to 
give an idea of the routes and sailed distances. A summary for all 50 vessels utilization rate 
(Table 1(F)), the voyage cost analysis (Table 2(F)), and an estimation of total CO2 emissions 
(Table 3(F)) under free competition is found in Appendix F. Provided in table 6.1 bellow, is 
an overview of the estimates for the entire fleet under free competition. 
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Figure 6.1: The Routes of 8 Out of the 50 Vessels Under Free Competition  
 
Table 6.1 Overall Calculations for Fleet Under Free Competition 
Free Competition Scenario   
  Average Utilization 61 % 
  Total Fuel Cost for Fleet  $          6 687 512,75  
Total Port Cost for Fleet  $        11 065 000,00  
Total Voyage Costs for Fleet  $        17 752 512,75  
  Total CO2 Emissions (tons)  211 994  
 
 
6.1.2	  Simulated	  Market	  Regulation	  (Central	  Planner)	  
A planned market is a market system where decisions regarding production and investment 
are embodied in a plan formulated by a central authority, usually by a public body such as a 
government agency or international organization (Encyclopædia Britannica Inc. 2013). There 
appears to be a general consensus among ship operators in the chemical tanker market today 
that a central planner would be able to more efficiently distribute cargos to vessels or 
operators so that they can operate with a higher productivity by for instance minimizing the 
number of berth calls per vessel thereby reducing port congestion.  Simulating a central 
planner I first composed 36 different routes in order to create network equilibrium by which 
all demand would be met. Based on Christiansen´s model of the scheduling problem for 
vessels with multiple cargoes I have been able to find an optimal vessel asignment for the 36 
routes. Using linear programing implementing and the CPLEX solver, the optimal assignment 
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was calculated giving the results as shown in table 6.2 below (AMPL script available in 
Appendix D). When a vessel is assigned the route number “0”, it indicates that the vessel is 
not used and can therefore be redistributed to other trade lanes. I assume that any vessel 
removed from this trade lane can be efficiently used on a different trade lane, thus removing it 
from the available capacity on this specific trade lane. 
 
Table	  6.2:	  Vessel	  Assignment	  under	  Central	  Planner	  
Vessel Name 
Assigned Route 
(CP) 
 
Vessel Name 
Assigned Route 
(CP) 
Amelia 29 
 
NCC Dammam 0 
Beech Galaxy 6 
 
NCC Najem 23 
Bow Engineer 13 
 
NCC Nasma 0 
Bow Spring 28 
 
NCC Noor 0 
Bunga Banyan 27 
 
Pine Galaxy 5 
Chembulk Barcelona 15 
 
Sichem Onomichi 24 
Chembulk Virgin Gorda 4 
 
Sira 7 
Chemway Lara 16 
 
Siteam Jupiter 35 
Fairchem Colt 1 
 
Siteam Leader 34 
Fairchem Eagle 31 
 
Siteam Neptun 19 
Fairchem Stallion 36 
 
Siva Ghent 2 
Formosa Thirteen 14 
 
Stolt Achievement 0 
FPMC 24 12 
 
Stolt Emerald 0 
FPMC 28 11 
 
Stolt Focus 33 
FPMC 30 0 
 
Stolt Sapphire 0 
MR Kentaurus 0 
 
Stolt Sea 0 
Ginga Bobcat 17 
 
Stolt Sneland 22 
Ginga Eagle 21 
 
Stolt Spray 3 
Ginga Lion 18 
 
Stolt Surf 30 
Ginga Lynx 20 
 
Stolt Topaz 0 
Golden Unity 25 
 
Sycamore 0 
Maemi 32 
 
Sypress 9 
Maritime Jingan 0 
 
Wawasan Emerald 0 
Maritime North 26 
 
Wawasan Ruby 10 
Miramis 8 
 
Xena 0 
 
In the same matter as in section 6.1.1 above, a summary of  the vessels utilization rate (Table 
1(G)), the voyage cost analysis (Table 2(G)), and an estimation of total CO2 emissions (Table 
3(G)) under a central planner is found in Appendix G. I have provided a simple overview in 
table 6.3 below.  
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Table	  6.3	  Overall Calculations for Fleet under Central Planner	  
Central Planner Scenario   
  Average Utilization 82 % 
  Total Fuel Cost for Fleet  $4 105 123,44  
Total Port Cost for Fleet  $5 665 000,00  
Total Voyage Costs for Fleet  $9 770 123,44  
  Total CO2 Emissions (tons) 130 132 
 
The savings with regards to utilization and costs could possibly have be even greater if I were 
to optimize routes through a route optimization model, instead of roughly composing them in 
the manner I have done. However due to the limitation of the scope of this thesis I consider 
the savings potential to be sufficiently observable through this method, though it would cause 
for an interesting further study. In addition to this, it is important to take into consideration the 
assumption made that all cargoes may be stowed adjacent to all other cargoes. As presented in 
section 2.1.2, this is certainly not the case in the true market. Therefore it might not 
necessarily be possible in reality to assign these vessels to these routes. One should also 
consider the time horizon of the data set. There might have been specified delivery constraints 
for the customer within my time horizon that caused the cargoes to be chartered as they were. 
Redistributing freely within this time horizon might therefore not be acceptable for the 
customer based on their time requirements. Again however, I believe that the assessment is 
right and provides insight of the issue and the existence of possible productivity 
improvements in the chemical freight market. 
 
6.2 The Comparison 
In this section I compare the true free market scenario of the cargoes transported in the period 
15th of October 2012 to the 15th of December 2012 with the simulated regulated market 
scenario of the central planner servicing the exact same cargoes. I compare, observe and 
discuss the impact the reduction in free competition would have had on productivity, costs 
and environmental footprint. 
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6.2.1	  Productivity	  
Productivity is the effectiveness of productive effort measured in the rate of output per unit of 
input (Stopford 1988), in other words productivity is the rate of which vessels (input) 
effectively are able to transport cargo (output). In order to determine the impact a regulated 
market has on the productivity of the chemical freight market, I first discuss its impact on 
vessels utilization, followed by an assessment of the impact on port congestion. 	  
6.2.1.1 Utilization 
The utilization of vessels under free competition is indicated to be approximately 61% in the 
Asia Pacific trade lane from the US Gulf to Asia from the 15th of October to the 15th of 
December of 2012. This is given by estimating the utilization of each vessel used for 
transportation in this trade lane, in this given time period. I then averaged the utilization levels 
of all the vessels used. A utilization level of 61% indicates that there were many vessels 
sailing with close to half of their tank capacity empty, there is seemingly low productivity. 
The highest and the lowest utilization level were respectively 96% and 3%, considering that 
the latter might be a result of plotting errors in the received PIERS dataset. Nonetheless, what 
might be leading to operations at such a low utilization?  
 
Looking briefly at the charter agreements from the US gulf to Asia in this period (Appendix 
A), one can observe that several of the cargoes are to and from the same ports. However the 
cargo is transported on several different vessels, not only contributing to port congestion, but 
reduced utilization or in other words productivity. For instance in my dataset I find that the 
operator INEOS Europe AG chartered 6 different vessels, from 6 different operators within 
the time period observed, to carry Acrylonitrile from Point Comfort to Ulsan, South Korea. In 
other words, 6 different ship operators carrying the same commodity, to and from the same 
ports, for the same customer. The average utilization of the vessel sailing with these cargos 
was approximately 68% (excluding Siteam Neptun), so there was access capacity available on 
the vessels. Would it not be sensible to redistribute these cargoes to be carried on fewer 
vessels, this way increasing productivity? Why would the customer not wish to consolidate 
these cargoes on a single vessel rather than 6 separate ships? One of the seemingly most 
obvious reasons might have been the freight rate achieved under prevailing market conditions. 
The freight rate tendered might have been different from ship owner, to ship owner so in 
order for the customer to minimize their costs they probably elected to split the cargo so to be 
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delivered by 6 different operators, however inefficient this might be at port. The savings of 
doing this must have beem at such a level that the increases in costs connected to larger port 
cost as well as cargo handling dues (if assumed a function of number of berth calls) were 
compensated. In addition to this, the time of delivery might have been a determining factor. 
Although these vessels all sailed in the same period I believe that they all arrived Ulsan at 
different times. However only maybe days apart, these days might be crucial for the customer 
causing him/her to wish to split the cargo. Finally, the cargoes might also have been divided 
in this manner based on the customers wish to be able to resell only a portion of the cargo 
while in transit or deliver to different end users at the destination port. For instance if the 
charterer were to speculate on acrylonitrile prices he/she would be able to sell the bill of 
lading for one of the cargos on one of the vessels. However one must be allowed to ask, 
would it not be possible for the charterer to sell a portion of a cargo, or distribute to different 
end users even if it is transported on the same vessel, simply dividing and redistributing the 
cargo when having arrived at Ulsan?  All in all the most sensible explanation to this 
inefficiency seems to be the large supply of operators giving the customer the possibility to 
minimize its transportation costs by splitting the cargo to several operators and by doing so 
contributing to a decrease in utilization.  
 
Would we be able to deliver the same level of transport (output) using fewer vessels (input) 
under a central planner? Comparing the total average utilization in the two scenarios we see 
an increase from 61% (under free competition) to 82% (under central planner). The increase 
in utilization is a result of utilizing fewer vessels, but still carrying the exact same cargoes. 
Under the central planner it would have been possible to eliminate 14 vessels. I also observe 
that under a central planner there would be several vessels operating at utilization levels close 
to 100% and that the lowest level of utilization would be only at 57%. Differences in 
utilization under these two scenarios are seemingly prominent, a portion of the potential 
improvement would likely have to be disregarded since the assumption of disregarded 
stowage regulations as well as the customer time constraints have not been taken into account.  
 
6.2.1.2 Port Congestion 
In terms of port congestion it is said that chemical tankers use a considerable amount of time 
in port. As mentioned in the introduction, Odfjell estimates that their vessels spend on average 
approximately 44% of the time available, in port (Walderhaug, 2013). Ship operators believe 
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that an expected affect of a planned market scenario, is that there would be a reduction in the 
number of berth calls per vessel, therefore naturally causing a reduction of congestion at port 
and as a result, also a reduction in the time spent waiting. I have observed in my dataset that 
today under free competition there are a considerable number of berth calls per voyage. On 
average the vessels operating the Asia-Pacific trade lane in the given time period, spent 
approximately 35% of its total time in port, given that on average each vessel spends 3 days 
per berth call. Even though this is a rough estimate and I am not able to identify the exact time 
spent waiting, it indicates that there is a large potential for productivity improvement in this 
area.  
 
Port congestion can be a result of many different things. It can be a momentary congestion as 
a result of bad weather or sailing conditions causing delays resulting in several vessels 
arriving at port simultaneously (Stopford 1988). At port, bad weather might also make cargo 
handling difficult, contributing to even further increased congestion. Port congestion can also 
be a result of a rapid increase in activity. When there is an increase in the number of vessels 
requesting to berth, without there simultaneously being an increase in port capacity, there will 
naturally be an increase of congestion. In this assessment however, I analyze to what extent 
free competition in the chemical freight market might be a contributing factor to the increase 
in port congestion.  
 
The chemical freight market is characterized by combining several customers’ cargo on a 
single vessel. This results in each vessel being in need to call at several different ports in order 
to load and discharge for a single Asia-Pacific voyage. Under free competition, with low 
vessel utilization, there are a larger number of vessels in use than would be the case under the 
simulated central planner, cf. 6.2.1.1. Looking at a similar example to the one presented 
above, VINMAR International chartered three different vessels (Ginga Bobcat, Sira and 
Wawasan Emerald) from three different operators (Tokyo Marine, Navig8 Chemicals and 
IMC/Aurora) all to load from Houston for discharging at Lianyungang within this time 
period. They were all carrying Acrylonitrile and the total cargo volume was approximately 
15300 metric tons divided between them. Like in my discussion above there could be several 
motives causing the customer to split similar cargo in this manner. As mentioned above, 
factors like delivery time, possibilities for resale or end user constraints are examples of this. 
Since I do not have information about the freight rates for each of these charter agreements I 
cannot determine whether this distribution maximized the revenue of the operators or 
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minimized the transportation costs for the customer. In terms of productivity at port, I would 
conclude that this was unfavorable, being as this resulted in three vessels being in need to call 
the same berth in Houston and Lianyungang instead of one. Did this result in access waiting? 
Seemingly, one single ship would have been able to load the entire capacity of the vessel at 
port A for discharging at port B. So in this instance reducing the number of berth calls in 
Houston and Lianyungang to just one operator. In order to increase productivity in this 
manner, a consolidation like a central planner is necessary. The central planner, like done in 
the simulation above, would in addition to other factors, put together routes which as far as 
possible would minimize the number of ports and berth the vessel would have to call before 
crossing the Pacific. In the chemical market the customers are located at many different ports 
making this task very challenging. However, simply by increasing utilization of each vessel, 
therefore reducing the number of overall berth calls, could result in a reduction in overall 
demand for time in port, increasing productivity at port and reducing port congestion. In my 
simulation the total time spent in port based on the same estimate of 3 days per berth call, was 
2 days in port per 5 days at sea (2:5), whereas under free competition the vessel spent 5 days 
in port per 9 days at sea (5:9).   
 
As a result of fewer vessels being needed to handle the cargoes and therefore reduced port 
congestion and time spent waiting, a cost reduction for the customer in the form of a reduced 
demurrage payments, could possibly be expected. Demurrage is the cost that is charged for 
any additional time in port out side of what was negotiated in advanced, regardless of how the 
time is spent. When congestion is reduced, waiting is also reduced and again the charged 
demurrage will be reduced. Odfjell collected in 2012 approximately 60 million USD in 
demurrage in 2012, representing 5.6% of the gross freight revenue. To what extent this 
demurrage would be reduced is difficult to determine without information on the actual time 
vessels spent in port and to what extent the pre-negotiated time was exceeded. 
 
 
To conclude, in terms of utilization and port congestion, the productivity of the chemical 
freight market indeed would increase under a market regulated by a central planner. In other 
words, free competition seemingly contributes to reduced productivity in the market.  
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6.2.2	  Changes	  in	  Cost	  
When considering the changes in costs, I have focused on the voyage specific costs; fuel costs 
and port costs. In the model used to solve the scheduling problem (section 4.3.2) the object 
function minimizes the total voyage costs for the fleet. By doing this, the central planner at 
the same time minimizes the total fuel consumed as well as the number of berth calls, 
intending to increase the market productivity for all participants. The central planner 
determines the distribution of cargoes on stipulated routes and assigns them to vessels with 
the object of minimizing the total fuel and port costs for the fleet. The fuel costs and port 
costs applicable to each route, for each vessel, is in the model pooled together. After receiving 
the redistribution as a result of the optimization, I have computed a voyage cost analysis 
determining the fuel costs with regards to a change in fuel consumption in port, as well as 
separating out port costs, see Appendix E. This way I have been able to illuminate the impact 
of regulation on fuel costs and port costs independently. An overview of the results is shown 
in table 6.2.2 below.  
 
 
Table	  6.2.2	  Overview	  of	  Differences	  in	  Cost	  
  
Free Competition 
Scenario 
Central Planner 
Scenario 
Difference 
(%) 
    Total Fuel Cost for Fleet  $6 687 512,75   $4 105 123,44  -39 % 
Total Port Cost for Fleet   $11 065 000,00   $5 665 000,00  -49 % 
Total Voyage Costs for Fleet  $17 752 512,75   $9 770 123,44  -45 % 
 
What are the causes of the reduction in costs? Looking at table 6.2.2 above I have estimated 
that the largest savings can be made in terms of reduced port costs. Being as the port fees are 
the same in both scenarios, I can contribute this change to the reduced number of calls to 
berth (302 vs. 152). In my simulation I have considered cargo-handling costs to be the same 
under both scenarios due to the assumption that cargo handling costs are a function of $ per 
ton handled and the amount of cargo being handled is the same under both scenarios. 
However, one might consider that the cost of handling large cargo quantities on one vessel 
implies higher costs than small cargo quantities on several vessels. Considering the advanced 
piping systems on board a chemical tanker, cf. section 2.2.1, I would assume that the costs of 
handling large versus small cargo quantities would be close to equal. In simplified terms the 
cargo handler only would have to connect the port pipes to the vessels pipe system and run 
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the pumps longer for larger quantities than smaller quantities. In contrast to chemicals 
shipping I would assume that the differences in cargo handling costs will be larger in other 
shipping segments like for instance in container shipping, where handling cargo is a more 
costly process per unit.  
 
Comparing the fuel costs of the two scenarios (table 6.2.2), the reduction is predominantly a 
result of fewer vessels in service due to the central planners ability to increase the utilization 
of vessels, cf. section 6.2.1. The average distance sailed by the vessels in service in the two 
scenarios is fairly similar. Under free competition the vessels travelled approximately 11 000 
miles/vessel in service within this period, while under the central planner the average distance 
travelled per vessel in service was approximately 10 500 miles. This underpins the 
assumption that reduced fuel costs would have been a result of the reduced number of vessels 
necessary to serving the demand. As implied earlier, there might be even more savings to be 
acquired under the regulated market if the central planner was to optimize the composition of 
routes based on minimizing these costs, as apposed to roughly minimizing as I have done in 
my simulation.  
 
As presented in section 4.1.1 the supply curve of a chemical freight market is determined by 
the capacity of a fleet at a given bunker price.  The curve is a summation of all the vessels 
capacity in a fleet. The supply curve is often referred to as a hockey stick due to a vessels 
ability to increase capacity by increasing the speed at which the vessel is sailing. If the market 
is weak and bunker prices are high, they will slow down and if the market is strong and 
bunker prices are low, they will speed up. The concept of regulating one´s capacity according 
to the current market condition using the speed of vessels is called speed optimization. If the 
result of using a central planner causes for the demand of a fewer number of vessels (due to 
the increase in utilization and unchanged demand), one might expect ship operators to reduce 
the speed of their vessels, or slow steam in order to adapt their supply and deliberately reduce 
fuel costs. However, as mentioned in section 4.5.1, there are empirical indications that capsize 
dry bulk vessels do not in the same degree as theoretically indicated adapt their speed (Ådland 
2013). This could possibly also be true for chemical tankers.  
 
Overall with regards to costs, there are seemingly large potential savings to be made by going 
from free competition to central planning, in terms of fuel savings and reduced port costs. 
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Based hereon I can conclude that free competition in this case does not contribute to the 
optimal usage of vessels and thus an optimal cost level.  
 
6.2.3	  Environmental	  Footprint	  
When roughly comparing the CO2 emissions under the two scenarios I see a clear reduction 
of the environmental footprint under the central planner due to the reduction in total travelled 
distance as well as a reduced number of total days spent in port. As indicated in the study by 
Psaraftis and Kontovas (2009) an increase in utilization is directly linked to a reduction in 
CO2 emissions. As discussed above there are indications of increased productivity both in 
terms of utilization and in port congestion under a central planner, cf. 6.2.1, thus I can assume 
that this reduction in environmental footprint is linked to the increase in productivity or in 
other words a more optimal use of the chemical tanker fleet.  
 
Table	  6.2	  Comparison	  of	  Total	  CO2	  Emissions	  Estimate	  	  
  
Free Competition 
Scenario 
Central Planner 
Scenario Difference (%) 
    Total CO2 emissions in transit (tons)  154 649   103 633  -33 % 
Total CO2 emissions in port (tons)  57 345   26 438  -54 % 
 
 
Table 6.2 shows a considerable reduction in estimated CO2 emissions. As the level of CO2 
emissions are calculated based on the amount of fuel consumed, I can assume that part of the 
reduction is ascribed to the reduced total distance sailed under a central planner. The reduced 
total distance sailed is a result of fewer vessels in service, which again is a result of the 
increase in utilization. This contributes to confirming that there is a correlation between 
increased utilization of vessels and decreased CO2 emissions. The increased utilization and 
therefore reduced number of vessels in service under the regulated market, contributes to an 
overall more environmentally friendly industry.  
 
Looking at the environmental effect of reduced CO2 emissions at port, the reduced total 
number of days spent in port as a result of fewer vessels in service, contributed to a 54% 
decrease in CO2 emissions. In addition to this one has to take into account how port 
congestion contributes to vessels waiting and thus unnecessary fuel consumption. When 
waiting a vessel burns fuel using auxiliary engines to generate the power necessary to 
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maintain the crew as well as the cargo. These engines have a lower level of fuel consumption 
and therefore possibly lower CO2 emissions, however they do still contribute to the 
environmental footprint, particularly in the form of local pollution. When reducing the 
number of vessels in service and therefore also the number of vessels requesting to berth, one 
automatically reduces the port congestion given port capacity remains unchanged. Doing this, 
vessels are no longer in the same degree forced to wait, thus reducing unnecessary fuel 
consumption. This most likely reduces the total environmental footprint in addition to 
contributing to a cleaner local port environment.  
 
6.2.4	  Summary	  
To sum up my comparison, I conclude that a regulated market under a central planner, would 
have contributed to; increased utilization and reduced port congestion, voyage costs and 
environmental footprint. Keeping in mind the possible errors in the data set provided, I must 
keep in mind whether the differences observed are in fact significant. In order to achieve more 
accurate results one must be able to in a more precise manner simulate the central planner. In 
further studies one could complete a comparative study using a much larger dataset as well as 
an increased time horizon to avoid static from seasonal trends. However having considered 
the possible discrepancies, overall one can state, based on this simulation, that free 
competition does in fact not contribute to the optimal use of vessels and the lowest possible 
environmental footprint. 
 
6.3 Who are the beneficiaries? 
Having determined that there are in fact gains to be made by implementing regulations on the 
market in the form of a central planner, thus reducing free competition, one must consider 
who would benefit from a central planned chemical freight market? Is this something all 
market participants potentially would agree to be a part of? 
 
It is seemingly beneficial for the ship operator to operate in a regulated market as this would 
result in a cut of costs and therefore also increased margins. Comparing the estimated costs 
connected to the two market situations there are clear savings to be made using a planner. 
Taking into consideration that this only is a rough estimate, there could potentially be 45% 
reduction of costs under a planning scheme, cf. section 6.2.2. In addition to a reduction of 
voyage costs, the ship operator would also most likely experience a reduction in demurrage 
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revenue. However, being as this only accounts for a small portion of total revenue I would 
assume that the savings in voyage costs would outweigh the tiny reduction in revenues.  
 
Determining whether the regulated market is beneficial for the customer is difficult. In a 
sense, the increased productivity as a result of central planning contributes to a more efficient 
transport of their cargoes. I estimate an increase in utilization of approximately 34% 
indicating that the total available supply of transport would be increased.  There would also be 
a 50% reduction in the number of berth calls, most likely causing a reduction in potential 
demurrage costs as well as a reduction in the risk connected to timely deliverance as a result 
of reduced port congestion, which is beneficial for the customer. 
 
The factor that has the most impact on whether a central planner would be beneficial for 
market participants, is price. When productivity increases under a free market scenario and 
the demand is met utilizing a fewer number of vessels, thus reducing the total fleet utilization, 
the freight rate would decrease. Market theory indicates that when the market is regulated and 
ship owners no longer compete for cargo, the freight rate for the given transport will increase. 
The customer is therefore in an unfavorable situation with a possibility of increased price. 
When reducing competition in a market, it becomes increasingly difficult to determine what 
the correct price will have to be. Markets characterized by no competition are markets with 
only one supplier, markets under monopoly. If the market were to enter a state of monopoly 
the freight rate would no longer represent the marginal cost of production, but exceed the 
marginal cost (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 2009). Doing this there would be a dead weight loss, 
which is the net loss of surplus (gain in producer surplus minus the reduction in consumer 
surplus) in the market (ibid.). In this situation the customer also would be worse off, in other 
words would not benefit from market regulation. Further one can question whether an 
increase in productivity and reduction in potential demurrage and risk for the customer, would 
justify the potential increase in freight rates? 
 
The difficulties of price setting under a regulated market could possibly be problematic for 
ship operators as well. How would price be determined under the central planner, and which 
costs would be included in this decision? Seeing as shipping operators are subject to different 
cost structures based on the differences in size and specialty of their vessels, how can a 
centrally set, common freight rate contribute to cover their different capital and running costs? 
The result of a price set to low would for instance possibly cause for ship owners to layup, 
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causing an under supply. This is seemingly something ship operators would not agree to be a 
part of.  
 
Overall there are pros and cons for both customer and ship operator. Whether they in the end 
benefit from a market under a central planner depends on what degree the correct price is 
possible to set, as well as the magnitude of the productivity gains. Thus answering whether 
this is something market participants would agree to be a part of.  
 
6.4 Challenges in the Implementation of a Central Planner 
Based on the assumption that a central planner would be beneficial both for ship owner and 
customer, I would like to briefly consider the challenges of implementing such regulations in 
a market. How will the information necessary be made available to the central planner? Who 
would the central planner be? These are all challenging questions that would need to be 
answered and discussed thoroughly before implementation. I can however, only provide some 
of my own reflections around these topics.  
 
How would a central authority receive the necessary information in order to compose the 
most efficient routes? I would believe that there would be reluctances in the market to hand 
over certain information to a potential central planner. For instance which routes an operator 
would be interested in serving might for strategic purposes be unfavorable to share. One 
might also consider the possibility of data manipulation or corruption occurring in order to 
capture the “best” routes from the central planner. This is of course not desirable.  
 
When it comes to whom the central planner could be, it is naturally important to consider that 
the chemical tanker market is a global market and the authority in this case would have to be a 
global authority. The central planner would have to be able to subjectively distribute cargoes 
to routes, control that what is set is complied to, and impose sanctions when deviation occurs. 
The most well-known central planner systems through history are those of Eastern Europe 
during WW2. The communist party would centralize distribution as well as production of a 
number of commodities, creating a planned market economy based on their authority from 
military power. As indicated above, when competition is reduced, or in the case of Easter 
Europe completely removed, the price of the product was also here difficult to determine. 
Looking at prices of products in Eastern Europe contra Western Europe, one would see large 
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discrepancies. Due to prices not truly reflecting the costs of the goods, the supply in Eastern 
Europe would shift therefore leading to for instance very low bread prices and at the same 
time very long lines at the baker (low supply) (Encyclopædia Britannica Inc. 2013). I can 
assume that implementing a central planner in the chemical freight market would also here 
cause for difficulties in determining the price of transport as discussed above, and also 
potentially cause undersupply in the market. This might also contribute to charterers resorting 
to bribes or under the table transactions in order to acquire the necessary transportation of 
their products. In the worst case black markets might be formed. However looking at recent 
developments in Chinas planned economy, one might become slightly more optimistic. The 
Chinese economy maintains some level of competition while at the same time using a central 
planner composing 5-year plans, one might heed that a combination of the two could possibly 
succeed also else where, gaining the benefits of productivity improvements in the chemical 
freight market through consolidation while at the same time being able to determine a close to 
correct price. Could it be possible under a central planner, to maintain enough competition to 
obtain a representative freight rate and at the same time ensure the optimal usage of vessels? 
Would a possible solution for instance be distributing cargoes to different operators according 
to geographical area? For example, one could consolidate and compose routes from all 
cargoes at the ports in Houston, Freeport and Texas City. One could then give the possibility 
to bid on these routes to a limited number of ship operators like for instance Odfjell and Jo 
Tankers. They would then compete for the central planners composed routes from this area. 
With only two operators there would be some level of competition, assisting to determine a 
close to correct price, however still a much lower level of competition then under the current 
free market situation. I would assume this would still reduce port congestion, as there are only 
two operators at these ports. The question however arises whether all of the same efficiency 
gains observed in my simulation above, also would exist under this type of consolidation? If it 
were possible to carry through something like this, obtaining a fair freight rate for the 
customer, as well as ensuring the gains discussed in my comparison above, the customer and 
the ship operator could possibly primarily benefit from the regulated market.  
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7. Concluding Remarks 
Through this thesis, my goal was to shed light upon whether a chemical tanker market under 
free competition caused for the optimal use of vessels, as well as the lowest possible 
environmental footprint. By comparing two scenarios, where both were exposed to the same 
input data, thus only separating the two by market regulation, I established a sensible platform 
for a comparative study. The first scenario was a true market situation of a geographical 
segment, over a specified period of time, under free competition. The other scenario was a 
regulated market scenario under a simulated central planner. I compared the two scenarios in 
terms of productivity, costs and environmental footprint. Doing this I was able to determine 
that market regulation, being the only thing differentiating the scenarios, can potentially cause 
increased utilization of vessels, and reduced port congestion, voyage costs and overall 
environmental footprint. In other words, free competition did in fact, based on this 
assessment, contribute to neither the optimal use of vessels nor the lowest possible 
environmental footprint. However, when that is said, I also shortly evaluated who the 
beneficiaries of a potential market regulation would be, and examined crucial challenges of 
implementing a central planner. Though the challenges are many and certainly cause for 
further research, the most predominant and vital challenge is that of setting the correct freight 
rate in a non-competitive setting. Assuming that it is possible in an efficient manner to 
achieve a correct price under market regulation, both ship operator and customers would reap 
the indicated benefits, as free competition in the chemical tanker market is not cause for the 
optimal use of vessels and the lowest environmental footprint.   
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Appendix A: Cargo Charters 	  
Here I have provided a segment of the PIERS data set displaying the 532 cargoes serviced on 
the Asia Pacific trade lane between the 15th of October and the 15th of December of 2012. I 
have chosen to only display the data of importance for my assessment.  
 
 
OPERATOR LOADDATE VESSEL LOADPORT DISCHARGE PORT COUNTRY COMMODITY MTONS CHARTERER
Berlian Laju Tankers 121124 CHEMBULK VIRGIN GORDA BATON ROUGE CHANGSHU CHINA CHLOROFORM UN1888 3 059,02 OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL
Berlian Laju Tankers 121128 CHEMBULK VIRGIN GORDA LK CHARLES NINGBO CHINA MIX XYLENE 5 000,01 SUMMIT PETROCHEMICAL TRADING INC
Berlian Laju Tankers 121128 CHEMBULK VIRGIN GORDA LK CHARLES ULSAN SOUTH KOREA STYRENE MONOMER 5 229,40 TRAMMOCHEM
Chembulk 121024 CHEMBULK BARCELONA PNT COMFORT ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ACRYLONITRILE 4 000,00 INEOS EUROPE AG
Chembulk 121024 CHEMBULK BARCELONA PNT COMFORT ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ACRYLONITRILE 4 000,00 INEOS EUROPE AG
Chembulk 121030 CHEMBULK BARCELONA HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA MIX XYLENE 4 857,89 TOTAL PETROCHEMICALS
Chembulk 121030 CHEMBULK BARCELONA TEXAS CITY ULSAN SOUTH KOREA MIX XYLENE 4 769,41 CHEMIUM INTERNATIONAL
Chembulk 121102 CHEMBULK BARCELONA LK CHARLES ULSAN SOUTH KOREA STYRENE MONOMER 4 756,75 TRAMMOCHEM
Chembulk 121102 CHEMBULK BARCELONA LK CHARLES XIAMEN CHINA ETHYLENE DICHLORIDE 10 000,01 MITSUBISHI
Dorval Tankships Pty Ltd 121213 GOLDEN UNITY BATON ROUGE TIANJIN CHINA ETHYLENE DICHLORIDE 12 000,01 TRICON SHIPPING
Eitzen Chemical 121203 SICHEM ONOMICHI HOUSTON DALIAN CHINA MIX XYLENE 11 000,01 KOCH SUPPLY & TRADING
Eitzen Chemical 121019 SITEAM JUPITER CORPUS CHRSTI MAILIAO TAIWAN MIX XYLENE 5 261,01 KOLMAR AMERICAS
Eitzen Chemical 121022 SITEAM JUPITER TEXAS CITY ANPING CHINA STYRENE MONOMER 7 000,01 SUMMIT PETROCHEMICAL TRADING INC
Eitzen Chemical 121022 SITEAM JUPITER TEXAS CITY TAICHUNG TAIWAN FATTY ACID 6 300,01 ALPHA BIO ENERGY
Eitzen Chemical 121022 SITEAM JUPITER TEXAS CITY ULSAN SOUTH KOREA MIX XYLENE 5 225,39 CHEMIUM INTERNATIONAL
Eitzen Chemical 121018 SITEAM LEADER BATON ROUGE ULSAN SOUTH KOREA XYLENE ETHYLBENZENE 10 000,01 EXXONMOBIL CHEMICAL
Eitzen Chemical 121026 SITEAM LEADER CORPUS CHRSTI TIANJIN CHINA ORTHOXYLENE 4 998,01 TRAMMOCHEM
Eitzen Chemical 121028 SITEAM LEADER HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN STYRENE MONOMER 5 000,01 SUMMIT PETROCHEMICAL TRADING INC
Eitzen Chemical 121102 SITEAM LEADER BATON ROUGE DAESAN SOUTH KOREA ETHYLENE DICHLORIDE 3 333,34 MITSUI & CO
Eitzen Chemical 121102 SITEAM LEADER BATON ROUGE KASHIMA JAPAN ETHYLENE DICHLORIDE 3 333,34 MITSUI & CO
Eitzen Chemical 121102 SITEAM LEADER BATON ROUGE TIANJIN CHINA ETHYLENE DICHLORIDE 5 000,01 MITSUI & CO
Eitzen Chemical 121102 SITEAM LEADER S LOUISIANA TIANJIN CHINA ETHYLENE DICHLORIDE 5 000,01 MITSUI & CO
Eitzen Chemical 121102 SITEAM LEADER S LOUISIANA TIANJIN CHINA ETHYLENE DICHLORIDE 5 000,01 MITSUI & CO
Eitzen Chemical 121207 SITEAM NEPTUN HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ORTHOXYLENE 2 000,00 KOLMAR AMERICAS
Eitzen Chemical 121207 SITEAM NEPTUN HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ORTHOXYLENE 1 053,11 KOLMAR AMERICAS
Eitzen Chemical 121207 SITEAM NEPTUN TEXAS CITY MAILIAO TAIWAN MIX XYLENE 4 925,47 ICC CHEMICALS
Eitzen Chemical 121211 SITEAM NEPTUN PNT COMFORT ANPING CHINA ACRYLONITRILE 4 000,00 INEOS EUROPE AG
Eitzen Chemical 121211 SITEAM NEPTUN PNT COMFORT TIANJIN CHINA ETHYLENE DICHLORIDE 17 299,00 MITSUI STEEL INC
Eitzen Chemical 121211 SITEAM NEPTUN PNT COMFORT ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ACRYLONITRILE 3 761,00 INEOS EUROPE AG
Eitzen Chemical 121211 SITEAM NEPTUN PNT COMFORT YOSU SOUTH KOREA ETHYLENE DICHLORIDE 17 299,00 MITSUI STEEL INC
Eitzen Chemical 121214 SITEAM NEPTUN TEXAS CITY ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA PARAXYLENE 5 089,43 ICC CHEMICALS
Fairfield Chemical Carriers 121209 FAIRCHEM COLT FREEPORT TX DALIAN CHINA MIX XYLENE 8 920,72 KOCH SUPPLY & TRADING
Fairfield Chemical Carriers 121211 FAIRCHEM COLT HOUSTON DALIAN CHINA MIX XYLENE 9 081,02 KOCH SUPPLY & TRADING
Fairfield Chemical Carriers 121215 FAIRCHEM EAGLE HOUSTON DACHAN CHINA MONOETHYLENE GLYCOL 5 000,01 TRICON SHIPPING
Fairfield Chemical Carriers 121215 FAIRCHEM EAGLE HOUSTON DACHAN CHINA STYRENE MONOMER 5 000,01 TRICON SHIPPING
Fairfield Chemical Carriers 121215 FAIRCHEM EAGLE HOUSTON DACHAN CHINA STYRENE MONOMER 5 000,01 TRICON SHIPPING
Fairfield Chemical Carriers 121215 FAIRCHEM EAGLE HOUSTON DACHAN CHINA STYRENE MONOMER 2 500,00 TRICON SHIPPING
Fairfield Chemical Carriers 121215 FAIRCHEM EAGLE HOUSTON DACHAN CHINA STYRENE MONOMER 2 500,00 TRICON SHIPPING
Fairfield Chemical Carriers 121116 FAIRCHEM STALLION LK CHARLES ULSAN SOUTH KOREA MIX XYLENE 6 007,64 TRAMMOCHEM
Formosa Plastics Marine 121207 FORMOSA THIRTEEN LK CHARLES KOBE JAPAN ETHYLENE DICHLORIDE 1 500,00 MITSUBISHI CORP BEVERAGE
Formosa Plastics Marine 121019 FPMC 24 BATON ROUGE ULSAN SOUTH KOREA XYLENE ETHYLBENZENE 10 266,26 EXXONMOBIL CHEMICAL
Formosa Plastics Marine 121016 FPMC 28 CORPUS CHRSTI TIANJIN CHINA MIX XYLENE 5 000,01 MITSUBISHI CORP
Formosa Plastics Marine 121116 FPMC 30 PORT ARTHUR TAICHUNG TAIWAN METHYL ESTER 3 000,00 JP MORGAN VENTURES ENERGY CORP
Formosa Plastics Marine 121121 FPMC 30 LK CHARLES KOBE JAPAN ETHYLENE DICHLORIDE 10 000,01 MITSUBISHI CORPORATION
Formosa Plastics Marine 121121 FPMC 30 LK CHARLES MAILIAO TAIWAN MIX XYLENE 10 000,01 KOLMAR AMERICAS
Formosa Plastics Marine 121121 FPMC 30 LK CHARLES MAILIAO TAIWAN MIX XYLENE 3 000,00 KOLMAR AMERICAS
Formosa Plastics Marine 121125 FPMC 30 BATON ROUGE ULSAN SOUTH KOREA XYLENE ETHYLBENZENE 10 054,78 EXXONMOBIL CHEMICAL
Iino 121017 CHEMWAY LARA HOUSTON CHIBA JAPAN ETHYL TERTIARY BUTYL ETHER 33 648,45 LYONDELL CHEMICAL
IMC/Aurora 121114 MARITIME JINGAN PNT COMFORT ANPING CHINA ACRYLONITRILE 4 000,00 INOES EURODE
IMC/Aurora 121114 MARITIME JINGAN PNT COMFORT TIANJIN CHINA ETHYLENE DICHLORIDE 10 000,01 MITSUI & CO
IMC/Aurora 121114 MARITIME JINGAN PNT COMFORT ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ACRYLONITRILE 1 000,00 INOES
IMC/Aurora 121114 MARITIME JINGAN PNT COMFORT ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ACRYLONITRILE 3 000,00 INOES EURODE
IMC/Aurora 121114 MARITIME JINGAN PNT COMFORT YOSU SOUTH KOREA ETHYLENE DICHLORIDE 10 000,01 MITSUI & CO
IMC/Aurora 121125 MARITIME JINGAN CORPUS CHRSTI ULSAN SOUTH KOREA MIX XYLENE 5 000,01 MITSUBISHI INTERNATIONAL
IMC/Aurora 121202 MARITIME JINGAN HOUSTON ANPING CHINA STYRENE MONOMER 5 250,49 LYONDELL CHEMICAL
IMC/Aurora 121202 MARITIME JINGAN HOUSTON NINGBO CHINA ACRYLONITRILE 3 000,00 VINMAR OVERSEAS
IMC/Aurora 121018 MARITIME NORTH HOUSTON ANPING CHINA STYRENE MONOMER 4 769,09 LYONDELL CHEMICAL
IMC/Aurora 121018 MARITIME NORTH HOUSTON JIANGYIN CHINA VINYL ACETATE MONOMER 3 000,00 OXYDE CHEMICALS
IMC/Aurora 121018 MARITIME NORTH HOUSTON NINGBO CHINA ACRYLONITRILE 2 059,43 VINMAR INTERNATIONAL
IMC/Aurora 121018 MARITIME NORTH HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA MIX XYLENE 5 840,02 MARUBENI AMERICA
IMC/Aurora 121021 MARITIME NORTH PNT COMFORT ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ACRYLONITRILE 4 000,00 INEOS EUROPE
IMC/Aurora 121030 MARITIME NORTH FREEPORT TX SHANGHAI CHINA ETHYLENE DICHLORIDE 10 000,01 TRICON SHIPPING INC
IMC/Aurora 121105 WAWASAN EMERALD HOUSTON ANPING CHINA ACRYLONITRILE 4 000,00 VINMAR INTERNATIONAL
IMC/Aurora 121105 WAWASAN EMERALD HOUSTON JIANGYIN CHINA VINYL ACETATE MONOMER 2 000,00 OXYDE CHEMICALS
IMC/Aurora 121105 WAWASAN EMERALD HOUSTON LIANYUNGANG CHINA ACRYLONITRILE 1 000,00 VINMAR INTERNATIONAL
IMC/Aurora 121105 WAWASAN EMERALD HOUSTON LIANYUNGANG CHINA ACRYLONITRILE 1 000,00 VINMAR INTERNATIONAL
IMC/Aurora 121105 WAWASAN EMERALD HOUSTON LIANYUNGANG CHINA ACRYLONITRILE 1 000,00 VINMAR INTERNATIONAL
IMC/Aurora 121105 WAWASAN EMERALD HOUSTON LIANYUNGANG CHINA ACRYLONITRILE 1 000,00 VINMAR INTERNATIONAL
IMC/Aurora 121105 WAWASAN EMERALD HOUSTON LIANYUNGANG CHINA ACRYLONITRILE 2 000,00 VINMAR INTERNATIONAL
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IMC/Aurora 121105 WAWASAN EMERALD HOUSTON LIANYUNGANG CHINA ACRYLONITRILE 500,00 VINMAR INTERNATIONAL
IMC/Aurora 121106 WAWASAN EMERALD CORPUS CHRSTI JIANGYIN CHINA PARAXYLENE 5 000,01 VINMAR INTERNATIONAL
IMC/Aurora 121105 WAWASAN RUBY HOUSTON JIANGYIN CHINA ACETONE 500,00 VINMAR INTERNATIONAL
IMC/Aurora 121105 WAWASAN RUBY HOUSTON ZHUHAI CHINA PARAXYLENE 15 000,02 EXXONMOBIL CHEMICAL
Koyo Kaiun 121120 AMELIA BATON ROUGE ULSAN SOUTH KOREA PHENOL 2 079,33 MITSUI & CO
Koyo Kaiun 121127 AMELIA FREEPORT TX MAILIAO TAIWAN MIX XYLENE 8 248,80 KOLMAR AMERICAS
Koyo Kaiun 121203 AMELIA HOUSTON DONGGUAN CHINA ETHYLENE GLYCOL BUTYL ETHER 200,00 ITOCHU CHEMICALS AMERICA
Koyo Kaiun 121203 AMELIA HOUSTON DONGGUAN CHINA ETHYLENE GLYCOL BUTYL ETHER 220,00 ITOCHU CHEMICALS AMERICA
Koyo Kaiun 121203 AMELIA HOUSTON DONGGUAN CHINA ETHYLENE GLYCOL BUTYL ETHER 80,00 ITOCHU CHEMICALS AMERICA
Koyo Kaiun 121203 AMELIA HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA BUTYL ACETATE UN1123 419,98 ITOCHU CHEMICALS AMERICA
Koyo Kaiun 121203 AMELIA HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA BUTYL ACETATE UN1123 210,00 ITOCHU CHEMICALS AMERICA
Koyo Kaiun 121203 AMELIA HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ETHYLENE GLYCOL BUTYL ETHER 500,00 ITOCHU CHEMICALS AMERICA
Koyo Kaiun 121015 XENA BATON ROUGE GUNSAN SOUTH KOREA PHENOL 2 622,92 MITSUBISHI INTERNATIONAL
Koyo Kaiun 121015 XENA BATON ROUGE ULSAN SOUTH KOREA PHENOL 2 083,79 MITSUI & CO
Koyo Kaiun 121020 XENA LK CHARLES ULSAN SOUTH KOREA MIX XYLENE 5 956,64 TRAMMOCHEM AG
Koyo Kaiun 121023 XENA HOUSTON DONGGUAN CHINA ETHYLENE GLYCOL BUTYL ETHER 220,00 ITOCHU CHEMICALS AMERICA
Koyo Kaiun 121023 XENA HOUSTON DONGGUAN CHINA ETHYLENE GLYCOL BUTYL ETHER 80,00 ITOCHU CHEMICALS AMERICA
Koyo Kaiun 121023 XENA HOUSTON GUANGZHOU CHINA ETHYLENE GLYCOL BUTYL ETHER 1 250,00 ITOCHU CHEMICALS AMERICA
Koyo Kaiun 121023 XENA HOUSTON GUANGZHOU CHINA ETHYLENE GLYCOL BUTYL ETHER 250,00 ITOCHU CHEMICALS AMERICA
Koyo Kaiun 121023 XENA HOUSTON GUANGZHOU CHINA ETHYLENE GLYCOL BUTYL ETHER 200,00 ITOCHU CHEMICALS AMERICA
Koyo Kaiun 121023 XENA HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA DIETHYLENE GLYCOL BUTYL ETHER 500,00 ITOCHU CHEMICALS AMERICA
Koyo Kaiun 121023 XENA HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA DIETHYLENE GLYCOL METHYL ETHER 500,00 ITOCHU CHEMICALS AMERICA
Koyo Kaiun 121023 XENA HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA PROPYLENE GLYCOL METHYL ETHER UN309 500,00 ITOCHU CHEMICALS AMERICA
MISC 121113 BUNGA BANYAN NEW ORLEANS ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA CRUDE DEGUMMED SOYBEAN OIL 19 370,18 BUNGE NORTH AMERICA
Navig8 Chemicals - Stainless8 Pool 121119 SIRA LK CHARLES KOBE JAPAN ETHYLENE DICHLORIDE 10 000,01 MITSUBISHI CORPARATION
Navig8 Chemicals - Stainless8 Pool 121121 SIRA HOUSTON LIANYUNGANG CHINA ACRYLONITRILE 1 000,00 VINMAR INTERNATIONAL
Navig8 Chemicals - Stainless8 Pool 121121 SIRA HOUSTON LIANYUNGANG CHINA ACRYLONITRILE 1 499,93 VINMAR INTERNATIONAL
Navig8 Chemicals - Stainless8 Pool 121121 SIRA HOUSTON LIANYUNGANG CHINA ACRYLONITRILE 1 000,00 VINMAR INTERNATIONAL
Navig8 Chemicals - Stainless8 Pool 121121 SIRA HOUSTON LIANYUNGANG CHINA ACRYLONITRILE 2 000,00 VINMAR INTERNATIONAL
Navig8 Chemicals - Stainless8 Pool 121121 SIRA HOUSTON LIANYUNGANG CHINA ACRYLONITRILE 500,00 VINMAR INTERNATIONAL
NCC Odfjell 121212 NCC DAMMAM TEXAS CITY ULSAN SOUTH KOREA PARAXYLENE 5 272,48 CHEMIUM INTERNATIONAL
NCC Odfjell 121214 NCC DAMMAM PNT COMFORT TIANJIN CHINA ETHYLENE DICHLORIDE 3 669,00 ORDER OF SHIPPER
NCC Odfjell 121214 NCC DAMMAM PNT COMFORT ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ACRYLONITRILE 7 840,01 INEOS EUROPE AG
NCC Odfjell 121214 NCC DAMMAM PNT COMFORT YOSU SOUTH KOREA ETHYLENE DICHLORIDE 3 669,00 ORDER OF SHIPPER
NCC Odfjell 121207 NCC NASMA HOUSTON NINGBO CHINA ADIPONITRILE 3 999,85 INVISTA
NCC Odfjell 121207 NCC NASMA HOUSTON NINGBO CHINA PARAXYLENE 15 408,44 EXXONMOBIL LUBRICANTS TRADING
NCC Odfjell 121207 NCC NASMA HOUSTON ZHUHAI CHINA PARAXYLENE 9 963,82 EXXONMOBIL LUBRICANTS TRADING
NCC Odfjell 121025 NCC NOOR CORPUS CHRSTI TIANJIN CHINA ETHYLENE DICHLORIDE 2 615,00 MITSUI
NCC Odfjell 121025 NCC NOOR CORPUS CHRSTI YOSU SOUTH KOREA ETHYLENE DICHLORIDE 2 615,00 MITSUI
NCC Odfjell 121029 NCC NOOR LK CHARLES ULSAN SOUTH KOREA MIX XYLENE 5 265,74 MITSUBISHI INTERNATIONAL
NCC Odfjell 121101 NCC NOOR HOUSTON HONG KONG CHINA MIX XYLENE 3 147,79 TOTAL PETROCHEMICALS
NCC Odfjell 121101 NCC NOOR HOUSTON HONG KONG CHINA MIX XYLENE 3 148,07 TOTAL PETROCHEMICALS
NCC Odfjell 121115 NCC NOOR S LOUISIANA TIANJIN CHINA ETHYLENE DICHLORIDE 6 295,01 ORDER OF SHIPPER
NCC Odfjell 121115 NCC NOOR S LOUISIANA ULSAN SOUTH KOREA XYLENES ETHYLBENZENE 10 503,39 EXXONMOBIL CHEMICAL
NCC Odfjell 121115 NCC NOOR S LOUISIANA YOSU SOUTH KOREA ETHYLENE DICHLORIDE 6 295,01 ORDER OF SHIPPER
Nordic Tankers 121201 MAEMI BATON ROUGE SINGAPORE SINGAPORE NEODENE 1 500,00 SHELL CHEMICAL
Nordic Tankers 121114 SIVA GHENT FREEPORT TX SHANGHAI CHINA ETHYLENE DICHLORIDE 100 000,11 TRICON SHIPPING INC
Nordic Tankers 121114 SIVA GHENT FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA MIX XYLENE 5 250,01 INTERCHEM INC
Nordic Tankers 121118 SIVA GHENT HOUSTON ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA MIX XYLENE 4 481,54 SHELLT RADING
Nordic Tankers 121118 SIVA GHENT HOUSTON ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA N BUTANOL 1 000,00 VINMAR OVERSEAS
Nordic Tankers 121123 SIVA GHENT CORPUS CHRSTI ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ORTHOXYLENE 4 896,01 IVNMAR OVERSEAS
Nordic Tankers 121123 SIVA GHENT CORPUS CHRSTI ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ORTHOXYLENE 2 074,00 IVNMAR OVERSEAS
Nordic Tankers 121123 SIVA GHENT CORPUS CHRSTI ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ORTHOXYLENE 1 074,00 IVNMAR OVERSEAS
Odfjell Tankers 121105 BOW ENGINEER HOUSTON HONG KONG CHINA MIX XYLENE 5 248,97 TOTAL PETROCHEMICALS
Odfjell Tankers 121105 BOW ENGINEER HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN METHYL ESTER 3 001,99 CHEMOIL CORPORATION
Odfjell Tankers 121105 BOW ENGINEER HOUSTON NINGBO CHINA ALPHAPLUS TETRADECENE 1 019,70 CHEVRON PHILLIPS CHEMICAL
Odfjell Tankers 121105 BOW ENGINEER HOUSTON NINGBO CHINA ETHYLENE GLYCOL BUTYL ETHER 524,81 EQUISTAR CHEMICALS
Odfjell Tankers 121105 BOW ENGINEER HOUSTON NINGBO CHINA ETHYLENE GLYCOL BUTYL ETHER 314,88 EQUISTAR CHEMICALS
Odfjell Tankers 121105 BOW ENGINEER HOUSTON NINGBO CHINA ETHYLENE GLYCOL BUTYL ETHER 209,92 EQUISTAR CHEMICALS
Odfjell Tankers 121105 BOW ENGINEER HOUSTON SAKURAJIMA JAPAN HEXAMETHYLENE DIAMINE SOLN 1 803,58 TORAY INDUSTRIES AMERICA INC
Odfjell Tankers 121105 BOW ENGINEER HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE ACETIC ANHYDRIDE 611,40 EASTMAN CHEMICAL
Odfjell Tankers 121105 BOW ENGINEER HOUSTON TAICHUNG TAIWAN NONENE 1 029,74 MITSUI STEEL INC
Odfjell Tankers 121105 BOW ENGINEER HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ACETIC ANHYDRIDE 100,00 CELANESE CORP
Odfjell Tankers 121105 BOW ENGINEER HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ACETIC ANHYDRIDE 99,86 CELANESE CORP
Odfjell Tankers 121105 BOW ENGINEER HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ACETIC ANHYDRIDE 100,00 CELANESE CORP
Odfjell Tankers 121105 BOW ENGINEER HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ACETIC ANHYDRIDE 100,00 CELANESE CORP
Odfjell Tankers 121105 BOW ENGINEER HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ALPHA OLEFIN 1 019,49 INEOS SINGAPORE
Odfjell Tankers 121105 BOW ENGINEER HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ALPHA OLEFIN 509,82 INEOS USA LLC
Odfjell Tankers 121105 BOW ENGINEER HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ALPHA OLEFIN 1 014,68 INEOS USA LLC
Odfjell Tankers 121105 BOW ENGINEER HOUSTON ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA DIISOBUTYLENE 1 007,59 JANEX CHEMIN DEL FLEURETTES
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Odfjell Tankers 121111 BOW ENGINEER PNT COMFORT ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ACRYLONITRILE 4 999,01 INOES
Odfjell Tankers 121111 BOW ENGINEER PNT COMFORT ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ACRYLONITRILE 1 000,00 INOES
Odfjell Tankers 121125 BOW SPRING PNT COMFORT ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ACRYLONITRILE 1 000,00 INEOS USA LLC
Odfjell Tankers 121125 BOW SPRING PNT COMFORT ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ACRYLONITRILE 6 999,01 INEOS EUROPE AG
Odfjell Tankers 121202 BOW SPRING BEAUMONT SINGAPORE SINGAPORE CHEVRON NEUTRAL OIL 1 985,56 CHEVRON CORPORATION
Odfjell Tankers 121202 BOW SPRING BEAUMONT SINGAPORE SINGAPORE CHEVRON NEUTRAL OIL 1 985,56 CHEVRON CORPORATION
Odfjell Tankers 121202 BOW SPRING BEAUMONT TIANJIN CHINA PROPYLENE OXIDE 2 951,75 OXYDE CHEMICALS
Odfjell Tankers 121207 BOW SPRING HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN PARAFFIN 1 250,09 ICC CHEMICALS
Odfjell Tankers 121207 BOW SPRING HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ALPHA OLEFIN 407,92 INEOS USA LLC
Odfjell Tankers 121207 BOW SPRING HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ALPHA OLEFIN 1 219,03 INEOS USA LLC
Odfjell Tankers 121207 BOW SPRING HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ALPHA OLEFIN 1 017,69 INEOS USA
Odfjell Tankers 121207 BOW SPRING HOUSTON YOKOHAMA JAPAN DURASYN 510,75 INEOS USA
Odfjell Tankers 121207 BOW SPRING HOUSTON YOKOHAMA JAPAN DURASYN 510,21 INEOS USA
Odfjell Tankers 121207 BOW SPRING HOUSTON ZHENJIANG CHINA ORTHOXYLENE 2 099,55 ICC CHEMICALS
Odfjell Tankers 121208 BOW SPRING FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA PROPYLENE OXIDE 2 098,06 OXYDE CHEMICALS
Odfjell Tankers 121213 BOW SPRING HOUSTON SAKURAJIMA JAPAN HEXAMETHYLENE DIAMINE SOLN 2 141,63 TORAY INTERNATIONAL AMERICA INC
Odfjell Tankers 121213 BOW SPRING HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE ACETIC ANHYDRIDE 1 019,34 EASTMAN CHEMICAL
Odfjell Tankers 121213 BOW SPRING TEXAS CITY SINGAPORE SINGAPORE METAXYLENE 3 976,06 ICC CHEMICALS
Odfjell Tankers 121120 NCC NAJRAN HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA MIX XYLENES 5 320,09 MARUBENI AMERICA
Odfjell Tankers 121120 NCC NAJRAN HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA MIX XYLENES 5 223,90 CHEMIUM INTERNATIONAL
Odfjell Tankers 121130 NCC NAJRAN BATON ROUGE ULSAN SOUTH KOREA XYLENES ETHYLBENZENE 5 253,87 EXXONMOBIL CHEMICAL
Odfjell Tankers 121130 NCC NAJRAN BATON ROUGE ULSAN SOUTH KOREA XYLENES ETHYLBENZENE 5 253,87 EXXONMOBIL CHEMICAL
Odfjell Tankers 121130 NCC NAJRAN BATON ROUGE YOSU SOUTH KOREA ETHYLENE DICHLORIDE 10 479,01 MITSUI & CO
Odfjell Tankers 121130 NCC NAJRAN BATON ROUGE YOSU SOUTH KOREA XYLENES ETHYLBENZENE 10 479,01 MITSUI & CO
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE BANGKOK THAILAND ISOPROPYLALCOHOL 998,64 EXXONMOBIL CHEMICM ASIA PACIFIC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE MERAK INDONESIA ISOPROPYLALCOHOL 998,55 EXXONMOBIL CHEMICM ASIA PACIFIC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE NINGBO CHINA NEODENE 500,00 SHELL CHEMICAL LP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE SHANGHAI CHINA NEODENE 100,00 SHELL CHEMICAL LP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE SHANGHAI CHINA NEODENE 100,00 SHELL CHEMICAL LP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE SHANGHAI CHINA NEODENE 200,00 SHELL CHEMICAL LP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE SHANGHAI CHINA NEODENE 300,00 SHELL CHEMICAL LP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE SHANGHAI CHINA NEODENE 200,00 SHELL CHEMICAL LP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE SHANGHAI CHINA NEODENE 500,00 SHELL CHEMICAL LP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE SHANGHAI CHINA NEODENE 100,00 SHELL CHEMICAL LP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE SHANGHAI CHINA NEODENE 100,00 SHELL CHEMICAL LP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE SHANGHAI CHINA NEODENE 250,00 SHELL CHEMICAL LP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE SHANGHAI CHINA NEODENE 150,00 SHELL CHEMICAL LP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE SHANGHAI CHINA NEODENE 300,00 SHELL CHEMICAL LP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE SINGAPORE SINGAPORE EXXAL TRIDECYL 701,22 EXXONMOBIL CHEMICM ASIA PACIFIC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE SINGAPORE SINGAPORE ISOPROPYLALCOHOL 998,64 EXXONMOBIL CHEMICM ASIA PACIFIC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE SINGAPORE SINGAPORE LUBE OIL ADDITIVE 1 993,35 EXXONMOBIL LUBRICANTS TRADING
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE ULSAN SOUTH KOREA DIALKYL PHTHALATES 400,00 EXXONMOBIL CHEMICM ASIA PACIFIC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE ULSAN SOUTH KOREA NEODENE 100,00 SHELL CHEMICAL LP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE ULSAN SOUTH KOREA NEODENE 489,16 SHELL CHEMICAL LP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE ULSAN SOUTH KOREA NEODENE 100,00 SHELL CHEMICAL LP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE ULSAN SOUTH KOREA NEODENE 100,00 SHELL CHEMICAL LP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE ULSAN SOUTH KOREA NEODENE 100,00 SHELL CHEMICAL LP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE ULSAN SOUTH KOREA NEODENE 98,84 SHELL CHEMICAL LP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE ULSAN SOUTH KOREA NEODENE 100,00 SHELL CHEMICAL LP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE ULSAN SOUTH KOREA NEODENE 100,00 SHELL CHEMICAL LP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE ULSAN SOUTH KOREA NEODENE 100,00 SHELL CHEMICAL LP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE ULSAN SOUTH KOREA NEODENE 151,65 SHELL CHEMICAL LP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE YOSU SOUTH KOREA HEXENE 996,87 SHELL CHEMICAL LP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT NEW ORLEANS SHANGHAI CHINA POLY ETHOXYLATES 420,66 SHELL CHEMICAL LP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT NEW ORLEANS SHANGHAI CHINA POLY ETHOXYLATES 253,11 SHELL CHEMICAL LP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT NEW ORLEANS SHANGHAI CHINA POLY ETHOXYLATES 151,87 SHELL CHEMICAL LP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT NEW ORLEANS SHANGHAI CHINA POLY ETHOXYLATES 202,49 SHELL CHEMICAL LP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT NEW ORLEANS SHANGHAI CHINA POLY ETHOXYLATES 410,64 SHELL CHEMICAL LP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT NEW ORLEANS SHANGHAI CHINA POLY ETHOXYLATES 303,74 SHELL CHEMICAL LP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT NEW ORLEANS SHANGHAI CHINA POLY ETHOXYLATES 101,25 SHELL CHEMICAL LP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT NEW ORLEANS SHANGHAI CHINA POLY ETHOXYLATES 50,62 SHELL CHEMICAL LP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT NEW ORLEANS SINGAPORE SINGAPORE NEODECANOIC ACID 502,03 EXXONMOBIL CHEMICM ASIA PACIFIC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121127 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT HOUSTON BANGKOK THAILAND MMA 50 PPM AO 30 METHYL METHACRYLAT 449,45 ROHM AND HAAS
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121127 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT HOUSTON BANGKOK THAILAND MMA 50 PPM AO 30 METHYL METHACRYLAT 549,39 ROHM AND HAAS
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121127 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN ARCOSLV PM PROPYLENE GLYCOL MONOALK 524,48 LYONDELL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121127 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN PROPYLENE GLYCOL INDUSTRIAL 644,54 LYONDELL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121127 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT HOUSTON KOBE JAPAN CRUDE TALL OIL 1 501,41 HARIMATEC INC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121127 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT HOUSTON KOBE JAPAN HEXAMETHYLENE DIAMINE 949,85 INVISTA SARL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121127 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT HOUSTON NINGBO CHINA ADIPONITRILE UN2205 4 500,01 INVISTA SARL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121127 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT HOUSTON ONSAN SOUTH KOREA ALIMET METHIONINE HYDROXY 1 499,80 NOVUS INTERNATIONAL
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Stolt Parcel Tankers 121127 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT HOUSTON SHEKOU CHINA BUTYL ACRYLATE UN2348 1 000,00 ARKEMA INC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121127 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE PROPYLENE GLYCOL 839,64 LYONDELL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121127 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ETHYLENE GLYCOL MONOALKYL ETHERS 917,29 EASTMAN CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121127 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ETHYLENE GLYCOL MONOALKYL ETHERS 803,57 EASTMAN CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121127 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ISOBUTYL ACETATE 304,81 OXEA CORPORATION
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121127 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT TEXAS CITY MERAK INDONESIA BUTYL ETHYLENE GLYCOL MONOALKYL ETH 498,17 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121206 STOLT EMERALD NEW ORLEANS SINGAPORE SINGAPORE LUBRICATING OIL ADDITIVES 1 410,45 CHEVRON ORONITE CO
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121023 STOLT FOCUS HOUSTON BANGKOK THAILAND METHYLMETHACRYLATE 524,42 ROHM AND HAAS
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121023 STOLT FOCUS HOUSTON BANGKOK THAILAND METHYLMETHACRYLATE 474,48 ROHM AND HAAS
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121023 STOLT FOCUS HOUSTON DONGGUAN CHINA BUTYL ACRYLATE 1 000,00 ROHM AND HAAS
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121023 STOLT FOCUS HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN BUTYL ACRYLATE 1 499,55 ROHM AND HAAS
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121023 STOLT FOCUS HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN METHYLMETHACRYLATE UN1247 199,90 ARKEMA INC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121023 STOLT FOCUS HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN METHYLMETHACRYLATE UN1247 1 299,34 ARKEMA INC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121023 STOLT FOCUS HOUSTON KOBE JAPAN HEXAMETHYLENE DIAMINE 930,78 INVISTA S A R L
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121023 STOLT FOCUS HOUSTON MAP TA PHUT THAILAND BUTYL ACRYLATE 399,88 ROHM AND HAAS
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121023 STOLT FOCUS HOUSTON MAP TA PHUT THAILAND BUTYL ACRYLATE 599,82 ROHM AND HAAS
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121023 STOLT FOCUS HOUSTON MAP TA PHUT THAILAND BUTYL ACRYLATE 199,94 ROHM AND HAAS
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121023 STOLT FOCUS HOUSTON MERAK INDONESIA BUTYL ACRYLATE 199,94 ROHM AND HAAS
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121023 STOLT FOCUS HOUSTON MERAK INDONESIA BUTYL ACRYLATE 999,70 ROHM AND HAAS
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121023 STOLT FOCUS HOUSTON NINGBO CHINA ADIPONITRILE UN2205 6 000,01 INVISTA SARL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121023 STOLT FOCUS HOUSTON SHEKOU CHINA BUTYL ACRYLATE STABILIZED UN2348 1 000,00 ARKEMA INC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121023 STOLT FOCUS HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ETHYLENE GLYCOL MONOALKYL ETHERS 699,39 EASTMAN CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121023 STOLT FOCUS HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA HEXAMETHYLENE DIAMINE 2 827,87 INVISTA SARL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121023 STOLT FOCUS HOUSTON YOKOHAMA JAPAN BUTYL ACRYLATE UN2348 763,08 ARKEMA INC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121023 STOLT FOCUS HOUSTON ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA BA 15 PPM MEHQ BUTYL ACRYLATE 1 000,00 ROHM AND HAAS
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121023 STOLT FOCUS TEXAS CITY DONGGUAN CHINA BUTYL CELLOSOLVE ETHYLENEGLYCOL MON 750,00 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121023 STOLT FOCUS TEXAS CITY KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN MONOETHANOLAMINE 599,95 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121023 STOLT FOCUS TEXAS CITY KOBE JAPAN BUTYL CARBITOL SOLVENT 471,18 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121023 STOLT FOCUS TEXAS CITY SINGAPORE SINGAPORE VORANOL COPOLYMER POLYOL 499,46 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121023 STOLT FOCUS TEXAS CITY ULSAN SOUTH KOREA BUTYL CELLOSOLVE SOLVENT 549,70 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121023 STOLT FOCUS TEXAS CITY ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ISOBUTANOL 525,58 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121023 STOLT FOCUS TEXAS CITY ULSAN SOUTH KOREA MONOETHANOLAMINE 499,95 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121023 STOLT FOCUS TEXAS CITY ULSAN SOUTH KOREA TRIETHANOLAMINE 300,26 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121023 STOLT FOCUS TEXAS CITY ULSAN SOUTH KOREA TRIETHANOLAMINE 500,43 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121023 STOLT FOCUS TEXAS CITY YOSU SOUTH KOREA BUTYL CELLOSOLVE ETHYLENEGLYCOL MON 250,00 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121023 STOLT FOCUS TEXAS CITY ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA BUTYL CELLOSOLVE ETHYLENEGLYCOL MON 100,00 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121023 STOLT FOCUS TEXAS CITY ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA BUTYL CELLOSOLVE ETHYLENEGLYCOL MON 600,00 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121023 STOLT FOCUS TEXAS CITY ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA BUTYL CELLOSOLVE ETHYLENEGLYCOL MON 150,00 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121023 STOLT FOCUS TEXAS CITY ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA BUTYL CELLOSOLVE ETHYLENEGLYCOL MON 150,00 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121026 STOLT FOCUS FREEPORT TX SINGAPORE SINGAPORE DIPROPYLENEGLYCOL 367,36 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121026 STOLT FOCUS FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA DER EPOXY RESIN 525,80 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121026 STOLT FOCUS FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA DER EPOXY RESIN 730,87 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121026 STOLT FOCUS FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA DIPROPYLENEGLYCOL 209,92 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121026 STOLT FOCUS FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA EPICHLOROHYDRIN 2 309,51 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121026 STOLT FOCUS FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA PROPYLENE GLYCOL 1 049,50 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121026 STOLT FOCUS FREEPORT TX YOSU SOUTH KOREA CRUDE MDI 1 052,67 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121026 STOLT FOCUS FREEPORT TX ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA DER EPOXY RESIN 500,00 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121017 STOLT SAPPHIRE FREEPORT TX SHEKOU CHINA VORANOL 1 000,00 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121017 STOLT SAPPHIRE FREEPORT TX SINGAPORE SINGAPORE DER EPOXY RESIN 523,94 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121017 STOLT SAPPHIRE FREEPORT TX SINGAPORE SINGAPORE DIPROPYLENEGLYCOL 899,41 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121017 STOLT SAPPHIRE FREEPORT TX SINGAPORE SINGAPORE DIPROPYLENEGLYCOL 368,28 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121017 STOLT SAPPHIRE FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA DER EPOXY RESIN 523,94 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121017 STOLT SAPPHIRE FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA DIPROPYLENEGLYCOL 210,45 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121017 STOLT SAPPHIRE FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA EPICHLOROHYDRIN 1 577,81 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121017 STOLT SAPPHIRE FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA PROPYLENE GLYCOL 1 079,29 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121017 STOLT SAPPHIRE FREEPORT TX ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA DER EPOXY RESIN 800,00 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON AUCKLAND NEW ZEALAND ALIMET 2HYDROXY4METHYLTHIOBUTANOIC 299,85 NOVUS INTERNATIONAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON AUCKLAND NEW ZEALAND BA 15 PPM MEHQ BUTYL ACRYLATE 350,00 ROHM AND HAAS
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON AUCKLAND NEW ZEALAND MMA 50 PPM AO 30 METHYL METHACRYLAT 199,54 ROHM AND HAAS
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON BRISBANE AUSTRALIA METHYL ISOBUTYL CARBINOL 494,04 CELANESE CORP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON FREMANTLE AUSTRALIA POTASSIUM HYDROXIDE SOLN UN1814 799,45 OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON MELBOURNE AUSTRALIA JAYFLEX DIDP 498,85 EXXONMOBIL CHEMICAL ASIA PACIFIC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON MELBOURNE AUSTRALIA POTASSIUM HYDROXIDE SOLN UN1814 1 200,01 OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON MELBOURNE AUSTRALIA PROPANOL 200,00 OXEA CORPORATION
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE EXXAL TRIDECYL 783,37 EXXONMOBIL CHEMICAL ASIA PACIFIC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE EXXSOL 258,08 EXXONMOBIL CHEMICAL ASIA PACIFIC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE ISOPAR FLUID NAPHTHA SOLVENT 504,42 EXXONMOBIL CHEMICAL ASIA PACIFIC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE LUBRICATING OIL ADDITIVES 706,39 THE LUBRIZOL CORPORATION
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE LUBRICATING OIL ADDITIVES 201,37 THE LUBRIZOL CORPORATION
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE LUBRICATING OIL ADDITIVES 402,58 THE LUBRIZOL CORPORATION
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Stolt Parcel Tankers 121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE LUBRICATING OIL ADDITIVES 314,51 THE LUBRIZOL CORPORATION
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE LUBRICATING OIL ADDITIVES 1 592,12 THE LUBRIZOL CORPORATION
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE LUBRICATING OIL ADDITIVES 200,52 THE LUBRIZOL CORPORATION
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE LUBRICATING OIL ADDITIVES 200,14 THE LUBRIZOL CORPORATION
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE LUBRICATING OIL ADDITIVES 805,38 THE LUBRIZOL CORPORATION
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE LUBRICATING OIL ADDITIVES 202,53 THE LUBRIZOL CORPORATION
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE SOLVENT NAPHTHA 299,86 EXXONMOBIL CHEMICAL ASIA PACIFIC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON SYDNEY AUSTRALIA LUBRICATING OIL ADDITIVES 405,41 THE LUBRIZOL CORPORATION
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON SYDNEY AUSTRALIA LUBRICATING OIL ADDITIVES 500,01 THE LUBRIZOL CORPORATION
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121025 STOLT SNELAND HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN ARCOL POLYOL 2 100,44 BAYER MATERIAL SCIENCE
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121025 STOLT SNELAND HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN ARCOSOLV PM SOLVENT 944,19 LYONDELL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121025 STOLT SNELAND HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN BUTANEDIOL 524,53 LYONDELL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121025 STOLT SNELAND HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN GLYCOLETHER EB 524,82 EQUISTAR CHEMICALS
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121025 STOLT SNELAND HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN PROPYLENE GLYCOL IND 842,39 LYONDELL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121025 STOLT SNELAND HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE N BUTANOL 2 500,17 OXEA CORPORATION
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121025 STOLT SNELAND HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE PROPYLENE GLYCOL 1 049,92 LYONDELL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121025 STOLT SNELAND HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ETHYLENE GLYCOL BUTYL ETHER 524,82 EQUISTAR CHEMICALS
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121025 STOLT SNELAND HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA METHYL ISOBUTYL KETONE 100,00 CELANESE CORP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121025 STOLT SNELAND HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA METHYL ISOBUTYL KETONE 100,00 CELANESE CORP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121025 STOLT SNELAND HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA METHYL ISOBUTYL KETONE 98,32 CELANESE CORP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121025 STOLT SNELAND HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA METHYL ISOBUTYL KETONE 100,00 CELANESE CORP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121025 STOLT SNELAND HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA METHYL ISOBUTYL KETONE 100,00 CELANESE CORP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121025 STOLT SNELAND HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA METHYL ISOBUTYL KETONE 100,00 CELANESE CORP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121025 STOLT SNELAND HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA METHYL ISOBUTYL KETONE 100,00 CELANESE CORP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121025 STOLT SNELAND HOUSTON YOKOHAMA JAPAN PROPANOL 524,97 OXEA CORPORATION
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121025 STOLT SNELAND HOUSTON ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA PROPYLENE GLYCOL INDUSTRIAL 1 000,00 LYONDELL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121025 STOLT SNELAND TEXAS CITY SINGAPORE SINGAPORE VORANOL COPOLYMER POLYOL 495,53 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121025 STOLT SNELAND TEXAS CITY ULSAN SOUTH KOREA BUTYL CELLOSOLVE SOLVENT 499,78 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121025 STOLT SNELAND TEXAS CITY ULSAN SOUTH KOREA DIISOBUTYL KETONE 309,96 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121025 STOLT SNELAND TEXAS CITY ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ETHYL ETHOXYPROPIONATE 944,51 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121025 STOLT SNELAND TEXAS CITY YOKOHAMA JAPAN BUTYL CELLOSOLVE SOLVENT 299,87 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121025 STOLT SNELAND TEXAS CITY YOKOHAMA JAPAN ETHYL ETHOXYPROPIONATE 209,89 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121025 STOLT SNELAND TEXAS CITY ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA BUTYL CELLOSOLVE SOLVENT 500,00 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121025 STOLT SNELAND TEXAS CITY ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA DIETHANOLAMINE 838,38 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121030 STOLT SNELAND FREEPORT TX KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN PROPYLENE GLYCOL 53,25 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121030 STOLT SNELAND FREEPORT TX LANSHAN CHINA PPAPI TM 27 PLYMERIC MDI 1 200,00 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121030 STOLT SNELAND FREEPORT TX NAGOYA JAPAN SPECFLEX TM NC630 POLYOL 457,60 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121030 STOLT SNELAND FREEPORT TX SHANGHAI CHINA DER EPOXY RESIN 519,87 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121030 STOLT SNELAND FREEPORT TX SHANGHAI CHINA DER EPOXY RESIN 500,00 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121030 STOLT SNELAND FREEPORT TX SINGAPORE SINGAPORE METHYLENE CHLORIDE 730,80 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121030 STOLT SNELAND FREEPORT TX SINGAPORE SINGAPORE PROPYLENE GLYCOL 1 254,29 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121030 STOLT SNELAND FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA DER EPOXY RESIN 729,06 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121030 STOLT SNELAND FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA DER EPOXY RESIN 415,89 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121030 STOLT SNELAND FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA METHYLENE CHLORIDE 313,20 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121030 STOLT SNELAND FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA PROPYLENE GLYCOL 1 672,39 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121030 STOLT SNELAND FREEPORT TX ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA DER EPOXY RESIN 500,00 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON AUCKLAND NEW ZEALAND BUTYL ACRYLATE 399,64 ROHM AND HAAS
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON AUCKLAND NEW ZEALAND MMA METHYLMETHACRYLATE 349,87 ROHM AND HAAS
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON BOTANY AUSTRALIA ACETIC ANHYDRIDE 149,72 CELANESE CORP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON BOTANY AUSTRALIA ALIMET DL 2HYDROXY4 METHYLTHIO BUTA 499,89 NOVUS INTERNATIONAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON BOTANY AUSTRALIA GAS OIL 253,16 NYNAS AB
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON BOTANY AUSTRALIA PROCESS OIL NYTEX 205,21 NYNAS AB
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON BOTANY AUSTRALIA PROCESS OIL NYTEX 579,26 NYNAS AB
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON BOTANY AUSTRALIA TRANSFORMER OIL 1 050,19 PETROLEUM SPECIALTIES
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON BOTANY AUSTRALIA TRANSFORMER OIL 1 516,86 NYNAS AB
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON BRISBANE AUSTRALIA METHYL ISOBUTYL CARBINOL 799,84 CELANESE CORP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON FREMANTLE AUSTRALIA LUBRIZOL 199,54 LUBRIZOL CORP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON FREMANTLE AUSTRALIA POTASSIUM HYDROXIDE SOLN 849,62 OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON MELBOURNE AUSTRALIA BA 15 PPM MEHQ BUTYL ACRYLATE 999,09 ROHM AND HAAS
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON MELBOURNE AUSTRALIA EXXSOL FLUID NAPHTHA SOLVENT 198,47 EXXONMOBIL CHEMICM ASIA PACIFIC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON MELBOURNE AUSTRALIA EXXSOL FLUID NAPHTHA SOLVENT 203,97 EXXONMOBIL CHEMICM ASIA PACIFIC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON MELBOURNE AUSTRALIA JAYFLEX DIDP 1 925,55 EXXONMOBIL CHEMICM ASIA PACIFIC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON MELBOURNE AUSTRALIA MMA 50 PPM AO METHYL METHACRYLATE 1 149,57 ROHM AND HAAS
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON MELBOURNE AUSTRALIA POTASSIUM HYDROXIDE SOLN 2 300,02 OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON MELBOURNE AUSTRALIA PROPYL ACETATE 199,67 OXEA CORPORATION
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON MERAK INDONESIA PROPYLENE OXIDE 2 071,70 BAYPO II LLC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE METHYL ISOBUTYL CARBINOL 299,85 CELANESE CORP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE N BUTANOL 2 950,88 OXEA CORPORATION
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON SYDNEY AUSTRALIA LUBRIZOL 799,91 LUBRIZOL CORP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT SPRAY TEXAS CITY BRISBANE AUSTRALIA METHYL ISOBUTYL CARBINOL 501,25 DOW CHEMICAL
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Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT SPRAY TEXAS CITY MELBOURNE AUSTRALIA BUTANOL 249,58 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121109 STOLT SPRAY FREEPORT TX MELBOURNE AUSTRALIA DER EPOXY RESIN 469,55 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121123 STOLT SURF HOUSTON ANPING CHINA METHYLMETHACRYLATE UN1247 1 498,62 ARKEMA INC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121123 STOLT SURF HOUSTON ANPING CHINA METHYLMETHACRYLATE UN1247 499,54 ARKEMA INC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121123 STOLT SURF HOUSTON NINGBO CHINA ADIPONITRILE UN2205 4 000,00 INVISTA SARL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121129 STOLT SURF BATON ROUGE NINGBO CHINA NEODENE 500,00 SHELL CHEMICAL LP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121025 STOLT TOPAZ NEW ORLEANS SINGAPORE SINGAPORE LUBRICATING OIL ADDITIVES 812,20 CHEVRON ORONITE CO
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121025 STOLT TOPAZ NEW ORLEANS YOKOHAMA JAPAN LUBRICATING OIL ADDITIVES 301,29 CHEVRON ORONITE CO
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121025 STOLT TOPAZ NEW ORLEANS YOKOHAMA JAPAN LUBRICATING OIL ADDITIVES 559,61 CHEVRON ORONITE CO
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON BUSAN SOUTH KOREA LUBRIZOL 449,72 LUBRIZOL CORP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN ARCOL POLYOL 2 624,93 BAYER MATERIAL SCIENCE
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN BUTYLENE GLYCOL 1 049,97 LYONDELL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN DIPROPYLENE GLYCOL INDUSTRIAL 523,68 LYONDELL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN ETHYLENE GLYCOL 1 049,73 EQUISTAR CHEMICALS
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN GLYCOL ETHER DB POLY28ALKYLENE GLYC 944,50 EQUISTAR CHEMICALS
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN GLYCOL ETHER EB ACETATE ETHYLENE GL 477,72 EQUISTAR CHEMICALS
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN METHYL 524,69 LYONDELL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN METHYL METHACRYLATE 1 000,04 ROHM AND HAAS
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN MM PPM METHYL METHACRYLATE 699,24 ROHM AND HAAS
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN PROPYLENE GLYCOL INDUSTRIAL 734,88 LYONDELL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN PROPYLENE OXIDE 2 428,27 BAYPO II LLC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON KAWASAKI JAPAN CRUDE TALL OIL 1 425,52 HARIMATEC INC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE LUBRIZOL 203,86 LUBRIZOL CORP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE LUBRIZOL 355,45 LUBRIZOL CORP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE LUBRIZOL 499,60 LUBRIZOL CORP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE LUBRIZOL 305,24 LUBRIZOL CORP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE LUBRIZOL 699,65 LUBRIZOL CORP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA LUBRIZOL 204,63 LUBRIZOL CORP
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON YOKOHAMA JAPAN ARCOSOLV PM SOLVENT 629,73 LYONDELL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON YOKOHAMA JAPAN ARCOSOLV PM SOLVENT 1 364,41 LYONDELL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON YOKOHAMA JAPAN ARCOSOLV PM SOLVENT 524,77 LYONDELL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT TOPAZ TEXAS CITY DONGGUAN CHINA BUTYL ETHYLENE GLYCOL MONOALKYL ETH 500,00 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT TOPAZ TEXAS CITY DONGGUAN CHINA BUTYL ETHYLENE GLYCOL MONOALKYL ETH 249,90 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT TOPAZ TEXAS CITY DONGGUAN CHINA BUTYL ETHYLENE GLYCOL MONOALKYL ETH 699,72 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT TOPAZ TEXAS CITY DONGGUAN CHINA BUTYL ETHYLENE GLYCOL MONOALKYL ETH 500,00 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT TOPAZ TEXAS CITY JIANGYIN CHINA EASTMAN 2ETHYLHEXANOL OCTANOL 2 022,51 EASTMAN CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT TOPAZ TEXAS CITY KOBE JAPAN BUTYL ETHYLENE GLYCOL MONOALKYL ETH 249,90 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT TOPAZ TEXAS CITY KOBE JAPAN BUTYL POLY28ALKYLENE GLYCOL MONOALK 209,62 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT TOPAZ TEXAS CITY ULSAN SOUTH KOREA BUTYL ETHYLENE GLYCOL MONOALKYL ETH 499,80 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT TOPAZ TEXAS CITY ULSAN SOUTH KOREA DIISOBUTYL KETONE 307,17 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT TOPAZ TEXAS CITY ULSAN SOUTH KOREA OCTANOL ETHYLHEXANOL 1 022,50 EASTMAN CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT TOPAZ TEXAS CITY ULSAN SOUTH KOREA UCAR ETHYL3ETHOXYPROPIONATE ESTER E 817,26 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT TOPAZ TEXAS CITY XIAOHUDAO CHINA BUTYL ETHYLENE GLYCOL MONOALKYL ETH 449,90 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT TOPAZ TEXAS CITY YOKOHAMA JAPAN BUTYL ETHYLENE GLYCOL MONOALKYL ETH 249,90 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT TOPAZ TEXAS CITY YOKOHAMA JAPAN MONOETHANOLAMINE 498,35 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT TOPAZ TEXAS CITY ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA DIETHANOLAMINE 2 048,41 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121106 STOLT TOPAZ TEXAS CITY ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA EASTMAN 2ETHYLHEXANOL OCTANOL 2 022,51 EASTMAN CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121109 STOLT TOPAZ FREEPORT TX SINGAPORE SINGAPORE DER EPOXY RESIN 501,57 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121109 STOLT TOPAZ FREEPORT TX SINGAPORE SINGAPORE DIPROPYLENEGLYCOL 574,79 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121109 STOLT TOPAZ FREEPORT TX SINGAPORE SINGAPORE PROPYLENE GLYCOL 1 566,73 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121109 STOLT TOPAZ FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA DER EPOXY RESIN 469,22 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121109 STOLT TOPAZ FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA DER EPOXY RESIN 802,50 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121109 STOLT TOPAZ FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA PROPYLENE GLYCOL 522,24 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN BUTYLENE GLYCOL 1 049,27 EQUISTAR CHEMICALS
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN GLYCOL ETHER DB 869,76 EQUISTAR CHEMICALS
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN GLYCOLETHER EB 839,76 EQUISTAR CHEMICALS
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN METHYLPYRROLIDONE 524,96 LYONDELL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN PROPYLENE GLYCOL INDUSTRIAL 839,65 LYONDELL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON KOBE JAPAN HEXAMETHYLENE DIAMINE 925,51 INVISTA SARL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON MAP TA PHUT THAILAND BA PPM MEHQ BUTYLATE ACRYLATE 600,11 ROHM AND HAAS
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON MAP TA PHUT THAILAND PHENOL 2 905,87 SHELL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON MAP TA PHUT THAILAND PHENOL 974,68 SHELL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON NINGBO CHINA PROPANOL 1 000,00 OXEA CORPORATION
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON PASIR GUDANG MALAYSIA PHENOL 974,68 SHELL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON SHANGHAI CHINA ALCOHOL POLY ETHOXYLATES 100,00 SHELL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON SHANGHAI CHINA ALCOHOL POLY ETHOXYLATES 250,00 SHELL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON SHANGHAI CHINA ALCOHOL POLY ETHOXYLATES 180,00 SHELL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON SHANGHAI CHINA ALCOHOL POLY ETHOXYLATES 400,00 SHELL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON SHANGHAI CHINA ALCOHOL POLY ETHOXYLATES 200,00 SHELL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON SHANGHAI CHINA ALCOHOL POLY ETHOXYLATES 150,00 SHELL CHEMICAL
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Stolt Parcel Tankers 121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON SHANGHAI CHINA ALCOHOL POLY ETHOXYLATES 150,00 SHELL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON SHANGHAI CHINA ALCOHOL POLY ETHOXYLATES 200,00 SHELL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE HEXAMETHYLENE DIAMINE 1 999,49 INVISTA SARL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE PROPYLENE GLYCOL 734,91 LYONDELL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA HEXAMETHYLENE DIAMINE 3 665,49 INVISTA SARL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121203 SYCAMORE TEXAS CITY JIANGYIN CHINA BUTYL ALCOHOL 1 000,00 EASTMAN CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121203 SYCAMORE TEXAS CITY ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA BUTYL ETHYLENE GLYCOL MONOALKYL ETH 250,00 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121203 SYCAMORE TEXAS CITY ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA BUTYL ETHYLENE GLYCOL MONOALKYL ETH 500,00 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121204 SYCAMORE FREEPORT TX KINUURA JAPAN EPICHLOROHYDRIN 136,73 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121204 SYCAMORE FREEPORT TX SINGAPORE SINGAPORE PROPYLENE GLYCOL 572,17 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121204 SYCAMORE FREEPORT TX SINGAPORE SINGAPORE PROPYLENE GLYCOL 525,25 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121204 SYCAMORE FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA DER EPOXY RESIN 291,84 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121204 SYCAMORE FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA DER EPOXY RESIN 336,93 DOW CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON KOBE JAPAN HEXAMETHYLENE DIAMINE 930,73 INVISTA SARL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON KOBE JAPAN PHENOL 1 015,49 SHELL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON MAP TA PHUT THAILAND PHENOL 1 015,49 SHELL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON MAP TA PHUT THAILAND PHENOL 2 538,71 SHELL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON MAP TA PHUT THAILAND PHENOL 2 030,98 SHELL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON MERAK INDONESIA ALPHA OLEFIN 1 010,13 INEOS SINGAPORE
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON MERAK INDONESIA NAPHTHA SOLVENT ISOPAR 500,83 EXXONMOBIL CHEMICAL ASIA PACIFIC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON NINGBO CHINA ADIPONITRILE UN2205 4 000,00 INVISTA SARL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON NINGBO CHINA HEXAMETHYLENE DIAMINE 1 660,00 INVISTA SARL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON SHANGHAI CHINA NEODOL 100,00 SHELL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON SHANGHAI CHINA NEODOL 300,00 SHELL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON SHANGHAI CHINA NEODOL 500,00 SHELL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON SHANGHAI CHINA NEODOL 220,00 SHELL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON SHANGHAI CHINA NEODOL 280,00 SHELL CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE EXXSOL D 130 FLUID 204,08 EXXONMOBIL CHEMICAL ASIA PACIFIC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE EXXSOL D110 FLUID 150,24 EXXONMOBIL CHEMICAL ASIA PACIFIC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE EXXSOL HEPTANE 671,42 EXXONMOBIL CHEMICAL ASIA PACIFIC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE HEXAMETHYLENE DIAMINE 2 057,87 INVISTA SARL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE ISOPAR 179,45 EXXONMOBIL CHEMICAL ASIA PACIFIC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE ISOPAR M FLUID 209,40 EXXONMOBIL CHEMICAL ASIA PACIFIC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE PETR OIL 203,98 EXXONMOBIL CHEMICAL ASIA PACIFIC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA DB SOLVENT 781,84 EASTMAN CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ETHYLENE GLYCOL 996,08 EASTMAN CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ETHYLENE GLYCOL MONOALKYL ETHERS 1 000,00 EASTMAN CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA HEXAMETHYLENE DIAMINE 981,78 INVISTA SARL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ISOPAR 304,88 EXXONMOBIL CHEMICAL ASIA PACIFIC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ISOPAR E FLUID 298,64 EXXONMOBIL CHEMICAL ASIA PACIFIC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ISOPAR H FLUID 797,56 EXXONMOBIL CHEMICAL ASIA PACIFIC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ISOPAR L BT VL NAPHTHA SOLVENT 300,50 EXXONMOBIL CHEMICAL ASIA PACIFIC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA POLYALKYLENE GLYCOL 509,86 EASTMAN CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON YANTIAN CHINA BUTYL BUTYRATE 500,00 EASTMAN CHEMICAL
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON YANTIAN CHINA NAPHTHA SOLVENT ISOPAR 200,00 EXXONMOBIL CHEMICAL ASIA PACIFIC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON YANTIAN CHINA NAPHTHA SOLVENT ISOPAR 180,00 EXXONMOBIL CHEMICAL ASIA PACIFIC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON YANTIAN CHINA NAPHTHA SOLVENT ISOPAR 300,00 EXXONMOBIL CHEMICAL ASIA PACIFIC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON YOKOHAMA JAPAN DURASYN 166 NC 407,73 INEOS SINGAPORE
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON YOKOHAMA JAPAN EXXSOL D110 FLUID 60,29 EXXONMOBIL CHEMICAL ASIA PACIFIC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON YOKOHAMA JAPAN ISOPAR 398,79 EXXONMOBIL CHEMICAL ASIA PACIFIC
Stolt Parcel Tankers 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA PHENOL 1 000,00 SHELL CHEMICAL
Tokyo Marine 121016 BEECH GALAXY RICHMOND MERAK INDONESIA PROPYLENE TETRAMER 2 484,28 CHEVRON ORONITE CO
Tokyo Marine 121016 BEECH GALAXY RICHMOND SINGAPORE SINGAPORE PROPYLENE TETRAMER 1 241,95 CHEVRON ORONITE CO
Tokyo Marine 121111 GINGA BOBCAT NEW ORLEANS JIANGYIN CHINA BUTANOL UN1120 500,00 DOW CHEMICAL
Tokyo Marine 121111 GINGA BOBCAT NEW ORLEANS JIANGYIN CHINA BUTANOL UN1120 500,00 DOW CHEMICAL
Tokyo Marine 121111 GINGA BOBCAT NEW ORLEANS NINGBO CHINA ALKYLENE GLYCOL MONOALKYL 500,00 DOW CHEMICAL
Tokyo Marine 121111 GINGA BOBCAT NEW ORLEANS NINGBO CHINA DIETHYLENETRIAMINE UN2079 500,00 DOW CHEMICAL
Tokyo Marine 121111 GINGA BOBCAT NEW ORLEANS NINGBO CHINA ETHYLENEDIAMINE UN1604 700,00 DOW CHEMICAL
Tokyo Marine 121111 GINGA BOBCAT NEW ORLEANS SHANGHAI CHINA BUTANOL UN1120 1 000,00 DOW CHEMICAL
Tokyo Marine 121111 GINGA BOBCAT NEW ORLEANS ULSAN SOUTH KOREA BUTANOL UN1120 157,20 DOW CHEMICAL
Tokyo Marine 121111 GINGA BOBCAT NEW ORLEANS ULSAN SOUTH KOREA BUTANOL UN1120 419,20 DOW CHEMICAL
Tokyo Marine 121111 GINGA BOBCAT NEW ORLEANS ULSAN SOUTH KOREA BUTANOL UN1120 471,60 DOW CHEMICAL
Tokyo Marine 121127 GINGA BOBCAT HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN MEHQ BUTYL ACRYLATE 1 481,49 ROHM AND HAAS
Tokyo Marine 121127 GINGA BOBCAT HOUSTON LIANYUNGANG CHINA ACRYLONITRILE 400,00 VINMAR INTERNATIONAL
Tokyo Marine 121127 GINGA BOBCAT HOUSTON LIANYUNGANG CHINA ACRYLONITRILE 2 000,00 VINMAR INTERNATIONAL
Tokyo Marine 121127 GINGA BOBCAT HOUSTON LIANYUNGANG CHINA ACRYLONITRILE 400,00 VINMAR INTERNATIONAL
Tokyo Marine 121127 GINGA BOBCAT HOUSTON NINGBO CHINA 2METHYL13PROPANEDIOL 525,00 EQUISTAR CHEMICALS
Tokyo Marine 121127 GINGA BOBCAT HOUSTON NINGBO CHINA DIETHYLENE GLYCOL METHYL ETHER 525,00 EQUISTAR CHEMICALS
Tokyo Marine 121127 GINGA BOBCAT HOUSTON NINGBO CHINA POLY GLYCOL 525,00 EQUISTAR CHEMICALS
Tokyo Marine 121127 GINGA BOBCAT HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA NMETHYLPYRROLIDONE 300,00 BASF CHEMICAL COMPANY
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Tokyo Marine 121127 GINGA BOBCAT HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA TETRAHYDROFURAN UN2056 1 450,00 BASF CHEMICAL COMPANY
Tokyo Marine 121127 GINGA BOBCAT HOUSTON YOSU SOUTH KOREA DIISOBUTYLENES 829,75 SI GROUP
Tokyo Marine 121127 GINGA BOBCAT HOUSTON ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA DIPROPYLENE GLYCOL INDUSTRIAL 525,00 LYONDELL CHEMICAL
Tokyo Marine 121127 GINGA BOBCAT HOUSTON ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA DIPROPYLENE GLYCOL INDUSTRIAL 735,00 LYONDELL CHEMICAL
Tokyo Marine 121128 GINGA BOBCAT PNT COMFORT ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ACRYLONITRILE 4 150,00 INEOS EUROPE AG
Tokyo Marine 121128 GINGA BOBCAT PNT COMFORT ULSAN SOUTH KOREA ACRYLONITRILE 1 999,00 INEOS USA LLC
Tokyo Marine 121201 GINGA BOBCAT TEXAS CITY KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN NEOL NEOPENTYLGLYCOL 600,00 BASF CORP
Tokyo Marine 121201 GINGA BOBCAT TEXAS CITY ULSAN SOUTH KOREA NEOL NEOPENTYLGLYCOL 700,00 BASF CORP
Tokyo Marine 121203 GINGA EAGLE RICHMOND KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN PROPYLENE TETRAMER 1 000,44 CHEVRON ORONITE CO
Tokyo Marine 121203 GINGA EAGLE RICHMOND SINGAPORE SINGAPORE PROPYLENE TETRAMER 990,46 CHEVRON ORONITE CO
Tokyo Marine 121203 GINGA EAGLE RICHMOND SINGAPORE SINGAPORE PROPYLENE TETRAMER 750,53 CHEVRON ORONITE CO
Tokyo Marine 121203 GINGA EAGLE RICHMOND ULSAN SOUTH KOREA PROPYLENE TETRAMER 1 250,75 CHEVRON ORONITE CO
Tokyo Marine 121130 GINGA LION BATON ROUGE ULSAN SOUTH KOREA CHEMICALS HARMLESS 500,00 BASF
Tokyo Marine 121205 GINGA LION LK CHARLES ULSAN SOUTH KOREA MIX XYLENE 6 000,01 TRAMMOCHEM
Tokyo Marine 121016 GINGA LYNX NEW ORLEANS NINGBO CHINA DIETHYLENETRIAMINE UN2079 500,00 DOW CHEMICAL
Tokyo Marine 121016 GINGA LYNX NEW ORLEANS NINGBO CHINA ETHYLENEDIAMINE UN1604 500,00 DOW CHEMICAL
Tokyo Marine 121020 GINGA LYNX FREEPORT TX KINUURA JAPAN DER EPOXY RESIN 525,55 DOW CHEMICAL
Tokyo Marine 121020 GINGA LYNX FREEPORT TX KINUURA JAPAN EPICHLOROHYDRIN 1 000,00 DOW CHEMICAL
Tokyo Marine 121020 GINGA LYNX FREEPORT TX KUNSAN SOUTH KOREA PHENOL 3 150,23 CEDAR PETROCHEMICALS
Tokyo Marine 121020 GINGA LYNX FREEPORT TX NANTONG CHINA CHLOROFORM 3 000,00 DOW CHEMICAL
Tokyo Marine 121020 GINGA LYNX FREEPORT TX NANTONG CHINA METHYLENE CHLORIDE 2 000,00 DOW CHEMICAL
Tokyo Marine 121020 GINGA LYNX FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA EPICHLOROHYDRIN 400,00 DOW CHEMICAL
Tokyo Marine 121020 GINGA LYNX FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA EPICHLOROHYDRIN 175,11 DOW CHEMICAL
Tokyo Marine 121105 GINGA LYNX HOUSTON KUNSAN SOUTH KOREA PHENOL 3 144,83 CEDAR PETROCHEMICALS
Tokyo Marine 121105 GINGA LYNX HOUSTON NINGBO CHINA ALPHA OLEFIN 1 000,00 INEOS SINGAPORE PTE LTD
Tokyo Marine 121105 GINGA LYNX HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA BUTYL ACRYLATE 100,00 ROHM AND HAAS
Tokyo Marine 121105 GINGA LYNX HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA BUTYL ACRYLATE UN2348 50,00 ROHM AND HAAS
Tokyo Marine 121105 GINGA LYNX HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA BUTYL ACRYLATE UN2348 50,00 ROHM AND HAAS
Tokyo Marine 121105 GINGA LYNX HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA TETRAHYDROFURAN UN2056 1 480,83 BASF CHEMICAL COMPANY
Tokyo Marine 121105 GINGA LYNX TEXAS CITY KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN NEOL NEOPENTYLGLYCOL 839,92 BASF CORP
Tokyo Marine 121105 GINGA LYNX TEXAS CITY ULSAN SOUTH KOREA NEOL NEOPENTYLGLYCOL 524,95 BASF CORP
Tokyo Marine 121105 GINGA LYNX TEXAS CITY ZHUHAI CHINA ETHYLHEXANOL 1 000,00 BASF CHEMICAL COMPANY
Tokyo Marine 121105 GINGA LYNX TEXAS CITY ZHUHAI CHINA ETHYLHEXANOL 1 000,00 BASF CHEMICAL COMPANY
Tokyo Marine 121016 PINE GALAXY RICHMOND ULSAN SOUTH KOREA PROPYLENE TETRAMER 2 252,59 CHEVRON ORONITE CO
Tokyo Marine 121016 PINE GALAXY RICHMOND YOKOHAMA JAPAN CRUDE DEGUMMED SOYBEAN OIL 489,47 CARGILL INC
Tokyo Marine 121016 PINE GALAXY RICHMOND YOKOHAMA JAPAN CRUDE OLEIC SAFFLOWER OIL 509,91 SUMITOMO CORPORATION AMERICA
Tokyo Marine 121016 PINE GALAXY RICHMOND YOKOHAMA JAPAN CRUDE OLEIC SAFFLOWER OIL 407,87 OILSEEDS INTL LTD
Tokyo Marine 121016 PINE GALAXY RICHMOND YOKOHAMA JAPAN CRUDE SAFFLOWER OIL 998,82 CALIFORNIA OILS CORPORATION
Trafigura 121119 FR8 FORTITUDE HOUSTON NAN SHA CHINA MIX AROMATICS 10 000,01 INTERCHEM PTE
Trafigura 121119 FR8 FORTITUDE HOUSTON NAN SHA CHINA MIX AROMATICS 10 000,01 INTERCHEM PTE
Trafigura 121119 FR8 FORTITUDE HOUSTON NAN SHA CHINA MIX AROMATICS 10 000,01 INTERCHEM PTE
Trafigura 121119 FR8 FORTITUDE HOUSTON NAN SHA CHINA MIX AROMATICS 4 350,98 INTERCHEM PTE
Ultragas 121111 MIRAMIS HOUSTON NINGBO CHINA PARAXYLENE 15 000,02 EXXONMOBIL CHEMICAL
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Appendix B: Vessel Details 	  
In this section I have presented the 50 vessels serviced in the period and geographical 
segment being observed, see section 5.1. I have chosen to remove some of the data that was 
provided, as it was not of importance for my assessment.  
 
Table:	  Vessel	  Details	  
IMO_Number Operator VesselName MDWT Year 
Total 
Capacity 
Epoxy 
Capacity 
Zinc 
Capacity 
StSteel 
capacity 
9624768 Koyo Kaiun Amelia 21 287 2011 22000     22000 
9340441 Tokyo Marine Beech Galaxy 19 998 2007 22176 0 0 22176 
9317860 Odfjell Tankers Bow Engineer 30 087 2006 35563 0 0 35563 
9215256 Odfjell Tankers Bow Spring 39 942 2004 51084 0 0 51084 
9458834 MISC Bunga Banyan 45 444 2011 53200 53200 0 0 
9278662 Chembulk 
Chembulk 
Barcelona 32 345 2004 36122 0 0 36122 
9294288 Berlian Laju Tankers 
Chembulk Virgin 
Gorda 34 584 2004 38861 0 0 38861 
9367530 Iino Chemway Lara 37 982 2007 46917 0 46917 0 
9304344 
Fairfield Chemical 
Carriers Fairchem Colt 19 998 2005 22184 0 0 22184 
9423750 
Fairfield Chemical 
Carriers Fairchem Eagle 25 400 2010 28482     28482 
9291456 
Fairfield Chemical 
Carriers Fairchem Stallion 19 992 2004 22184 0 0 22184 
9272503 
Formosa Plastics 
Marine Formosa Thirteen 45 706 2005 52428 52428 0 0 
9418573 
Formosa Plastics 
Marine FPMC 24 51 150 2010 54744 54744 0 0 
9528378 
Formosa Plastics 
Marine FPMC 28 50 400 2011 53000 53000 0 0 
9581679 
Formosa Plastics 
Marine FPMC 30 51 150 2012 54744 54744   0 
9379131 Trafigura MR Kentaurus 46 541 2007 52489 52489 0 0 
9472737 Tokyo Marine Ginga Bobcat 26 073 2010 28978 0 0 28978 
9108104 Tokyo Marine Ginga Eagle 19 999 1995 22996 0 0 22996 
9278727 Tokyo Marine Ginga Lion 25 451 2004 28837 0 0 28837 
9442550 Tokyo Marine Ginga Lynx 26 040 2009 28970 0 0 28970 
9572575 
Dorval Tankships Pty 
Ltd Golden Unity 23 300 2011 24725 0 0 24725 
9416044 Nordic Tankers Maemi 19 858 2008 22761 0 0 22761 
9251523 IMC/Aurora Maritime Jingan 44 800 2003 52756 21663 31093 0 
9308534 IMC/Aurora Maritime North 44 487 2005 52759 11349 33418 0 
9421271 Ultragas Miramis 17 527 2009 18613 18613   0 
9335056 NCC Odfjell NCC Dammam 45 965 2008 53313 0 53313 0 
9459022 NCC Odfjell NCC Najem 45 500 2012 53000 30100 22900 0 
9459008 NCC Odfjell NCC Nasma 45 550 2011 53091 30112 22979 0 
9399260 NCC Odfjell NCC Noor 45 565 2011 52425 29761 22664 0 
9272682 Tokyo Marine Pine Galaxy 19 997 2004 21487 0 0 21487 
9361471 Eitzen Chemical Sichem Onomichi 13 105 2008 14064 14064 0 0 
9408803 
Navig8 Chemicals - 
Stainless8 Pool Sira 19 990 2008 21600 0 0 21600 	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Table:	  Vessel	  Details	  Continued	  
IMO_Number Operator VesselName MDWT Year 
Total 
Capacity 
Epoxy 
Capacity 
Zinc 
Capacity 
StSteel 
capacity 
9185487 Eitzen Chemical Siteam Jupiter 48 309 2000 51136 37046 14090 0 
9343194 Eitzen Chemical Siteam Leader 46 190 2009 52461 29322 23139 0 
9185499 Eitzen Chemical Siteam Neptun 48 309 2000 51136 37046 14090 0 
9565649 Nordic Tankers Siva Ghent 33 600 2011 37730     37730 
9124469 Stolt Parcel Tankers Stolt Achievement 37 141 1999 41578 0 0 41578 
8309543 Stolt Parcel Tankers Stolt Emerald 38 720 1986 44866 0 13745 31121 
9214305 Stolt Parcel Tankers Stolt Focus 37 467 2001 39822 0 0 39822 
8309531 Stolt Parcel Tankers Stolt Sapphire 38 746 1986 44866 0 13745 31121 
9149495 Stolt Parcel Tankers Stolt Sea 22 198 1999 24713 0 0 24713 
9352212 Stolt Parcel Tankers Stolt Sneland 44 080 2008 45155 0 20155 25000 
9168611 Stolt Parcel Tankers Stolt Spray 22 147 2000 24717 0 0 24717 
9168623 Stolt Parcel Tankers Stolt Surf 22 273 2000 24705 0 0 24705 
8309555 Stolt Parcel Tankers Stolt Topaz 38 818 1986 44866 0 13745 31121 
9198563 Jo Tankers Sycamore 37 622 2000 40600 0 7895 32705 
9150315 Stolt Parcel Tankers Sypress 36 677 1998 38475 0 7777 30698 
9412763 IMC/Aurora Wawasan Emerald 19 800 2010 22500     22500 
9477517 IMC/Aurora Wawasan Ruby 19 990 2010 22100     22100 
9360958 Koyo Kaiun Xena 19 908 2007 21651 0 0 21651 
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Appendix C: Route Composition Following	  are	  the	  routes	  composed	  by	  the	  central	  planner	  roughly	  minimizing	  distance	  as	  well	  as	  the	  number	  of	  port	  calls.	  
Table	  1(C):	  Route	  Composition	  under	  a	  Central	  Planner	  
	  
Route LOADDATE VESSEL LOADPORT DISCHARGEPORT COUNTRY MTONS Distance Route LOADDATE VESSEL LOADPORT DISCHARGEPORT COUNTRY MTONS Distance
121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON AUCKLAND NEW ZEALAND 299,850 121026 STOLT FOCUS FREEPORT TX SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 367,360
121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON AUCKLAND NEW ZEALAND 350,000 121017 STOLT SAPPHIRE FREEPORT TX SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 523,940
121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON AUCKLAND NEW ZEALAND 199,540 121017 STOLT SAPPHIRE FREEPORT TX SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 899,410
121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON AUCKLAND NEW ZEALAND 399,640 121017 STOLT SAPPHIRE FREEPORT TX SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 368,280
121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON AUCKLAND NEW ZEALAND 349,870 121030 STOLT SNELAND FREEPORT TX SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 730,800
121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON BOTANY AUSTRALIA 149,720 121030 STOLT SNELAND FREEPORT TX SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 1 254,290
121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON BOTANY AUSTRALIA 499,890 121109 STOLT TOPAZ FREEPORT TX SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 501,570
121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON BOTANY AUSTRALIA 253,160 121109 STOLT TOPAZ FREEPORT TX SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 574,790
121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON BOTANY AUSTRALIA 205,210 121109 STOLT TOPAZ FREEPORT TX SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 1 566,730
121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON BOTANY AUSTRALIA 579,260 121204 SYCAMORE FREEPORT TX SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 572,170
121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON BOTANY AUSTRALIA 1 516,860 121204 SYCAMORE FREEPORT TX SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 525,250
121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON BOTANY AUSTRALIA 1 050,190 121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON PASIR GUDANG MALAYSIA 974,680
121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON BRISBANE AUSTRALIA 494,040 121023 STOLT FOCUS HOUSTON MERAK INDONESIA 199,940
121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON BRISBANE AUSTRALIA 799,840 121023 STOLT FOCUS HOUSTON MERAK INDONESIA 999,700
121106 STOLT SPRAY TEXAS CITY BRISBANE AUSTRALIA 501,250 121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON MERAK INDONESIA 2 071,700
121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON FREMANTLE AUSTRALIA 799,450 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON MERAK INDONESIA 500,830
121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON FREMANTLE AUSTRALIA 199,540 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON MERAK INDONESIA 1 010,130
121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON FREMANTLE AUSTRALIA 849,620 121105 BOW ENGINEER HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 611,400
121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON MELBOURNE AUSTRALIA 498,850 121213 BOW SPRING HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 1 019,340
121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON MELBOURNE AUSTRALIA 1 200,010 121127 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 839,640
121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON MELBOURNE AUSTRALIA 200,000 121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 783,370
121106 STOLT SPRAY TEXAS CITY MELBOURNE AUSTRALIA 249,580 121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 258,080
121109 STOLT SPRAY FREEPORT TX MELBOURNE AUSTRALIA 469,550 121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 504,420
121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON MELBOURNE AUSTRALIA 198,470 121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 299,860
121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON MELBOURNE AUSTRALIA 203,970 121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 706,390
121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON MELBOURNE AUSTRALIA 1 925,550 121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 201,370
121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON MELBOURNE AUSTRALIA 2 300,020 121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 402,580
121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON MELBOURNE AUSTRALIA 199,670 121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 314,510
121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON MELBOURNE AUSTRALIA 999,090 121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 1 592,120
121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON MELBOURNE AUSTRALIA 1 149,570 121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 200,520
121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON SYDNEY AUSTRALIA 405,410 121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 200,140
121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON SYDNEY AUSTRALIA 500,010 121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 805,380
121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON SYDNEY AUSTRALIA 799,910 121214 STOLT SEA HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 202,530
1 20$796,590 12299,51 121025 STOLT SNELAND HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 1 049,920
121025 STOLT SNELAND HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 2 500,170
121123 STOLT SURF HOUSTON ANPING CHINA 499,540 121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 299,850
121123 STOLT SURF HOUSTON ANPING CHINA 1 498,620 121106 STOLT SPRAY HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 2 950,880
121114 MARITIME JINGAN PNT COMFORT ANPING CHINA 4 000,000 121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 203,860
121211 SITEAM NEPTUN PNT COMFORT ANPING CHINA 4 000,000 121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 355,450
121105 WAWASAN EMERALD HOUSTON ANPING CHINA 4 000,000 121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 499,600
121018 MARITIME NORTH HOUSTON ANPING CHINA 4 769,090 121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 305,240
121202 MARITIME JINGAN HOUSTON ANPING CHINA 5 250,490 121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 699,650
121022 SITEAM JUPITER TEXAS CITY ANPING CHINA 7 000,010 121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 1 999,490
2 31 017,750 10389 121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 734,910
121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 204,080
121215 FAIRCHEM EAGLE HOUSTON DACHAN CHINA 2 500,000 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 150,240
121215 FAIRCHEM EAGLE HOUSTON DACHAN CHINA 2 500,000 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 671,420
121215 FAIRCHEM EAGLE HOUSTON DACHAN CHINA 5 000,010 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 179,450
121215 FAIRCHEM EAGLE HOUSTON DACHAN CHINA 5 000,010 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 209,400
121215 FAIRCHEM EAGLE HOUSTON DACHAN CHINA 5 000,010 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 203,980
3 20 000,030 10339 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 2 057,870
121213 BOW SPRING TEXAS CITY SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 3 976,060
121209 FAIRCHEM COLT FREEPORT TX DALIAN CHINA 8 920,720 121023 STOLT FOCUS TEXAS CITY SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 499,460
121211 FAIRCHEM COLT HOUSTON DALIAN CHINA 9 081,020 121025 STOLT SNELAND TEXAS CITY SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 495,530
121203 SICHEM ONOMICHI HOUSTON DALIAN CHINA 11 000,010 22 42 829,730 12261
4 29 001,750 10230
121120 AMELIA BATON ROUGE ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 2 079,330
121019 FPMC 24 BATON ROUGE ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 10 266,260
121207 BOW SPRING HOUSTON ZHENJIANG CHINA 2 099,550 121125 FPMC 30 BATON ROUGE ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 10 054,780
121127 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT HOUSTON SHEKOU CHINA 1 000,000 121130 GINGA LION BATON ROUGE ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 500,000
121023 STOLT FOCUS HOUSTON SHEKOU CHINA 1 000,000 121130 NCC NAJRAN BATON ROUGE ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 5 253,870
121017 STOLT SAPPHIRE FREEPORT TX SHEKOU CHINA 1 000,000 121130 NCC NAJRAN BATON ROUGE ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 5 253,870
121203 AMELIA HOUSTON DONGGUAN CHINA 80,000 121018 SITEAM LEADER BATON ROUGE ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 10 000,010
121023 XENA HOUSTON DONGGUAN CHINA 80,000 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 400,000
121203 AMELIA HOUSTON DONGGUAN CHINA 200,000 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 100,000
121203 AMELIA HOUSTON DONGGUAN CHINA 220,000 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 489,160
121023 XENA HOUSTON DONGGUAN CHINA 220,000 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 100,000
121106 STOLT TOPAZ TEXAS CITY DONGGUAN CHINA 249,900 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 100,000
121106 STOLT TOPAZ TEXAS CITY DONGGUAN CHINA 500,000 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 100,000
121106 STOLT TOPAZ TEXAS CITY DONGGUAN CHINA 500,000 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 98,840
121106 STOLT TOPAZ TEXAS CITY DONGGUAN CHINA 699,720 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 100,000
121023 STOLT FOCUS TEXAS CITY DONGGUAN CHINA 750,000 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 100,000
121023 STOLT FOCUS HOUSTON DONGGUAN CHINA 1 000,000 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 100,000
121023 XENA HOUSTON GUANGZHOU CHINA 200,000 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 151,650
121023 XENA HOUSTON GUANGZHOU CHINA 250,000 121015 XENA BATON ROUGE ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 2 083,790
121023 XENA HOUSTON GUANGZHOU CHINA 1 250,000 23 47$331,560 9628
5 11 299,170 11009
121125 MARITIME JINGAN CORPUS CHRSTI ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 5 000,010
121102 CHEMBULK BARCELONA LK CHARLES XIAMEN CHINA 10 000,010 121123 SIVA GHENT CORPUS CHRSTI ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 4 896,010
121106 STOLT TOPAZ TEXAS CITY XIAOHUDAO CHINA 449,900 121123 SIVA GHENT CORPUS CHRSTI ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 2 074,000
121101 NCC NOOR HOUSTON HONG KONG CHINA 3 147,790 121123 SIVA GHENT CORPUS CHRSTI ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 1 074,000
121101 NCC NOOR HOUSTON HONG KONG CHINA 3 148,070 24 13$044,020 9653
121105 BOW ENGINEER HOUSTON HONG KONG CHINA 5 248,970
6 21 994,740 10855 121208 BOW SPRING FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 2 098,060
121020 GINGA LYNX FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 400,000
121111 GINGA BOBCAT NEW ORLEANS JIANGYIN CHINA 500,000 121020 GINGA LYNX FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 175,110
121111 GINGA BOBCAT NEW ORLEANS JIANGYIN CHINA 500,000 121114 SIVA GHENT FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 5 250,010
121105 WAWASAN RUBY HOUSTON JIANGYIN CHINA 500,000 121026 STOLT FOCUS FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 525,800
121203 SYCAMORE TEXAS CITY JIANGYIN CHINA 1 000,000 121026 STOLT FOCUS FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 730,870
121105 WAWASAN EMERALD HOUSTON JIANGYIN CHINA 2 000,000 121026 STOLT FOCUS FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 209,920
121106 STOLT TOPAZ TEXAS CITY JIANGYIN CHINA 2 022,510 121026 STOLT FOCUS FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 2 309,510
121018 MARITIME NORTH HOUSTON JIANGYIN CHINA 3 000,000 121026 STOLT FOCUS FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 1 049,500
121106 WAWASAN EMERALD CORPUS CHRSTI JIANGYIN CHINA 5 000,010 121017 STOLT SAPPHIRE FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 523,940
7 14 522,520 10874 121017 STOLT SAPPHIRE FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 210,450
121017 STOLT SAPPHIRE FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 1 577,810
121127 GINGA BOBCAT HOUSTON LIANYUNGANG CHINA 400,000 121017 STOLT SAPPHIRE FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 1 079,290
121127 GINGA BOBCAT HOUSTON LIANYUNGANG CHINA 400,000 121030 STOLT SNELAND FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 729,060
121121 SIRA HOUSTON LIANYUNGANG CHINA 500,000 121030 STOLT SNELAND FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 415,890
121105 WAWASAN EMERALD HOUSTON LIANYUNGANG CHINA 500,000 121030 STOLT SNELAND FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 313,200
121121 SIRA HOUSTON LIANYUNGANG CHINA 1 000,000 121030 STOLT SNELAND FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 1 672,390
121121 SIRA HOUSTON LIANYUNGANG CHINA 1 000,000 121109 STOLT TOPAZ FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 469,220
121105 WAWASAN EMERALD HOUSTON LIANYUNGANG CHINA 1 000,000 121109 STOLT TOPAZ FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 802,500
121105 WAWASAN EMERALD HOUSTON LIANYUNGANG CHINA 1 000,000 121109 STOLT TOPAZ FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 522,240
121105 WAWASAN EMERALD HOUSTON LIANYUNGANG CHINA 1 000,000 121204 SYCAMORE FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 291,840
121105 WAWASAN EMERALD HOUSTON LIANYUNGANG CHINA 1 000,000 121204 SYCAMORE FREEPORT TX ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 336,930
121121 SIRA HOUSTON LIANYUNGANG CHINA 1 499,930 25 21$693,540 9601
121127 GINGA BOBCAT HOUSTON LIANYUNGANG CHINA 2 000,000
121121 SIRA HOUSTON LIANYUNGANG CHINA 2 000,000 121203 AMELIA HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 419,980
121105 WAWASAN EMERALD HOUSTON LIANYUNGANG CHINA 2 000,000 121203 AMELIA HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 210,000
8 15 299,930 10113 121203 AMELIA HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 500,000
121105 BOW ENGINEER HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 100,000
121119 FR8 FORTITUDE HOUSTON NAN SHA CHINA 4 350,980 121105 BOW ENGINEER HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 99,860
121119 FR8 FORTITUDE HOUSTON NAN SHA CHINA 10 000,010 121105 BOW ENGINEER HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 100,000
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121119 FR8 FORTITUDE HOUSTON NAN SHA CHINA 10 000,010 121105 BOW ENGINEER HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 100,000
121119 FR8 FORTITUDE HOUSTON NAN SHA CHINA 10 000,010 121105 BOW ENGINEER HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 1 019,490
9 34 351,010 10678 121105 BOW ENGINEER HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 509,820
121105 BOW ENGINEER HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 1 014,680
121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON YANTIAN CHINA 180,000 121207 BOW SPRING HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 1 017,690
121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON YANTIAN CHINA 200,000 121207 BOW SPRING HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 407,920
121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON YANTIAN CHINA 300,000 121207 BOW SPRING HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 1 219,030
121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON YANTIAN CHINA 500,000 121030 CHEMBULK BARCELONA HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 4 857,890
121124 CHEMBULK VIRGIN GORDA BATON ROUGE CHANGSHU CHINA 3 059,020 121127 GINGA BOBCAT HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 300,000
121030 STOLT SNELAND FREEPORT TX LANSHAN CHINA 1 200,000 121127 GINGA BOBCAT HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 1 450,000
121020 GINGA LYNX FREEPORT TX NANTONG CHINA 2 000,000 121105 GINGA LYNX HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 1 480,830
121020 GINGA LYNX FREEPORT TX NANTONG CHINA 3 000,000 121105 GINGA LYNX HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 100,000
121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE NINGBO CHINA 500,000 121105 GINGA LYNX HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 50,000
121129 STOLT SURF BATON ROUGE NINGBO CHINA 500,000 121105 GINGA LYNX HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 50,000
121128 CHEMBULK VIRGIN GORDA LK CHARLES NINGBO CHINA 5 000,010 121018 MARITIME NORTH HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 5 840,020
121111 GINGA BOBCAT NEW ORLEANS NINGBO CHINA 500,000 121120 NCC NAJRAN HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 5 223,900
121111 GINGA BOBCAT NEW ORLEANS NINGBO CHINA 500,000 121120 NCC NAJRAN HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 5 320,090
121016 GINGA LYNX NEW ORLEANS NINGBO CHINA 500,000 121207 SITEAM NEPTUN HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 2 000,000
121016 GINGA LYNX NEW ORLEANS NINGBO CHINA 500,000 121207 SITEAM NEPTUN HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 1 053,110
121111 GINGA BOBCAT NEW ORLEANS NINGBO CHINA 700,000 121127 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 917,290
10 19 139,030 10689 121127 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 803,570
121127 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 304,810
121018 MARITIME NORTH HOUSTON NINGBO CHINA 2 059,430 121023 STOLT FOCUS HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 699,390
121023 STOLT FOCUS HOUSTON NINGBO CHINA 6 000,010 121023 STOLT FOCUS HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 2 827,870
121105 BOW ENGINEER HOUSTON NINGBO CHINA 209,920 121025 STOLT SNELAND HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 100,000
121105 BOW ENGINEER HOUSTON NINGBO CHINA 314,880 121025 STOLT SNELAND HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 100,000
121105 BOW ENGINEER HOUSTON NINGBO CHINA 524,810 121025 STOLT SNELAND HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 98,320
121105 GINGA LYNX HOUSTON NINGBO CHINA 1 000,000 121025 STOLT SNELAND HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 100,000
121105 BOW ENGINEER HOUSTON NINGBO CHINA 1 019,700 121025 STOLT SNELAND HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 100,000
121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON NINGBO CHINA 1 660,000 121025 STOLT SNELAND HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 100,000
121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON NINGBO CHINA 4 000,000 121025 STOLT SNELAND HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 100,000
121111 MIRAMIS HOUSTON NINGBO CHINA 15 000,020 121025 STOLT SNELAND HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 524,820
11 31 788,770 10033 121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 204,630
121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 3 665,490
121123 STOLT SURF HOUSTON NINGBO CHINA 4 000,000 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 781,840
121127 GINGA BOBCAT HOUSTON NINGBO CHINA 525,000 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 996,080
121127 GINGA BOBCAT HOUSTON NINGBO CHINA 525,000 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 1 000,000
121127 GINGA BOBCAT HOUSTON NINGBO CHINA 525,000 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 509,860
121127 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT HOUSTON NINGBO CHINA 4 500,010 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 304,880
121202 MARITIME JINGAN HOUSTON NINGBO CHINA 3 000,000 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 298,640
121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON NINGBO CHINA 1 000,000 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 797,560
121207 NCC NASMA HOUSTON NINGBO CHINA 3 999,850 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 300,500
121207 NCC NASMA HOUSTON NINGBO CHINA 15 408,440 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 981,780
12 33 483,300 10033 121023 XENA HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 500,000
121023 XENA HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 500,000
121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE SHANGHAI CHINA 100,000 121023 XENA HOUSTON ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 500,000
121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE SHANGHAI CHINA 100,000 26 52$561,640 9641
121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE SHANGHAI CHINA 100,000
121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE SHANGHAI CHINA 100,000 121102 CHEMBULK BARCELONA LK CHARLES ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 4 756,750
121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE SHANGHAI CHINA 150,000 121128 CHEMBULK VIRGIN GORDA LK CHARLES ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 5 229,400
121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE SHANGHAI CHINA 200,000 121116 FAIRCHEM STALLION LK CHARLES ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 6 007,640
121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE SHANGHAI CHINA 200,000 121205 GINGA LION LK CHARLES ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 6 000,010
121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE SHANGHAI CHINA 250,000 121029 NCC NOOR LK CHARLES ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 5 265,740
121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE SHANGHAI CHINA 300,000 121020 XENA LK CHARLES ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 5 956,640
121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE SHANGHAI CHINA 300,000 27 33$216,180 9516
121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE SHANGHAI CHINA 500,000
121030 STOLT SNELAND FREEPORT TX SHANGHAI CHINA 500,000 121111 BOW ENGINEER PNT COMFORT ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 4 999,010
121030 STOLT SNELAND FREEPORT TX SHANGHAI CHINA 519,870 121111 BOW ENGINEER PNT COMFORT ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 1 000,000
121030 MARITIME NORTH FREEPORT TX SHANGHAI CHINA 10 000,010 121125 BOW SPRING PNT COMFORT ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 6 999,010
121114 SIVA GHENT FREEPORT TX SHANGHAI CHINA 10 000,110 121125 BOW SPRING PNT COMFORT ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 1 000,000
121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON SHANGHAI CHINA 100,000 121024 CHEMBULK BARCELONA PNT COMFORT ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 4 000,000
121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON SHANGHAI CHINA 100,000 121024 CHEMBULK BARCELONA PNT COMFORT ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 4 000,000
121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON SHANGHAI CHINA 150,000 121128 GINGA BOBCAT PNT COMFORT ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 4 150,000
121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON SHANGHAI CHINA 150,000 121128 GINGA BOBCAT PNT COMFORT ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 1 999,000
121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON SHANGHAI CHINA 180,000 121114 MARITIME JINGAN PNT COMFORT ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 1 000,000
121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON SHANGHAI CHINA 200,000 121114 MARITIME JINGAN PNT COMFORT ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 3 000,000
121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON SHANGHAI CHINA 200,000 121021 MARITIME NORTH PNT COMFORT ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 4 000,000
121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON SHANGHAI CHINA 220,000 121214 NCC DAMMAM PNT COMFORT ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 7 840,010
121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON SHANGHAI CHINA 250,000 121211 SITEAM NEPTUN PNT COMFORT ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 3 761,000
121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON SHANGHAI CHINA 280,000 28 47$748,030 9641
121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON SHANGHAI CHINA 300,000
121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON SHANGHAI CHINA 400,000 121111 GINGA BOBCAT NEW ORLEANS ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 157,200
121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON SHANGHAI CHINA 500,000 121111 GINGA BOBCAT NEW ORLEANS ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 419,200
121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT NEW ORLEANS SHANGHAI CHINA 50,620 121111 GINGA BOBCAT NEW ORLEANS ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 471,600
121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT NEW ORLEANS SHANGHAI CHINA 101,250 121203 GINGA EAGLE RICHMOND ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 1 250,750
121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT NEW ORLEANS SHANGHAI CHINA 151,870 121016 PINE GALAXY RICHMOND ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 2 252,590
121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT NEW ORLEANS SHANGHAI CHINA 202,490 121115 NCC NOOR S LOUISIANA ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 10 503,390
121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT NEW ORLEANS SHANGHAI CHINA 253,110 29 15$054,730 11212
121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT NEW ORLEANS SHANGHAI CHINA 303,740
121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT NEW ORLEANS SHANGHAI CHINA 410,640
121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT NEW ORLEANS SHANGHAI CHINA 420,660 121030 CHEMBULK BARCELONA TEXAS CITY ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 4 769,410
121111 GINGA BOBCAT NEW ORLEANS SHANGHAI CHINA 1 000,000 121201 GINGA BOBCAT TEXAS CITY ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 700,000
13 29 244,370 10510 121105 GINGA LYNX TEXAS CITY ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 524,950
121212 NCC DAMMAM TEXAS CITY ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 5 272,480
121102 SITEAM LEADER BATON ROUGE TIANJIN CHINA 5 000,010 121022 SITEAM JUPITER TEXAS CITY ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 5 225,390
121213 GOLDEN UNITY BATON ROUGE TIANJIN CHINA 12 000,010 121023 STOLT FOCUS TEXAS CITY ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 549,700
121202 BOW SPRING BEAUMONT TIANJIN CHINA 2 951,750 121023 STOLT FOCUS TEXAS CITY ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 525,580
121025 NCC NOOR CORPUS CHRSTI TIANJIN CHINA 2 615,000 121023 STOLT FOCUS TEXAS CITY ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 499,950
121026 SITEAM LEADER CORPUS CHRSTI TIANJIN CHINA 4 998,010 121023 STOLT FOCUS TEXAS CITY ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 300,260
121016 FPMC 28 CORPUS CHRSTI TIANJIN CHINA 5 000,010 121023 STOLT FOCUS TEXAS CITY ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 500,430
121102 SITEAM LEADER S LOUISIANA TIANJIN CHINA 5 000,010 121025 STOLT SNELAND TEXAS CITY ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 499,780
121102 SITEAM LEADER S LOUISIANA TIANJIN CHINA 5 000,010 121025 STOLT SNELAND TEXAS CITY ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 309,960
121115 NCC NOOR S LOUISIANA TIANJIN CHINA 6 295,010 121025 STOLT SNELAND TEXAS CITY ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 944,510
14 48 859,820 10784 121106 STOLT TOPAZ TEXAS CITY ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 499,800
121106 STOLT TOPAZ TEXAS CITY ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 307,170
121214 NCC DAMMAM PNT COMFORT TIANJIN CHINA 3 669,000 121106 STOLT TOPAZ TEXAS CITY ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 817,260
121114 MARITIME JINGAN PNT COMFORT TIANJIN CHINA 10 000,010 121106 STOLT TOPAZ TEXAS CITY ULSAN SOUTH KOREA 1 022,500
121211 SITEAM NEPTUN PNT COMFORT TIANJIN CHINA 17 299,000 30 23 269,130 9515
15 30$968,010 10256
121102 SITEAM LEADER BATON ROUGE DAESAN SOUTH KOREA 3 333,340
121026 STOLT FOCUS FREEPORT TX ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA 500,000 121015 XENA BATON ROUGE GUNSAN SOUTH KOREA 2 622,920
121030 STOLT SNELAND FREEPORT TX ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA 500,000 121130 NCC NAJRAN BATON ROUGE YOSU SOUTH KOREA 10 479,010
121017 STOLT SAPPHIRE FREEPORT TX ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA 800,000 121130 NCC NAJRAN BATON ROUGE YOSU SOUTH KOREA 10 479,010
121127 GINGA BOBCAT HOUSTON ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA 525,000 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE YOSU SOUTH KOREA 996,870
121127 GINGA BOBCAT HOUSTON ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA 735,000 31 27 911,150 9774
121118 SIVA GHENT HOUSTON ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA 1 000,000
121023 STOLT FOCUS HOUSTON ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA 1 000,000
121025 STOLT SNELAND HOUSTON ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA 1 000,000
121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA 1 000,000 121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON BUSAN SOUTH KOREA 449,720
121105 BOW ENGINEER HOUSTON ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA 1 007,590 121127 GINGA BOBCAT HOUSTON YOSU SOUTH KOREA 829,750
121118 SIVA GHENT HOUSTON ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA 4 481,540 121026 STOLT FOCUS FREEPORT TX YOSU SOUTH KOREA 1 052,670
121113 BUNGA BANYAN NEW ORLEANS ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA 19 370,180 121020 GINGA LYNX FREEPORT TX KUNSAN SOUTH KOREA 3 150,230
121023 STOLT FOCUS TEXAS CITY ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA 100,000 121105 GINGA LYNX HOUSTON KUNSAN SOUTH KOREA 3 144,830
121023 STOLT FOCUS TEXAS CITY ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA 150,000 121127 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT HOUSTON ONSAN SOUTH KOREA 1 499,800
	   83	  
 	    
121023 STOLT FOCUS TEXAS CITY ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA 150,000 121023 STOLT FOCUS TEXAS CITY YOSU SOUTH KOREA 250,000
121203 SYCAMORE TEXAS CITY ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA 250,000 121025 NCC NOOR CORPUS CHRSTI YOSU SOUTH KOREA 2 615,000
121025 STOLT SNELAND TEXAS CITY ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA 500,000 32 12$992,000 9989
121203 SYCAMORE TEXAS CITY ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA 500,000
121023 STOLT FOCUS TEXAS CITY ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA 600,000 121114 MARITIME JINGAN PNT COMFORT YOSU SOUTH KOREA 10 000,010
121025 STOLT SNELAND TEXAS CITY ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA 838,380 121214 NCC DAMMAM PNT COMFORT YOSU SOUTH KOREA 3 669,000
121106 STOLT TOPAZ TEXAS CITY ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA 2 022,510 121211 SITEAM NEPTUN PNT COMFORT YOSU SOUTH KOREA 17 299,000
121106 STOLT TOPAZ TEXAS CITY ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA 2 048,410 121115 NCC NOOR S LOUISIANA YOSU SOUTH KOREA 6 295,010
121214 SITEAM NEPTUN TEXAS CITY ZHANGJIAGANG CHINA 5 089,430 33 37$263,020 10203
16 44 168,040 10556
121105 BOW ENGINEER HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN 3 001,990
121105 GINGA LYNX TEXAS CITY ZHUHAI CHINA 1 000,000 121207 BOW SPRING HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN 1 250,090
121105 GINGA LYNX TEXAS CITY ZHUHAI CHINA 1 000,000 121201 GINGA BOBCAT TEXAS CITY KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN 600,000
121207 NCC NASMA HOUSTON ZHUHAI CHINA 9 963,820 121127 GINGA BOBCAT HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN 1 481,490
121105 WAWASAN RUBY HOUSTON ZHUHAI CHINA 15 000,020 121203 GINGA EAGLE RICHMOND KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN 1 000,440
17 26$963,840 10698 121105 GINGA LYNX TEXAS CITY KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN 839,920
121028 SITEAM LEADER HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN 5 000,010
121102 SITEAM LEADER BATON ROUGE KASHIMA JAPAN 3 333,340 121127 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN 524,480
121207 FORMOSA THIRTEEN LK CHARLES KOBE JAPAN 1 500,000 121127 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN 644,540
121121 FPMC 30 LK CHARLES KOBE JAPAN 10 000,010 121023 STOLT FOCUS HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN 199,900
121119 SIRA LK CHARLES KOBE JAPAN 10 000,010 121023 STOLT FOCUS HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN 1 299,340
121025 STOLT TOPAZ NEW ORLEANS YOKOHAMA JAPAN 301,290 121023 STOLT FOCUS TEXAS CITY KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN 599,950
121025 STOLT TOPAZ NEW ORLEANS YOKOHAMA JAPAN 559,610 121023 STOLT FOCUS HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN 1 499,550
121016 PINE GALAXY RICHMOND YOKOHAMA JAPAN 998,820 121025 STOLT SNELAND HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN 2 100,440
121016 PINE GALAXY RICHMOND YOKOHAMA JAPAN 489,470 121030 STOLT SNELAND FREEPORT TX KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN 53,250
121016 PINE GALAXY RICHMOND YOKOHAMA JAPAN 407,870 121025 STOLT SNELAND HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN 524,820
121016 PINE GALAXY RICHMOND YOKOHAMA JAPAN 509,910 121025 STOLT SNELAND HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN 944,190
18 28$100,330 11332 121025 STOLT SNELAND HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN 524,530
121025 STOLT SNELAND HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN 842,390
19 121017 CHEMWAY LARA HOUSTON CHIBA JAPAN 33 648,450 9217 121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN 2 624,930
121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN 2 428,270
121020 GINGA LYNX FREEPORT TX KINUURA JAPAN 525,550 121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN 1 049,730
121020 GINGA LYNX FREEPORT TX KINUURA JAPAN 1 000,000 121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN 944,500
121204 SYCAMORE FREEPORT TX KINUURA JAPAN 136,730 121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN 477,720
121030 STOLT SNELAND FREEPORT TX NAGOYA JAPAN 457,600 121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN 1 049,970
121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON KAWASAKI JAPAN 1 425,520 121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN 523,680
121127 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT HOUSTON KOBE JAPAN 1 501,410 121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN 524,690
121127 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT HOUSTON KOBE JAPAN 949,850 121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN 734,880
121023 STOLT FOCUS HOUSTON KOBE JAPAN 930,780 121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN 1 000,040
121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON KOBE JAPAN 925,510 121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN 699,240
121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON KOBE JAPAN 930,730 121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN 1 049,270
121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON KOBE JAPAN 1 015,490 121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN 869,760
121105 BOW ENGINEER HOUSTON SAKURAJIMA JAPAN 1 803,580 121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN 839,760
121213 BOW SPRING HOUSTON SAKURAJIMA JAPAN 2 141,630 121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN 524,960
121207 BOW SPRING HOUSTON YOKOHAMA JAPAN 510,750 121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN 839,650
121207 BOW SPRING HOUSTON YOKOHAMA JAPAN 510,210 34 39$112,370 10498
121023 STOLT FOCUS HOUSTON YOKOHAMA JAPAN 763,080
121025 STOLT SNELAND HOUSTON YOKOHAMA JAPAN 524,970 121127 AMELIA FREEPORT TX MAILIAO TAIWAN 8 248,800
121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON YOKOHAMA JAPAN 629,730 121121 FPMC 30 LK CHARLES MAILIAO TAIWAN 10 000,010
121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON YOKOHAMA JAPAN 1 364,410 121121 FPMC 30 LK CHARLES MAILIAO TAIWAN 3 000,000
121106 STOLT TOPAZ HOUSTON YOKOHAMA JAPAN 524,770 121019 SITEAM JUPITER CORPUS CHRSTI MAILIAO TAIWAN 5 261,010
121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON YOKOHAMA JAPAN 60,290 121207 SITEAM NEPTUN TEXAS CITY MAILIAO TAIWAN 4 925,470
121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON YOKOHAMA JAPAN 398,790 121105 BOW ENGINEER HOUSTON TAICHUNG TAIWAN 1 029,740
121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON YOKOHAMA JAPAN 407,730 121116 FPMC 30 PORT ARTHUR TAICHUNG TAIWAN 3 000,000
121023 STOLT FOCUS TEXAS CITY KOBE JAPAN 471,180 121022 SITEAM JUPITER TEXAS CITY TAICHUNG TAIWAN 6 300,010
121106 STOLT TOPAZ TEXAS CITY KOBE JAPAN 249,900 35 41$765,040 11120
121106 STOLT TOPAZ TEXAS CITY KOBE JAPAN 209,620
121025 STOLT SNELAND TEXAS CITY YOKOHAMA JAPAN 299,870 121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE BANGKOK THAILAND 998,640
121025 STOLT SNELAND TEXAS CITY YOKOHAMA JAPAN 209,890 121127 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT HOUSTON BANGKOK THAILAND 449,450
121106 STOLT TOPAZ TEXAS CITY YOKOHAMA JAPAN 249,900 121127 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT HOUSTON BANGKOK THAILAND 549,390
121106 STOLT TOPAZ TEXAS CITY YOKOHAMA JAPAN 498,350 121023 STOLT FOCUS HOUSTON BANGKOK THAILAND 524,420
20 21$627,820 9785 121023 STOLT FOCUS HOUSTON BANGKOK THAILAND 474,480
121023 STOLT FOCUS HOUSTON MAP TA PHUT THAILAND 399,880
121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE MERAK INDONESIA 998,550 121023 STOLT FOCUS HOUSTON MAP TA PHUT THAILAND 599,820
121201 MAEMI BATON ROUGE SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 1 500,000 121023 STOLT FOCUS HOUSTON MAP TA PHUT THAILAND 199,940
121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 701,220 121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON MAP TA PHUT THAILAND 600,110
121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 998,640 121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON MAP TA PHUT THAILAND 2 905,870
121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT BATON ROUGE SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 1 993,350 121203 SYCAMORE HOUSTON MAP TA PHUT THAILAND 974,680
121202 BOW SPRING BEAUMONT SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 1 985,560 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON MAP TA PHUT THAILAND 1 015,490
121202 BOW SPRING BEAUMONT SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 1 985,560 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON MAP TA PHUT THAILAND 2 538,710
121108 STOLT ACHIEVEMENT NEW ORLEANS SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 502,030 121108 SYPRESS HOUSTON MAP TA PHUT THAILAND 2 030,980
121206 STOLT EMERALD NEW ORLEANS SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 1 410,450 36 14$261,860 12620
121025 STOLT TOPAZ NEW ORLEANS SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 812,200
121016 BEECH GALAXY RICHMOND MERAK INDONESIA 2 484,280
121203 GINGA EAGLE RICHMOND SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 990,460
121203 GINGA EAGLE RICHMOND SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 750,530
21 17 112,830 12261
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Appendix D: Simulation Model 
 
In order to solve the scheduling problem of the simulated central planner, I set up a model 
based on the mathematical formulation by Christiansen et al. (2002), as presented in section 
4.3. I used AMPL to script the problem as shown below, and the AMPLCPLEX solver to 
generate the solution. AMPL is a comprehensive and powerful algebraic modeling language 
for linear and nonlinear optimization problems, in discrete or continuous variables.  
 
	  	  
In the table below displaying the data file, only a segment of the file is included, as it is far 
too large to be shown in full. It is also worth mentioning that the parameter “assign” limits the 
vessels to only be assigned to the routes of which their vessel capacity allows, indirectly 
including this limitation to the model.    	  	  
	  
#Model File: 
 
set VESSEL; 
set CARGO; 
set ROUTE; 
 
param cost (VESSEL,ROUTE) 
param assign(ROUTE, VESSEL, CARGO); 
 
var X(VESSEL,ROUTE) binary; 
 
minimize totalcost: 
sum(v in VESSEL,r in ROUTE)cost(v,r)*X(v,r)=1; 
 
subject to cargoassign (i in CARGO): 
sum(v in VESSEL,r in ROUTE)assign(r,v,i)*X(v,r)=1; 
 
subject to vesselassign (v in VESSEL); 
sum(r in route)X(v,r)<=1; 
 
#Data for Ship Scheduling 
 
set VESSEL := AMELIA BEECH_GALAXY BOW_ENGINEER BOW_SPRING BUNGA_BANYAN CHEMBULK_BARCELONA 
CHEMBULK_VIRGIN_GORDA (…); 
 
set ROUTE := 1 2 3 (…) 35 36; 
 
set CARGO := 1 2 3 4 5(…) 528 529 530; 
 
param cost (tr):  AMELIA BEECH_GALAXY BOW_ENGINEER (…) := 
1   462014 462014     493817 
2   0 0  271759    
(…) 
36   266899 266899  291679  (…);    
 
param assign:= 
 
[*,AMELIA,*](tr): 1 2 3 (…) 36:= 
1   1 0 0  0 
2   1 0 0  0  
(…) 
530   0 0 0  1 
 
[*,BEECH_GALAXY,*](tr): 1 2 (…) 36:= 
1    1 0  0 
2    1 0  0 
(…) 
530    0 0  1 
 
(…); 
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After	  running	  the	  model	  through	  the	  AMPLCPLEX	  solver,	  a	  solution	  was	  generated	  as	  partially	  shown	  in	  the	  table	  below.	  Also	  here	  the	  file	  was	  too	  large	  to	  be	  shown	  in	  full.	  	  
	    
AMPL Version 20051214 (x86_win32) 
 
ampl: model ModelHilde2.mod; 
 
ampl: data DataHilde2.dat; 
 
ampl: solve; 
 
CPLEX 10.0.0: optimal integer solution; objective 9770120 
 
125 MIP simplex iterations 
 
0 branch-and-bound nodes 
 
ampl: display totalcost; 
 
totalcost = 9770120 
 
ampl: display X; 
 
X [*,*] 
 
:                       1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9  10  11  12  13  14 := 
 
AMELIA                  0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0 
 
BEECH_GALAXY            0   0   0   0   0   1   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0 
 
BOW_ENGINEER            0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   1   0 
 
BOW_SPRING              0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0 
 
BUNGA_BANYAN            0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0 
 
CHEMBULK_BARCELONA      0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0 
 
CHEMBULK_VIRGIN_GORDA   0   0   0   1   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0 
 
CHEMWAY_LARA            0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0 
 
FAIRCHEM_COLT           1   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0 
 
FAIRCHEM_EAGLE          0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0 
 
(…) 
 
 
:                      29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36    := 
 
(…) 
 
STOLT_SURF              0   1   0   0   0   0   0   0 
 
STOLT_TOPAZ             0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0 
 
SYCAMORE                0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0 
 
SYPRESS                 0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0 
 
WAWASAN_EMERALD         0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0 
 
WAWASAN_RUBY            0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0 
 
XENA                    0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0 
 
; 
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Appendix E: 	  In	  this	  segment	  I	  have	  presented	  the	  method	  of	  calculation	  for	  the	  utilization	  rate,	  the	  voyage	  costs,	  and	  the	  estimated	  CO2	  emissions.	  	  
Estimation	  of	  Utilization:	  	  Utilization	   	  =	  total	  cargo	  (for	  a	  single	  voyage	  Gulf-­‐Far	  East	  for	  vessels	  v)	  /	  total	  vessel	  
v´s	  capacity	  	  
Voyage	  Cost	  Calculations:	  
 
Input data: 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
 
Output:	  
 
Days at sea   = Distance /(Average speed*24h)  
Days at port   = Total # of berthing * Estimated # of days per port 
Total days    = Sum of all of the above 
 
Port	  Cost	   	  	   	  	  
	   	   	  Houston	  
	  
	  $50	  000,00	  	  
Other	  US	  ports	  
	  
	  $35	  000,00	  	  
Far	  East	  Ports	  
	  
	  $35	  000,00	  	  
	   	   	  Estimated	  days	  per	  
port	   3	  
	  
	   	   	  
	   	  
Xena	  
Vessel	  Data	   	  	   	  	  
	   	   	  Ship	  Size	   d.w.t	   19908	  
Fuel	  Consumption	  
(in	  transit)	   ton/day	   25	  
Fuel	  Consumption	  
(in	  port)	   ton/day	   15	  
Average	  Speed	   knots	   14	  
	   	   	  Route	  
	   	  Distance	   nmiles	   12672	  
Cargo	   d.w.t.	   14163	  
Freight	  Rate	   $/ton	   12	  
Fuel	  Price	   $/ton	   100	  
	   	   	  Number	  of	  
Berthing:	  
	   	  Houston	  
	  
1	  
Other	  US	  Ports	  
	  
2	  
Far	  East	  Ports	  
	  
3	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Fuel cost (in transit)  = Fuel consumption (in transit)*days at sea*fuel price 
Fuel cost (at port)  = Fuel consumption (at port)*days in port*fuel price 
Port cost  = (#of berthing (Houston)*Port cost estimate “Houston”) + (#of 
berthing (other US ports)*Port cost estimate “Other US ports”) 
+ (#of berthing (Far East ports)*Port cost estimate “Far East 
ports”) 
Total Voyage Cost  = Sum of all of the above 	  
Estimation	  of	  Emission:	  	  
Output: 	  Total	  Fuel	  Consumption	   = (Fuel consumption (in transit)*days in transit) + (Fuel 
consumption (at port)*days in port) 
* CO2 Emissions Factor  = 3,17  
Total	  CO2	  emissions	   =	  (in	  total	  tons)	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Appendix F: Free Competition 
In this section I have complied the calculations and estimates from the free competition 
scenario. 
 
Table	  1(F):	  Utilization	  under	  Free	  Competition	  
Vessel Name MDWT Cargo Utilization 
 
Vessel Name MDWT Cargo Utilization 
Amelia 21 287 11958 56 % 
 
NCC Najem 45 500 42010 92 % 
Beech Galaxy 19 998 3726 19 % 
 
NCC Nasma 45 550 29372 64 % 
Bow Engineer 30 087 23715 79 % 
 
NCC Noor 45 565 39885 88 % 
Bow Spring 39 942 31172 78 % 
 
Pine Galaxy 19 997 4659 23 % 
Bunga Banyan 45 444 19370 43 % 
 
Sichem Onomichi 13 105 11000 84 % 
Chembulk Barcelona 32 345 21284 66 % 
 
Sira 19 990 16000 80 % 
Chembulk Virgin Gorda 34 584 13288 38 % 
 
Siteam Jupiter 48 309 23786 49 % 
Chemway Lara 37 982 33648 89 % 
 
Siteam Leader 46 190 41665 90 % 
Fairchem Colt 19 998 18002 90 % 
 
Siteam Neptun 48 309 55427 115 % 
Fairchem Eagle 25 400 20000 79 % 
 
Siva Ghent 33 600 28776 86 % 
Fairchem Stallion 19 992 6008 30 % 
 
Stolt Achievement 37 141 28706 77 % 
Formosa Thirteen 45 706 1500 3 % 
 
Stolt Emerald 38 720 1410 4 % 
FPMC 24 51 150 10266 20 % 
 
Stolt Focus 37 467 33310 89 % 
FPMC 28 50 400 5000 10 % 
 
Stolt Sapphire 38 746 6983 18 % 
FPMC 30 51 150 33055 65 % 
 
Stolt Sea 22 198 11418 51 % 
Ginga Bobcat 26 073 21893 84 % 
 
Stolt Sneland 44 080 23679 54 % 
Ginga Eagle 19 999 3992 20 % 
 
Stolt Spray 22 147 21172 96 % 
Ginga Lion 25 451 6500 26 % 
 
Stolt Surf 22 273 6498 29 % 
Ginga Lynx 26 040 20441 79 % 
 
Stolt Topaz 38 818 37178 96 % 
Golden Unity 23 300 12000 52 % 
 
Sycamore 37 622 23147 62 % 
Maemi 19 858 1500 8 % 
 
Sypress 36 677 28797 79 % 
Maritime Jingan 44 800 41251 92 % 
 
Wawasan Emerald 19 800 17500 88 % 
Maritime North 44 487 29669 67 % 
 
Wawasan Ruby 19 990 15500 78 % 
Miramis 17 527 15000 86 % 
 
Xena 19 908 14163 71 % 
NCC Dammam 45 965 20450 44 % 
 
Total     61 % 
 
 
As mentioned in section 5.1.1 there are possibilities of plotting errors in the PIERS data set, 
as well as the lack of last minute charter data, which might cause the unlikely low and high 
utilization levels shown in the table above. The utilization rates that I suspect might be a 
result of this are here marked with grey. 
 
Shown in table 2(F) below is the calculation of total voyage cost for the entire fleet under free 
competition using the calculation method stipulated in appendix E. I have chosen to not 
	   89	  
display all calculations for limitation purposes, however I do believe it will provide you with 
a sufficient understanding of my calculations. 
 
Table	  2(F):	  Voyage	  Cost	  Calculations	  for	  the	  fleet	  under	  Free	  Competition	  
	  	  	  
In a similar matter as the cost calculations above, I have provided a segment of the CO2 
emissions estimates for the entire fleet under free competition. This is displayed in table 3(F) 
below and is also based on the method of calculation as presented in appendix E.   
Amelia Beech Galaxy Bow Engineer (…) Sycamore Sypress Wawasan Emerlad Wawasan Ruby Xena
Vessel Data Total
Ship Size d.w.t 21287 19998 30087 (…) 37622 36677 19800 19908 19908
Fuel Consumption 
(in transit) ton/day 25 25 30 (…) 30 30 25 25 25
Fuel Consumption 
(in port) ton/day 15 15 20 (…) 20 20 15 15 15
Average Speed knots 14 14 14 (…) 14 14 14 14 14
Route
Distance miles 11474 8167 12669 (…) 13821 14565 11225 11035 12672 555706
Cargo d.w.t. 11958 3726 23715 (…) 23147 28797 17500 15500 14163 1000641
Freight Rate $/ton 12 12 12 (…) 12 12 12 12 12
Fuel Price $/ton 100 100 100 (…) 100 100 100 100 100
Number of 
Berthings:
Houston 1 0 1 (…) 1 1 1 1 1
Other US Ports 2 1 1 (…) 2 0 1 0 2
Far East Ports 3 2 8 (…) 11 10 3 2 4 302
Sea Time days 34 24 38 (…) 41 43 33 33 38 1654
Port Time days 18 9 30 (…) 42 33 15 9 21 906
Total Days days 52 33 68 (…) 83 76 48 42 59 2560
Houston  $             50 000,00 
Other US ports  $             35 000,00 
Far East Ports  $             35 000,00 
Estimated days per 
port 3
Voyage Cost 
Calculation
Fuel Cost (transit)  $             85 372,62  $                        60 762,65  $                    113 120,09 (…)  $    123 398,84  $  130 048,21  $              83 518,82  $         82 104,69  $    94 288,32 
Fuel Cost (port)  $             27 000,00  $                        13 500,00  $                      60 000,00 (…)  $      84 000,00  $    66 000,00  $              22 500,00  $         13 500,00  $    31 500,00  kr     6 687 512,75 
Port Cost  $           225 000,00  $                      105 000,00  $                    365 000,00 (…)  $    505 000,00  $  400 000,00  $            190 000,00  $       120 000,00  $  260 000,00  kr   11 065 000,00 
Total Voyage 
Specific Cost  $           337 372,62  $                      179 262,65  $                    538 120,09 (…)  $    712 398,84  $  596 048,21  $            296 018,82  $       215 604,69  $  385 788,32  kr   17 752 512,75 
Total Cost Fleet  $      17 752 512,75 
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Table	  3(F):	  Estimated	  CO2	  Emissions	  for	  entire	  fleet	  under	  Free	  Competition	  
 	    
Amelia Beech*Galaxy Bow*Engineer (…) Sycamore Sypress
Wawasan*
Emerlad
Wawasan*
Ruby Xena
Vessel%Data
Ship%Size d.w.t 21287 19998 30087 (…) 37622 36677 19800 19908 19908
Fuel%Consumption%(in%transit) ton/day 25 25 30 (…) 30 30 25 25 25
Fuel%Consumption%(in%port) ton/day 15 15 20 (…) 20 20 15 15 15
Average%Speed knots 14 14 14 (…) 14 14 14 14 14
Route
Distance miles 11474 8167 12669 (…) 13821 14565 11225 11035 12672
Cargo d.w.t. 11958 3726 23715 (…) 23147 28797 17500 15500 14163
Freight%Rate $/ton 12 12 12 (…) 12 12 12 12 12
Fuel%Price $/ton 100 100 100 (…) 100 100 100 100 100
Number'of'Berthings:
Houston 1 0 1 (…) 1 1 1 1 1
Other%US%Ports 2 1 1 (…) 2 0 1 0 2
Far%East%Ports 3 2 8 (…) 11 10 3 2 4
Sea%Time days 34 24 38 (…) 41 43 33 33 38
Port%Time days 18 9 30 (…) 42 33 15 9 21
Total%Days days 52 33 68 (…) 83 76 48 42 59
Estimated%days%per%port 3
Estimated%CO2%Emissions Total
Total%Fuel%Consumption%(in%transit) (ton/day%*%days) 854 608 1131 (…) 1234 1300 835 821 943 48785
Total%Fuel%Consumption%(in%port) (ton/day%*%days) 270 135 600 (…) 840 660 225 135 315 18090
CO2%emissions%Factor ton/day 3,17 3,17 3,17 (…) 3,17 3,17 3,17 3,17 3,17 3,17
Total%CO2%Emissions%per%vessel tons 3562 2354 5488 (…) 6575 6215 3361 3031 3987 211994
Total%CO2%Emissions%for%Fleet tons 211994
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Appendix G: Simulated Central Planner 
In this section I have complied the calculations and estimates from the simulated regulated 
market scenario with a central planner. 
Table	  1(G):	  Utilization	  Rate	  under	  Central	  Planner	  
Vessel Name Capacity 
Cargo 
(ton) Utilization 
 
Vessel Name Capacity 
Cargo 
(ton) Utilization 
Amelia 22000 15055 68 % 
 
FPMC 30 54744 0 0 % 
Beech Galaxy 22176 21995 99 % 
 
MR Kentaurus 52489 0 0 % 
Bow Engineer 35563 29244 82 % 
 
Maritime Jingan 52756 0 0 % 
Bow Spring 51084 47748 93 % 
 
NCC Dammam 53313 0 0 % 
Bunga Banyan 53200 33216 62 % 
 
NCC Nasma 53091 0 0 % 
Chembulk Barcelona 36122 30968 86 % 
 
NCC Noor 52425 0 0 % 
Chembulk Virgin Gorda 38861 29002 75 % 
 
Stolt Achievement 41578 0 0 % 
Chemway Lara 46917 44168 94 % 
 
Stolt Emerald 44866 0 0 % 
Fairchem Colt 22184 20797 94 % 
 
Stolt Sapphire 44866 0 0 % 
Fairchem Eagle 28482 27911 98 % 
 
Stolt Sea 24713 0 0 % 
Fairchem Stallion 22184 14262 64 % 
 
Stolt Topaz 44866 0 0 % 
Formosa Thirteen 52428 48860 93 % 
 
Sycamore 40600 0 0 % 
FPMC 24 54744 33483 61 % 
 
Wawasan Emerald 22500 0 0 % 
FPMC 28 53000 31789 60 % 
 
Xena 21651 0 0 % 
Ginga Bobcat 28978 26964 93 % 
     
Ginga Eagle 22996 17113 74 % 
     
Ginga Lion 28837 28100 97 % 
     
Ginga Lynx 28970 21628 75 % 
     
Golden Unity 24725 21694 88 % 
     
Maemi 22761 12992 57 % 
     
Maritime North 52759 52562 100 % 
     
Miramis 18613 15300 82 % 
     
NCC Najem 53000 47332 89 % 
     
Pine Galaxy 21487 11299 53 % 
     
Sichem Onomichi 14064 13044 93 % 
     
Sira 21600 14523 67 % 
     
Siteam Jupiter 51136 41765 82 % 
     
Siteam Leader 52461 39112 75 % 
     
Siteam Neptun 51136 33648 66 % 
     
Siva Ghent 37730 31018 82 % 
     
Stolt Focus 39822 37263 94 % 
     
Stolt Sneland 45155 42830 95 % 
     
Stolt Spray 24717 20000 81 % 
     
Stolt Surf 24705 23269 94 % 
     
Sypress 38475 34351 89 % 
     
Wawasan Ruby 22100 19139 87 % 
     
Total Average     82 % 
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Shown in table 2(G) below is the calculation of total voyage cost for the entire fleet under free 
competition using the calculation method stipulated in appendix E. I have chosen to not 
display all calculations for limitation purposes, however I do believe it will provide you with 
a sufficient understanding of my calculations. 
 
Table	  2(G):	  Voyage	  Cost	  Calculation	  for	  entire	  fleet	  under	  Simulated	  Central	  Planning	  
 
 
 
In a similar matter as the cost calculations above, I have provided a segment of the CO2 
emissions estimates for the entire fleet under a simulated central planning. This is displayed in 
table 3(G) below and is also based on the method of calculation as presented in appendix E. 
 
Amelia Beech Galaxy Bow Engineer (…)
Wawasan 
Emerlad Wawasan Ruby Xena
Vessel Data Total
Ship Size d.w.t 21287 19998 30087 (…) 19800 19908 19908
Fuel Consumption (in transit) ton/day 25 25 30 (…) 25 25 25
Fuel Consumption (in port) ton/day 15 15 20 (…) 15 15 15
Average Speed knots 14 14 14 (…) 14 14 14
Route
Distance miles 11212 10855 10510 (…) 0 10689 0 377 813              
Cargo d.w.t. 15055 21995 29244 (…) 0 19139 0 1 033 442           
Freight Rate $/ton 12 12 12 (…) 12 12 12
Fuel Price $/ton 100 100 100 (…) 100 100 100
Number of Berthings:
Houston 0 1 1 (…) 0 1 0
Other US Ports 3 2 3 (…) 0 4 0
Far East Ports 1 3 1 (…) 0 5 0 152
Sea Time days 33 32 31 (…) 0 32 0 1 124                  
Port Time days 12 18 15 (…) 0 30 0 456                     
Total Days days 45 50 46 (…) 0 62 0 1 580                  
Houston 50 000,00$         
Other US ports 35 000,00$         
Far East Ports 35 000,00$         
Estimated days per port 3
Voyage Cost Calculation
Fuel Cost (transit) 83 422,62$         80 766,37$         93 839,29$             (…) -$                   79 531,25$           -$     
Fuel Cost (port) 18 000,00$         27 000,00$         30 000,00$             (…) -$                   45 000,00$           -$     4 105 123,44$    
Port Cost 140 000,00$       225 000,00$       190 000,00$           (…) -$                   365 000,00$         -$     5 665 000,00$    
Total Voyage Specific Cost 241 422,62$       332 766,37$       313 839,29$           (…) -$                   489 531,25$         -$     9 770 123,44$    
Total Cost Fleet 9 770 123,44$    
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Table	  3(G):	  Estimated	  CO2	  Emissions	  for	  entire	  fleet	  under	  Simulated	  Central	  Planning	  
 
Amelia Beech*Galaxy Bow*Engineer (…) Sycamore Sypress
Wawasan*
Emerlad
Wawasan*
Ruby Xena
Vessel%Data
Ship%Size d.w.t 21287 19998 30087 (…) 37622 36677 19800 19908 19908
Fuel%Consumption%(in%transit) ton/day 25 25 30 (…) 35 30 25 25 25
Fuel%Consumption%(in%port) ton/day 15 15 20 (…) 25 20 15 15 15
Average%Speed knots 14 14 14 (…) 14 14 14 14 14
Route
Distance miles 11212 10855 10510 (…) 0 10678,4 0 10689 0
Cargo d.w.t. 15055 21995 29244 (…) 0 34351 0 19139 0
Freight%Rate $/ton 12 12 12 (…) 12 12 12 12 12
Fuel%Price $/ton 100 100 100 (…) 100 100 100 100 100
Number'of'Berthings:
Houston 0 1 1 (…) 0 1 0 1 0
Other%US%Ports 3 2 3 (…) 0 0 0 4 0
Far%East%Ports 1 3 1 (…) 0 1 0 5 0
Sea%Time days 33 32 31 (…) 0 32 0 32 0
Port%Time days 12 18 15 (…) 0 6 0 30 0
Total%Days days 45 50 46 (…) 0 38 0 62 0
Estimated%days%per%port 3
Estimated%CO2%Emissions Total
Total%Fuel%Consumption%(in%transit)(ton/day%*%days) 834 808 938 (…) 0 953 0 795 0 32%696%%%%%%%%%%
Total%Fuel%Consumption%(in%port) (ton/day%*%days) 180 270 300 (…) 0 120 0 450 0 8%355%%%%%%%%%%%%
CO2%emissions%Factor ton/day 3,17 3,17 3,17 (…) 3,17 3,17 3,17 3,17 3,17 3,17%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Total%CO2%Emissions%per%vessel tons 3215 3416 3926 (…) 0 3403 0 3948 0 130%132%%%%%%%%
Total*CO2*Emissions*for*Fleet tons 130132
